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It doesn't use player tendencies, it plays closer to Nash equilibrium than the human players, AFAIK.
Yes it does. The Libratus bot uses a conterfactual regret minimization algorithm variant of the CMUs teams' own design to calculate endgame strategy. The inputs to that algorithm explicitly takes into account previous player behavior.
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A better AI should be able to fool the opponent into thinking it has thrown rock (metaphorically) so that the opponent throws paper while the AI instead throws scissors. Poker isn't about equilibrium, it's about misdirection and exploitation. When the table gets cold, you liven it up by convincing everyone to do a round of straddle.
Heads up poker is precisely about equilibrium. Your straddle reference is also irrelevant, this is not live multiway poker. "Tricking an opponent into thinking it has metaphorically thrown rock" extrapolated into a poker example would be betting larger/smaller, calling more/less, folding more/less than is optimal in a given scenario in the hope that your opponent makes a (bigger) mistake. You're simply hoping he make…
I agree that would not happen if two equilibrium-seeking computers played each other. Since the human strategy is unknown, it is possible that equilibrium may not exist or be optimal. Even if it's two computers, if one of the computers has the possibility of choosing a non-equilibrium strategy, then again the optimal strategy may not be to seek equilibrium.
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You misunderstood "a solution" to mean the only optimal solution. Also, note that Nash equilibrium assumes the opponent does not change strategy. Once you relax that assumption, especially with the idea that you can induce change , another strategy becomes viable. Check out the "Occurrence" section in the article you linked to.
A Nash equilibrium strategy does not assume that an opponents strategy never changes. A Nash equilibrium has the property that if the opponents strategy deviates from a Nash equilibrium, then the opponent will lose.
Nash equilibrium may not exist if one of the players follows, say, a Markov switching process. If that process causes the opponent to stop seeking equilibrium or to settle into a false equilibrium, then the switching process may have been a better strategy than seeking equilibrium.