Live data from Hacker News

Internal FBI risk assessment of Bitcoin network [pdf]

wired.com

111–120 of 152 posts

Re: Internal FBI risk assessment of Bitcoin network [pdf]

#111
post #108
post #106

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It makes it a little harder to prove. If you do something sketchy and get bitcoins in wallet 1, and then buy something from wallet 1, people will see that the same wallet that did something sketchy also bought something. On the other hand, if you move bitcoins from wallet 1 to wallet 2, then do the buying from wallet 2, there's some separation and people aren't sure if it's the same person.

This is suggesting doing something sketchy with 1 and then moving it and 2 and 3 to 4. You can improve your odds of evading detection by moving things around a bit, yes, but most applications I'm aware of will simply move them all in a single transaction. There have also been some fairly large-scale network analysis papers showing linked accounts and the flow of e.g. one big theft a while back - unless you run it thr…

Think about it as cash: if someone knows that serial #AAAA was stolen, and then later you deposit that bill at a bank, they still have no idea if you are the person who stole it. It could have gone through any number of hands. I think I see your point about mixers though.

Re: Internal FBI risk assessment of Bitcoin network [pdf]

#112
post #111
post #108

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is suggesting doing something sketchy with 1 and then moving it and 2 and 3 to 4. You can improve your odds of evading detection by moving things around a bit, yes, but most applications I'm aware of will simply move them all in a single transaction. There have also been some fairly large-scale network analysis papers showing linked accounts and the flow of e.g. one big theft a while back - unless you run it thr…

Think about it as cash: if someone knows that serial #AAAA was stolen, and then later you deposit that bill at a bank, they still have no idea if you are the person who stole it. It could have gone through any number of hands. I think I see your point about mixers though.

It couldn't have gone through any number of hands - Bitcoin transactions are public. You can see every hand it has gone through, though you may not (or may!) know the owner of the hand. That's why any large-scale analysis can be dangerous to such actions - if you discover the intermediaries, you can start drawing conclusions about who performed actions.

edit: here's the main article I'm aware of http://anonymity-in-bitcoin.blogspot.com/2011/07/bitcoin-is-...

Re: Internal FBI risk assessment of Bitcoin network [pdf]

#113
post #77

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What about bitcoin tumbling services? They obscure transactions quickly and cheaply.

Obscure being the key word. There's no proof of security there, right?

Obscuring isn't the method.. it's the goal. The question is how obscure do they make things.

Re: Internal FBI risk assessment of Bitcoin network [pdf]

#114
post #109
post #54

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The only? Greece may be collapsing. To say that other Euro countries are also collapsing would at this point be hyperbole.

Spain's economy is headed for a depression, Ireland's credit is shot after their bailout, Portugal collapsed almost immediately and is suffering high unemployment even after a bailout, Cyprus's credit rating is junk and they've applied for a bailout. So it's not just Greece. Several other countries were headed for trouble but seem to have things under control now: Italy, Belgium, France, the UK, Switzerland, Germany,…

That’s not collapse in any sense of the word.

Even if I were to agree with you on the collapse, that’s not all Euro countries. Germany, for example, had never any problems or trouble that could by any sane person be described as collapse.

Re: Internal FBI risk assessment of Bitcoin network [pdf]

#115
post #110
post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The network doesn't automatically obfuscate transactions, but it's easy to do using tumbling services.

If the FBI were following a trail involving my wallet, I would also want to avoid being linked to the tumbling services.

I suppose the question is how recognizable are tumbling services? Do they create new wallets regularly, and does the resulting traffic leave a fuzzy line between what is "in" the service and what is "out"? It could be that using a tumbling service looks fairly similar to giving money to somebody/somebodies who themselves uses the service.

Re: Internal FBI risk assessment of Bitcoin network [pdf]

#116
post #114
post #109

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Spain's economy is headed for a depression, Ireland's credit is shot after their bailout, Portugal collapsed almost immediately and is suffering high unemployment even after a bailout, Cyprus's credit rating is junk and they've applied for a bailout. So it's not just Greece. Several other countries were headed for trouble but seem to have things under control now: Italy, Belgium, France, the UK, Switzerland, Germany,…

That’s not collapse in any sense of the word. Even if I were to agree with you on the collapse, that’s not all Euro countries. Germany, for example, had never any problems or trouble that could by any sane person be described as collapse.

CBS says it's a collapse. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-57406006/spains-colla...

Re: Internal FBI risk assessment of Bitcoin network [pdf]

#117

Given that Bitcoin records all transactions for posterity, and given the ongoing rise of "big data" analytics, I'd say Bitcoin is likely to be harder , in the long run, to use for shenanigans. A government currency has forms in which transactions create no paper trail. Bitcoin does not. Really the big disruption Bitcoin could cause if it becomes well established, is to act as a stable reference frame against which th…

Really the big disruption Bitcoin could cause if it becomes well established, is to act as a stable reference frame against which the other currencies can be compared

What would make it any more (or less) stable than the traditional reference currencies of gold, ammo, and canned baked beans?

Re: Internal FBI risk assessment of Bitcoin network [pdf]

#118
post #108
post #106

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It makes it a little harder to prove. If you do something sketchy and get bitcoins in wallet 1, and then buy something from wallet 1, people will see that the same wallet that did something sketchy also bought something. On the other hand, if you move bitcoins from wallet 1 to wallet 2, then do the buying from wallet 2, there's some separation and people aren't sure if it's the same person.

This is suggesting doing something sketchy with 1 and then moving it and 2 and 3 to 4. You can improve your odds of evading detection by moving things around a bit, yes, but most applications I'm aware of will simply move them all in a single transaction. There have also been some fairly large-scale network analysis papers showing linked accounts and the flow of e.g. one big theft a while back - unless you run it thr…

What would stop me from creating a thousand (or a million) wallets, and just randomly shuffling money between them a thousand times per day, creating a visibility of activity?

As long as you control all the wallets, the money is still yours.

Re: Internal FBI risk assessment of Bitcoin network [pdf]

#119

"All Bitcoin transactions are published online and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses are linked to the public Bitcoin transactions." How are IP addresses linked to the block chain?

Well, presumably if you infiltrate the P2P network, you can catch the transaction at its source?

Re: Internal FBI risk assessment of Bitcoin network [pdf]

#120
post #64
post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Given that Bitcoin records all transactions for posterity, and given the ongoing rise of "big data" analytics, I'd say Bitcoin is likely to be harder, in the long run, to use for shenanigans. A government currency has forms in which transactions create no paper trail. Bitcoin does not. I did some research on anonymity (mentioned in that document); I find it hard to project how private Bitcoin will be in future. Our…

It seems that to do shenanigans with Bitcoin would require the same care to avoid information leakage that would be required to do similar things with global digital payment networks and banks. The key would be to begin by considering any address linked to an identity that is you or related to you "dirty," and to be careful about avoiding linkage to any of those dirty addresses. To really be careful I think you'd hav…

If they were to automate some big system that cycles money among new addresses throughout the network while preserving ownership, then any address connected with someone would be instantly emptied and its money mixed in with numerous unknown addresses.

Unless you intend to prosecute everyone who spends BTC that was ever connected with a "known, even address" (which could very well be an option they take!), anonymity and laundering capability is preserved.

Post reply on HN