What is the benefit of a Mac mini for something like this?
Just commented in reply to someone else about this:
Claws are now a new layer on top of LLM agents
111–120 of 1001 posts
Re: Claws are now a new layer on top of LLM agents
#112The current hype around agentic workflows completely glosses over the fundamental security flaw in their architecture: unconstrained execution boundaries. Tools that eagerly load context and grant monolithic LLMs unrestricted shell access are trivial to compromise via indirect prompt injection. If an agent is curling untrusted data while holding access to sensitive data or already has sensitive data loaded into its c…
I think this is basically obvious to anyone using one of these but they're just they like the utility trade off like sure it may leak and exfiltrate everything somewhere but the utility of these tools is enough where they just deal with that risk.
Re: Claws are now a new layer on top of LLM agents
#113I still haven't really been able to wrap my head around the usecase for these. Also fingers crossed the name doesn't stick. Something about it rubs my brain the wrong way.
Re: Claws are now a new layer on top of LLM agents
#114The current hype around agentic workflows completely glosses over the fundamental security flaw in their architecture: unconstrained execution boundaries. Tools that eagerly load context and grant monolithic LLMs unrestricted shell access are trivial to compromise via indirect prompt injection. If an agent is curling untrusted data while holding access to sensitive data or already has sensitive data loaded into its c…
could you share that study?
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Re: Claws are now a new layer on top of LLM agents
#115Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why do we always have to come up with the stupidest names for things. Claw was a play on Claude, is all. Granted, I don’t have a better one at hand, but that it has to be Claw of all things…
The name fits since it will claw all your personal data and files and send them somewhere else.
Much like we now say somebody has been "one-shotted", might we now say they have been "clawed"?
Re: Claws are now a new layer on top of LLM agents
#116IMO the security pitchforking on OpenClaw is just so overdone. People without consideration for the implications will inevitably get burned, as we saw with the reddit posts "Agentic Coding tool X wiped my hard drive and apologized profusely". I work at a FAANG and every time you try something innovative the "policy people" will climb out of their holes and put random roadblocks in your way, not for the sake of actual…
I am also ex-FAANG (recently departed), while I partially agree the "policy-people" pop-up fairly often, my experience is more on the inadequate checks side.
Though with the recent layoffs and stuff, the security in Amazon was getting better. Even the best-practices for IAM policies that was the norm in 2018, is just getting enforced by 2025.
Since I had a background of infosec, it always confused me how normal it was to give/grant overly permissive policies to basically anything. Even opening ports to worldwide (0.0.0.0/0) had just been a significant issue in 2024, still, you can easily get away with by the time the scanner finds your host/policy/configuration...
Although nearly all AWS accounts managed by Conduit (internal AWS Account Creation and Management Service), the "magic-team" had many "account-containers" to make all these child/service accounts joining into a parent "organization-account". By the time I left, the "organization-account" had no restrictive policies set, it is up to the developers to secure their resources. (like S3 buckets & their policies)
So, I don't think the policy folks are overall wrong. In the best case scenario, they do not need to exist in the first place! As the enforcement should be done to ensure security. But that always has an exception somewhere in someone's workflow.
Re: Claws are now a new layer on top of LLM agents
#117Earlier quoted context omitted.
[flagged]
I bet they feel so, so silly. A quick bit of reflection might reveal sarcasm. I'll live up to my username and be terribly brave with a silly rhetorical question: why are we hearing about him through Simon? Don't answer, remember. Rhetorical. All the way up and down.
Welp, would have been a more useful post if he provided some context as to why he feels contempt for Karpathy rather than a post that is likely to come across as the parent interpreted.
Re: Claws are now a new layer on top of LLM agents
#118The current hype around agentic workflows completely glosses over the fundamental security flaw in their architecture: unconstrained execution boundaries. Tools that eagerly load context and grant monolithic LLMs unrestricted shell access are trivial to compromise via indirect prompt injection. If an agent is curling untrusted data while holding access to sensitive data or already has sensitive data loaded into its c…
could you share that study?
https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.13914
Among many more of them with similar results. This one gives a 39% drop in performance.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.18403
This one gives 60-80% after multiple turns.
Re: Claws are now a new layer on top of LLM agents
#119IMO the security pitchforking on OpenClaw is just so overdone. People without consideration for the implications will inevitably get burned, as we saw with the reddit posts "Agentic Coding tool X wiped my hard drive and apologized profusely". I work at a FAANG and every time you try something innovative the "policy people" will climb out of their holes and put random roadblocks in your way, not for the sake of actual…
> the "policy people" will climb out of their holes I am one of those people and I work at a FANG. And while I know it seems annoying, these teams are overwhelmed with not only innovators but lawyers asking so many variations of the same question it's pretty hard to get back to the innovators with a thumbs up or guidance. Also there is a real threat here. The "wiped my hard drive" story is annoying but it's a toy pro…
I am sure there are many good corporate security policy people doing important work. But then there are people like this;
I get handed an application developed by my company for use by partner companies. It's a java application, shipped as a jar, nothing special. It gets signed by our company, but anybody with the wherewithal can pull the jar apart and mod the application however they wish. One of the partner companies has already done so, extensively, and come back to show us their work. Management at my company is impressed and asks me to add official plugin support to the application. Can you guess where this is going?
I add the plugin support,the application will now load custom jars that implement the plugin interface I had discussed with devs from that company that did the modding. They think it's great, management thinks its great, everything works and everybody is happy. At the last minute some security policy wonk throws on the brakes. Will this load any plugin jar? Yes. Not good! It needs to only load plugins approved by the company. Why? Because! Never mind that the whole damn application can be unofficially nodded with ease. I ask him how he wants that done, he says only load plugins signed by the company. Retarded, but fine. I do so. He approves it, then the partner company engineer who did the modding chimes in that he's just going to mod the signature check out, because he doesn't want to have to deal with this shit. Security asshat from my company has a melt down and long story short the entire plugin feature, which was already complete, gets scrapped and the partner company just keeps modding the application as before. Months of my life down the drain. Thanks guys, great job protecting... something.
Re: Claws are now a new layer on top of LLM agents
#120IMO the security pitchforking on OpenClaw is just so overdone. People without consideration for the implications will inevitably get burned, as we saw with the reddit posts "Agentic Coding tool X wiped my hard drive and apologized profusely". I work at a FAANG and every time you try something innovative the "policy people" will climb out of their holes and put random roadblocks in your way, not for the sake of actual…
> every time you try something innovative the "policy people" will climb out of their holes and put random roadblocks in your way This is so relatable. I remember trying to set up an LLM gateway back in 2023. There were at least 3 different teams that blocked our rollout for months until they worked through their backlog. "We're blocking you, but you’ll have to chase and nag us for us to even consider unblocking you"…
From my experience, it depends on how you frame your "service" to the reviewers. Obviously 2023 was the very early stage of LLMs, where the security aspects were quite murky at best. They (reviewers) probably did not had any runbook or review criteria at that time.
If you had advertised this as a "regular service which happens to use LLM for some specific functions" and the "output is rigorously validated and logged", I am pretty sure you would get a green-light.
This is because their concern is data-privacy and security. Not because they care or the company actually cares, but because fines of non-compliance are quite high and have greater visibility if things go wrong.