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Response by Ray Kurzweil to chatbot Eugene Goostman “passing the Turing test”

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Re: Response by Ray Kurzweil to chatbot Eugene Goostman “passing the Turing test”

#121
post #90
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think we agree. And I think Turing's point in choosing a conversation as the test was to pick something that would indicate the vast range of human experience. If a computer could pass a strong version of the test as you describe, then I would agree that we would have say, as you do, "if it looks like a duck, .... then it is a duck." But I don't agree that it renders the concept of conciousness meaningless (or at l…

I'm not so sure that just because you can fool me that an object is a duck, that it is a duck. At least when applied to general AI. Nor do I necessarily agree that just because I can have a conversation with an algorithm, that we should give that algorithm all the rights given to humans. For example, if I say mean things to that algorithm, even one that can fool me into thinking it's another human for decades, is tha…

To be honest, I'm not entirely sure how to define consciousness in this regard, but I suspect it would require surprising its creators to the point that they cannot fathom how it behaved the way it did.

It absolutely would require that. If you believe in determinism then part of the definition of intelligence, or an intelligent system, is that it exhibits behaviors that are just too complex for a human consciousness to intuitively follow the causal chain. Incidentally, biological intelligence is built on top of some other systems which, given our current levels of understanding, also meet that criterion themselves, so we're pretty clueless about how it works.

Part of this is a definition problem - the Turing Test was defined vaguely enough that everyone has different conceptions. When a person talks about a "good" or "strong" Turing Test, they are envisioning one that would pass all of their personal standards and all the ways they could think of to trick it. And when they talk about it with someone else, who likely envisions a somewhat different version of the test, there seems a tendency for that person to assume that their version would not be passed, so they start to talk past each other.

In other words, if an AI were to consistently surprise you with thoughtfulness, compassion, creativity, or whatever other constituents of "true intelligence" you assume the duck imposter would lack, would you then confer it those rights?

I think you would, because that's the point: it has thoroughly convinced you that it is "thinking", and you feel like it truly "understands" you - frankly a higher bar than many rights-granted humans would pass.

What separates animals that deserve human-level rights from those that don't? Would you argue that all animals do? If not, I would say that that distinction is no less arbitrary than the one you're drawing at the end.

Re: Response by Ray Kurzweil to chatbot Eugene Goostman “passing the Turing test”

#122

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Fooling people into mistaking a submarine for a whale doesn't show that submarines really swim Why not? Presumably part of the act of fooling would involve 'swimming' submarines. I think passing a __strong__ Turing test actually does say something about our brains, cognition, and consciousness. And by a 'strong Turing test', I don't mean dinky 5 minute tests with a "Ukrainian boy". Imagine you carry on a 20 year rel…

There are a few problems with this line of reasoning. First, that there is an implicit assumption about how cognition and consciousness are defined, but there is no real definition. Following the example, it's not defined what a duck is, and "philosophers" actually don't try to elevate the question - they try to find answers to it. While a "strong" test for example would look appealing, the problem is that there is n…

>First, that there is an implicit assumption about how cognition and consciousness are defined, but there is no real definition.

And yet volumes are written on the topic, and you have no trouble dismissing this particular approach as not really answering "consciousness". Well what do you mean exactly then?

>and while a human would pass all the possible models of humanity, a computer would surely pass only the ones it's programmed for.

I don't agree with either the first nor the second assumption a priori. Would a schizophrenic, or autistic or infant brain pass "all the possible models of humanity". And second, why would a computer pass only the models it was programmed for?! We know that isn't true with today's software and today's AI. IBM's Watson wasn't programmed with every single fact it used to win Jeopardy, nor is any rudimentary video game AI programmed with a specific set of behaviors that it executes regardless of player actions. If you want to go deeper, I can also claim the human brain itself was shaped by natural selection for a finite and very specific set of tasks, and the neural machinery is as deterministic as software since both are subject to the fundamental laws. So tell me why can't software simulate human behaviour again?

