The Bomb Didn't Beat Japan

Yes, later Leahy apparently said, "It is my opinion," not, "At the time we all believed" ["that the Japanese were defeated and ready to surrender...."]

I'm willing to believe that some, maybe including Leahy, thought the US had only to stand back and wait for the inevitable surrender, with no ratcheting up of force necessary. But, at the same time, somebody [not including the Fleet Admiral?] was also preparing for a full boots-on-the-ground invasion of the Japanese mainland, which (going by the US death tolls of previous island invasions) would have sent thousands of Americans to their deaths.

Unless that invasion plan was entirely fake--something nobody is suggesting--there were obviously plenty of people at the top who thought that the Japanese might not be ready to surrender.

Suddenly a middle option appeared between just waiting and hoping and sending thousands of Americans to their deaths: drop atomic bombs. Even though an atom bomb would actually kill fewer people than the firebombings, it would represent an even greater threat of what could happen if they didn't surrender immediately.

Maybe the Japanese were about to surrender. Maybe they would keep fighting and Americans would keep dying. Maybe the atom bombs would convince them to surrender. Or maybe not. Maybe nothing short of a full invasion would be required. Maybe even that wouldn't be enough to end it quickly, and the dying would continue for a very long time. The Japanese in many places had gone on fighting until they were dead without ever surrendering.

In that context, with no benefit of hindsight, to say that the bomb was not dropped to win the war but just to intimidate the USSR is nonsense.

His argument seems to come down to this 3 day delay between Hiroshima and the Supreme Council meeting. He is not looking at this through the lens of the Supreme Council, or even any Japanese citizen.

Remember: this is the first use of the atomic weapon in front of the entire world in human history. As far as the Japanese were concerned, on August 6, 1945 the sky suddenly lit on fire and destroyed an entire city in seconds. To the mind of 1945, this event was indistinguishable from magic. He cites many examples of military emergencies inciting a quick response but none on the level of total, wholesale destruction like the atomic bomb. Indeed, the atomic bomb was completely unprecedented in all of human history.

It is therefore not completely mysterious why the Supreme Council would initially not know what to do. They would be a) in a state of complete confusion b) in a state of complete defeat and c) trying to shore up the nation after what must have appeared like a supernatural force leveling an entire city and killing many, many thousands of people.

" Japan had a nuclear weapons program. Several of the military men mention the fact that it was a nuclear weapon that destroyed Hiroshima in their diaries. General Anami Korechika, minster of war, even went to consult with the head of the Japanese nuclear weapons program on the night of August 7. The idea that Japan's leaders didn't know about nuclear weapons doesn't hold up."

As for your " none on the level of total, wholesale destruction like the atomic bomb":

" if you graph the number of people killed in all 68 cities bombed in the summer of 1945, you find that Hiroshima was second in terms of civilian deaths. If you chart the number of square miles destroyed, you find that Hiroshima was fourth. If you chart the percentage of the city destroyed, Hiroshima was 17th. Hiroshima was clearly within the parameters of the conventional attacks carried out that summer."

In other words, there is nothing to suggest any of the state of shock that you suggest would prevent them from meeting earlier.