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Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company

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Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company

#11
Really love this post. My favorite line is:

> Every month of less than 20% growth should have been a red flag.

I think that's pretty insightful. 20% growth is great for a normal business, of course; for a VC-backed startup it can show some warning signs about future hard decisions you might have to face.

I think there's certainly lots of discussion that has been had — and should be had — about "should I or shouldn't I raise money?", but there still are plenty of companies and founders who will raise VC, and paying attention to those early warning signs are important if that's the choice you make. It's important to worry about it each month and each week rather than the two months surrounding the raise of your next round.

Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company

#12

Ouch, number 2 employee at Pinterest - a $10 billion company that’s about to go public this year. He probably would have been worth an easy 100-200 million.

I prefer not to do the math.

Your story speaks to my soul. I've never been too attracted to the VC-funded startup life (although I wouldn't pass it up if it was the correct move to grow my business), but reading about your commitment to your users through thick and thin gives me so much more respect for you, and that is a quality I hope to emulate someday.

Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company

#14

Ouch, number 2 employee at Pinterest - a $10 billion company that’s about to go public this year. He probably would have been worth an easy 100-200 million.

I prefer not to do the math.

Haha, sorry didn’t mean to rub it in brother.

But you’re still in an incredibly fortunate situation, and it’s all about the journey anyway.

Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company

#16
post #11

Really love this post. My favorite line is: > Every month of less than 20% growth should have been a red flag. I think that's pretty insightful. 20% growth is great for a normal business, of course; for a VC-backed startup it can show some warning signs about future hard decisions you might have to face. I think there's certainly lots of discussion that has been had — and should be had — about "should I or shouldn't…

These “metrics” are exactly why you see these venture backed SV companies engage in the behavior we saw posted all over the front page of HN yesterday (I.e. silently apply workers tips to their “guaranteed” pay and pocket the difference). But hey it’s an HN/SV unicorn, so there is too much investment that needs to be made back to fail now...and they have the perfect back story, rejected from YC until they personally delivered PG a 6 pack of beer and pretended they had a functional product.

It allows them to continue to make the representations of growth to future investors, the more buy in have from investors, the more you can continue these market/marketing manipulations (e.g. the fyer festival).

Of course the entire SV ethos encourages this behavior: move fast and break things, growth hacking, and fake it till you make it. It’s also built into the system that 9 out of 10 of these scams will fail, but every 10th scam can be offloaded to the public through an IPO.

Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company

#17
post #11

Really love this post. My favorite line is: > Every month of less than 20% growth should have been a red flag. I think that's pretty insightful. 20% growth is great for a normal business, of course; for a VC-backed startup it can show some warning signs about future hard decisions you might have to face. I think there's certainly lots of discussion that has been had — and should be had — about "should I or shouldn't…

Yeah it appears this is a perfectly fine and successful business... it just went through an odd route for someone to figure that out.

Those charts and numbers, all pretty good IMO. If someone came to me and said "Hey I (or we) made this thing here is what it does and the numbers." I'd be all about high fives and such. And yet at times they didn't think so based on the route they went, very interesting.

I always wonder if there is value lost in companies that are shuttered because something isn't the next big hit, or some private equity decides they want to cash out / break up a company that otherwise... would be just fine and would have continued contribute.

Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company

#19

I wasn't interested in the emotional story behind this. But I did resonate with 1 line in particular here: "It doesn’t matter how amazing your product is, or how fast you ship features. The market you’re in will determine most of your growth." This is so true, in my experience. You hit a roadblock in recurring revenue, not because your product doesn't have enough features, or your team sucks, but simply: your market…

I always think of the market as ... all those shitty services and websites I absolutely hate / or just don't like ... that i still use because I want the service.

Arguably they failed to execute some of what they did (their actual app or site) very well, but it doesn't matter, they picked the right market because I can't stop using it even in the face of other things.

Re: Reflecting on My Failure to Build a Billion-Dollar Company

#20
Grateful to read such a personal and detailed post. I had a startup that failed myself, back in the long ago, and in retrospect I'm glad that if failed quickly and cleanly. I admire this alternate path though of working your way to a new equilibrium.

The offer from KPCB to let you off the hook for the venture financing is amazing. Is that a common thing to happen? I get why they just wanted to write it off and be done with it, but it still seems like a generous outcome. An undo button!

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