>Another thing is that in order for a computer to truly mimic a human, that is, to fool people for 20 years about movies/music/sports/family/relationships, but also other abstract experiences, the computer would need to experience them

No necessarily. It can lie. Or it can live them by ingesting huge amounts of information from digital content, or maybe it was trained in a lab or adopted by a family and raised like a human. Whatever.

> and especially, elaborate them in a human way.

Define "human way", because that's the entire point. I don't see intrinsically why such a computer program could not be built. What's so special about the "human way".

>You can achieve it in a static picture, but once you freely move in a 3D world, you see the flaws that show that what you're experiencing in reality is a limited set of limited algorithms, which are used to workaround hard problems

And you base this on what? I mean you're just asserting it can't be done, why? Because human brains are powered by magic!?

>I think exactly the same arguments stand, that is, in order to mimic a human in such a high level of faithfulness, very hard problems would need to be solved, not just worked around.

I'm not sure what the difference is between solving problems and merely working around them, in your context. But yes, we're not there yet, obviously. I think the Turing test is actually deeper than most people give it credit to be. And you illustrate this perfectly. All your objections are hand-wavy appeals to some vague notions of the "human way".

Re: Response by Ray Kurzweil to chatbot Eugene Goostman “passing the Turing test”

#123
post #118
post #116

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Imagine such a computer program fooling every human it interacts with for decades at a time, I think that would say something about ourselves and I think it would render the question of consciousness meaningless. Maybe we're operating with different notions of "the question of consciousness", but I have to disagree that a perfect simulation of a human mind would dissolve the problem. And by "the problem" I mean the…

to have a first-person subjective experience You actually can't prove _anybody else in the world_ besides you has a first person subjective experience. Trying to prove a magic talking box has experience when you can't prove another moist robot has experience is moving the goalpost too far out. require a paradigm shift so radical Not really, we just need more high speed training data. It'll all be available to way too…

> Trying to prove a magic talking box has experience when you can't prove another moist robot has experience is moving the goalpost too far out.

Maybe I'm just confused about what goals we're talking about. If your goal is to understand cognition, then sure; a highly intelligent machine is a great way to do that. However, the comment I replied to was suggesting that strong AI would "render the question of consciousness meaningless"; that's a far stronger claim, and in my opinion, unrealistic. I think you and I are actually in agreement on this one... if anything, I was arguing against A.I. having the goalpost of understanding subjective experience.

Re: Response by Ray Kurzweil to chatbot Eugene Goostman “passing the Turing test”

#124
post #116

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Fooling people into mistaking a submarine for a whale doesn't show that submarines really swim Why not? Presumably part of the act of fooling would involve 'swimming' submarines. I think passing a __strong__ Turing test actually does say something about our brains, cognition, and consciousness. And by a 'strong Turing test', I don't mean dinky 5 minute tests with a "Ukrainian boy". Imagine you carry on a 20 year rel…

> Imagine such a computer program fooling every human it interacts with for decades at a time, I think that would say something about ourselves and I think it would render the question of consciousness meaningless. Maybe we're operating with different notions of "the question of consciousness", but I have to disagree that a perfect simulation of a human mind would dissolve the problem. And by "the problem" I mean the…

>Maybe we're operating with different notions of "the question of consciousness", but I have to disagree that a perfect simulation of a human mind would dissolve the problem.

Because human brains are magic?

> And by "the problem" I mean the Hard Problem of Consciousness, the issue of how the hell the subjective experience of being arises in a lump of bloody meat (or in anything, really).

You have your answer, the effect of consciousness clearly arises from physical matter that is subject to natural laws of physics and shaped blindly by natural selection. That should tell you that it is quite possible. For example, for a related concept of Free Will, I think we can confidently say that for all intents and purposes we don't have any, and yet our brains produce a very powerful subjective feeling of having it. This is why I think Consciousness is a much simpler problem than it really is. We have a cognitive bias for seeing the world in a very specific way, just as we have a cognitive bias in visualizing 3-dimensional spaces and we have incredible problems visualizing higher dimensions (heck, we can't even visualize a 2-D or 1-D space without embedding it in a 3-D space).

