Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think we agree. And I think Turing's point in choosing a conversation as the test was to pick something that would indicate the vast range of human experience. If a computer could pass a strong version of the test as you describe, then I would agree that we would have say, as you do, "if it looks like a duck, .... then it is a duck." But I don't agree that it renders the concept of conciousness meaningless (or at l…
I'm not so sure that just because you can fool me that an object is a duck, that it is a duck. At least when applied to general AI. Nor do I necessarily agree that just because I can have a conversation with an algorithm, that we should give that algorithm all the rights given to humans. For example, if I say mean things to that algorithm, even one that can fool me into thinking it's another human for decades, is tha…
It absolutely would require that. If you believe in determinism then part of the definition of intelligence, or an intelligent system, is that it exhibits behaviors that are just too complex for a human consciousness to intuitively follow the causal chain. Incidentally, biological intelligence is built on top of some other systems which, given our current levels of understanding, also meet that criterion themselves, so we're pretty clueless about how it works.
Part of this is a definition problem - the Turing Test was defined vaguely enough that everyone has different conceptions. When a person talks about a "good" or "strong" Turing Test, they are envisioning one that would pass all of their personal standards and all the ways they could think of to trick it. And when they talk about it with someone else, who likely envisions a somewhat different version of the test, there seems a tendency for that person to assume that their version would not be passed, so they start to talk past each other.
In other words, if an AI were to consistently surprise you with thoughtfulness, compassion, creativity, or whatever other constituents of "true intelligence" you assume the duck imposter would lack, would you then confer it those rights?
I think you would, because that's the point: it has thoroughly convinced you that it is "thinking", and you feel like it truly "understands" you - frankly a higher bar than many rights-granted humans would pass.
What separates animals that deserve human-level rights from those that don't? Would you argue that all animals do? If not, I would say that that distinction is no less arbitrary than the one you're drawing at the end.