Consciousness and free will are very powerful illusions hard-wired into our brains, unless you think the particles that make us up, somehow don't follow deterministic (or random in case of QM) natural laws?

Re: Response by Ray Kurzweil to chatbot Eugene Goostman “passing the Turing test”

#125
post #94
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My big takeaway from the Chomsky quote is that it's useless to ask if computers can think because one of the fundamental properties we associate with thinking is some biological/spiritual aspect. For a computer to "think", we'd need to redefine what we mean by think. And if we have to redefine what it means to think, why bother hailing it as an accomplishment to make a computer "think". The properties are incredibly…

> we associate with thinking is some biological/spiritual aspect Well I don't. > The fact that we have different words for "think", "compute", and "calculate" Also my native language (Finnish) doesn't have separate words for "compute" and calculate". Both are covered by "laskea". (Also "suorittaa" is used, but that is "execute".)

But you do have a different word for "think", right?

Google Translate shows multiple, but these three seem most applicable:

  ajatella: propose, consider, think about, weigh, cogitate, think
  miettiä: think about, think, consider, reflect, contemplate, ponder
  luulla: think, believe, suppose, imagine, expect, suspect
The difference between "think" and "compute" is the important distinction being made, and I tend to agree that moving the goal posts does nothing to help decide whether a computer is really capable of thought.

Re: Response by Ray Kurzweil to chatbot Eugene Goostman “passing the Turing test”

#126
post #123
post #118

Earlier quoted context omitted.

to have a first-person subjective experience You actually can't prove _anybody else in the world_ besides you has a first person subjective experience. Trying to prove a magic talking box has experience when you can't prove another moist robot has experience is moving the goalpost too far out. require a paradigm shift so radical Not really, we just need more high speed training data. It'll all be available to way too…

> Trying to prove a magic talking box has experience when you can't prove another moist robot has experience is moving the goalpost too far out. Maybe I'm just confused about what goals we're talking about. If your goal is to understand cognition, then sure; a highly intelligent machine is a great way to do that. However, the comment I replied to was suggesting that strong AI would "render the question of consciousne…

strong AI would "render the question of consciousness meaningless"; that's a far stronger claim, and in my opinion, unrealistic.

That's actually a great point many people misunderstand, largely due to nobody pinning down a definition for "Strong AI."

I prefer the term "computational consciousness" instead of Strong AI. It gets the point across better about future AI actually _thinking_ and _experiencing_ instead of having people misconceive AI as just a clever if/else decision tree.

Strong/Hard AI (and human consciousness) is a combinations of algorithms and data. People have hard-wired algorithms for processing data from their senses. Some people have better hard-wired algorithms than others. But, if you take the smartest person alive today back in time and raise them in an isolated environment (i.e. limit their data intake), they won't be the same person and they won't be able to think the same thoughts.

Summary: AI = mostly data, with algorithms to help organize/cluster/recall things. You can't have recall and intent of agency without a self-directed consciousness controlling the internal stateexternal world feedback gradient.

Re: Response by Ray Kurzweil to chatbot Eugene Goostman “passing the Turing test”

#127
post #94

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> we associate with thinking is some biological/spiritual aspect Well I don't. > The fact that we have different words for "think", "compute", and "calculate" Also my native language (Finnish) doesn't have separate words for "compute" and calculate". Both are covered by "laskea". (Also "suorittaa" is used, but that is "execute".)

But you do have a different word for "think", right? Google Translate shows multiple, but these three seem most applicable: ajatella: propose, consider, think about, weigh, cogitate, think miettiä: think about, think, consider, reflect, contemplate, ponder luulla: think, believe, suppose, imagine, expect, suspect The difference between "think" and "compute" is the important distinction being made, and I tend to agree…

> But you do have a different word for "think", right?

Yes, sure.

Re: Response by Ray Kurzweil to chatbot Eugene Goostman “passing the Turing test”

#128
post #116

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Imagine such a computer program fooling every human it interacts with for decades at a time, I think that would say something about ourselves and I think it would render the question of consciousness meaningless. Maybe we're operating with different notions of "the question of consciousness", but I have to disagree that a perfect simulation of a human mind would dissolve the problem. And by "the problem" I mean the…

>Maybe we're operating with different notions of "the question of consciousness", but I have to disagree that a perfect simulation of a human mind would dissolve the problem. Because human brains are magic? > And by "the problem" I mean the Hard Problem of Consciousness, the issue of how the hell the subjective experience of being arises in a lump of bloody meat (or in anything, really). You have your answer, the eff…

> Because human brains are magic?

See, this is the problem with this virulent strain of Scientism making the rounds right now. There's this tendency to divide ideas into two camps: "explained by our current understanding of physics" and "magic". It seems like a knee-jerk reaction to religion, like anyone that posits that we don't have a complete understanding of reality is therefore a crypto-theist. It completely misunderstands the nature of scientific progress, the evolution of our conceptions of reality in response to empirical evidence.

It's easy to picture human progress as millennia of trudging through continually-decreasing ignorance and finally arriving at the Correct Answers, but this can be a dangerous view. Science works best when we aren't constrained by dogma -- when we're allowed to "think outside the box" and consider the world in new and revolutionary ways.

People in the thrall of this Scientism often act like raising the Hard Problem of Consciousness is some kind of intellectual weakness, that we're just not able to "get over" the fact that subjective experience happens to emerge from physical matter. Nobody here (or at least not me) is saying that the Hard Problem means that subjective experience is "magic" or that we have anthropomorphic souls that float up to heaven with angel wings when we die. The Hard Problem of Consciousness is still a scientific problem, and I'm not saying it can't be solved by science. But telling me that Strong AI will basically solve this issue (and that any protestation is an appeal to "magic") comes across as hand-waving; the simulation of a conscious entity does not help me understand why being in the world feels like anything.

Re: Response by Ray Kurzweil to chatbot Eugene Goostman “passing the Turing test”

#129
post #75

I already created a bot that would pass the Turing Test, according to these specifications anyway: S: Hi Josiah, I'm Steven. What do you like to do? J: S: Josiah, are you there? J: J: uhqtuhq a S: Excuse me? J:

Strong AI confirmed, alert the press.

Re: Response by Ray Kurzweil to chatbot Eugene Goostman “passing the Turing test”

#130
post #94
post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My big takeaway from the Chomsky quote is that it's useless to ask if computers can think because one of the fundamental properties we associate with thinking is some biological/spiritual aspect. For a computer to "think", we'd need to redefine what we mean by think. And if we have to redefine what it means to think, why bother hailing it as an accomplishment to make a computer "think". The properties are incredibly…

> we associate with thinking is some biological/spiritual aspect Well I don't. > The fact that we have different words for "think", "compute", and "calculate" Also my native language (Finnish) doesn't have separate words for "compute" and calculate". Both are covered by "laskea". (Also "suorittaa" is used, but that is "execute".)

So the words for a calculator (small electronic device used to do mathematics, usually arithmetic) and the word for computer (like a general purpose desktop computer, the thing that runs and OS like Apple OS X or Microsoft Windows 8) are the same? I'm assuming that you do have a different word for think though as you didn't mention that.

What about arvioida? Would that be used for compute?

This might be an instances where the Sapir Whorf hypothesis (linguistic relativity, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sapir_Whorf) comes in to play. The idea would be that you don't consider computing and calculating to differ from thought because the [primary] language you use [or grew up using] doesn't make that differentiation.

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