Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel • Hacker News Board

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#111

Post by vokep » Thu, May 30, 2019, 10:46 PM UTC

fwip wrote: post #46

petters wrote: post #43

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You can have the camera record metadata as well, like focus settings and super speed. That will make it harder.

And you can build a camera that lies about this.

True, but today you also can hire a lookalike to some target person and record footage of them doing something terrible, or edit footage carefully enough that the edit cannot be detected.

Deepfake makes it less expensive to create fake video of someone, special signing cameras could make it expensive again in the face of that.

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#112

Post by vokep » Thu, May 30, 2019, 10:57 PM UTC

BlueTemplar wrote: post #26

_red wrote: post #8

I would imagine that in the future video encoders will start to automatically include a cryptographic signature every X frames, which then players will become aware of and show an indicator for "original / modified" content.

Yep, this might make Intel-style rootkit+DRM legally mandatory... welcome to 1984 ! :(

So then.....how do we start hobbyist chip-fab@home?

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#113

Post by vokep » Thu, May 30, 2019, 11:03 PM UTC

cr0sh wrote: post #78

kittiepryde wrote: post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm thinking that we'd need an Originality Authority (like a CA), to act as the anchor. I assume anyone could just strip the cryptographic signature and then re-sign it with their own signature, and we'd need an authority to prevent that. Upload your content, request a key you can sign with, the OA checks against previously registered content in it's database for originality (I can only assume this would be as buggy…

I wonder if it'd be possible to "deepfake" the crypto sigs...?

It should be entirely unfeasible if its good crypto

In order to deepfake it, a neural net would have to understand the crypto algo in such a way it could modify its deepfake input to collide with the original input's hash. Basically it would need to reverse the crypto to generate all frames that evaluate to a certain hash, and then find one that is mostly similar to the intended input.

I don't think it will be realistic at all, if even theoretically possible.

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#114

Post by robotzero » Thu, May 30, 2019, 11:32 PM UTC

redisman wrote: post #108

One thing I don't see talked about much is the Uncanny Valley. No other technology has made it past it and looking at these they definitely have not either. Is there any reason to think that "deepfakes" will leapfrog it somehow?

I can't say that though... had these videos been sent to me and it was mentioned "Arnold lost weight" or "Brad Pitt reshot the scene after shedding some pounds" I'd have probably been less of a sceptic and in a quick pass this "fake news" could have got a pass from me or others. It's an interesting time and if you're doing cursory browsing of news bites for the day this may fly right past...

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#115

Post by fuzz4lyfe » Fri, May 31, 2019, 12:37 AM UTC

pessimizer wrote: post #94

xienze wrote: post #72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> So you're arguing that at some point in the future, nobody will give even the slightest credence to amateur footage captured on camera phones I think that's the end goal of all the "deep fake" hysteria we're being primed with. In the future if some damning video of a politician or other elite member of society pops up the defense will simply be "well you can't rule out that it's a fake, look, it's not signed and it…

Or the end goal of the "fake news" scare in general (not to say that there aren't sites that specialize in making up news.) To combat "fake news," you start whitelisting "true news," and defining it by the influence of the provider, not the content. In the end, you just end up with state news sources. related: It's telling that "factchecking" isn't a dialogue between various authorities, but instead just a bunch of w…

1st amendment won't allow that, but then again people seem to want to throw out the 2nd without a constitutional convention so it's not impossible. I can see the arguments now, "it's the freedom of the press, are you the press? Then why do you have a own a fully automatic printing press?"

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#116

Post by buildzr » Fri, May 31, 2019, 1:55 AM UTC

nessunodoro wrote: post #104

buildzr wrote: post #103

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What's the relevant application here? If you're suggesting this could be added by video editing software or display hardware, it seems if everyone knew about such watermarking it'd be trivial to strip out and turn into noise, so it would work publicly exactly once. If you're saying it'd be added by legitimate camera sensors, well it wouldn't beat the possibilities I suggested already of simply feeding tampered data t…

As it was described to me, the watermarking is encoded in such a way that it would be prohibitively expensive computationally to offset or overwrite it.

Okay, let's assume that's remotely possible. Injecting such a watermark at the camera doesn't help you - in fact, such a watermark you're describing is attempting to be resistant to things like re-transcoding so it might actually be carried through an editing process successfully. Not to mention the previous camera sensor bypasses. So let's ignore camera based options.

You have to get all video editing software or displays to inject such a watermark while keeping their keys private. Getting direct LVDS access to a panel and being able to write your own firmware pretty much bypasses most display options, and well... software based options are even worse I'd say, software is open to such a wide array of attacks and the mere existence of open source video editing tools, including FaceSwap itself makes this seem... questionable at best.

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#117

Post by [deleted] » Fri, May 31, 2019, 3:07 AM UTC

dang wrote: post #91

gambler wrote: post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're not thinking this through. The problem isn't that creators can make fake videos (which would be analogous to DRM). Let them. There is no harm in it. The problem is that users have no way of verifying true videos. This can be solved with cryptography, because both parties involved (creators and viewers) would want this to work. In other words, DRM is about forcing everyone to do a thing. Verification is about a…

> You're not thinking this through. Would you please edit swipes like that (and "you must live in a parallel universe, to put it politely") out of your comments here? They break the guidelines, lower the signal/noise ratio, and invite more of the same from others. Your comments would be just fine without those bits. https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html

[deleted]

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#118

Post by taneq » Fri, May 31, 2019, 3:34 AM UTC

gambler wrote: post #48

jdietrich wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Have you ever tried this? Yes. It used to be the industry standard method for recording TV programmes prior to the invention of videotape recorders. If you know what you're doing and use the right equipment, the generational quality loss is very minor. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kinescope

>It used to be the industry standard method for recording TV programmes prior to the invention of videotape recorders. Back when everything was analog and low-resolution, had noise and artifacts anyway, sure. Do you have a video that compares modern digital 1080p with its best "Kinescoped" version? You have to deal with parallax, mismatched frame frequencies, pixels and differences between natural light and whatever…

> Do you have a video that compares modern digital 1080p with its best "Kinescoped" version?

As an informal comparison, check out a downloaded "cam version" of any recent movie compared with a DVD rip. If you ignore the occasional noise or interference from the crowd, the quality can be quite good.

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#119

Post by copperx » Fri, May 31, 2019, 7:11 AM UTC

redisman wrote: post #108

One thing I don't see talked about much is the Uncanny Valley. No other technology has made it past it and looking at these they definitely have not either. Is there any reason to think that "deepfakes" will leapfrog it somehow?

The problem is that a big percentage of people will not have the gut reaction that screams "there's something really unsettling about that person's face" when looking at a deepfake.

Just take a sample of your close friends or relatives. How many of them can tell 48fps video apart from 24fps? How many people leave Smooth Motion turned on on their TV's without even noticing it?

Hell, I remember people telling me that they could not tell the difference between Blu-ray and DVD when Blu-ray came out. Even in this forum, a lot of people have claimed that there's little difference between a 1080p monitor and a 4k monitor scaled at 200% (Retina). It's 2019. 1080p screens are completely unsuitable for looking at text, and yet many people can barely notice the difference.

That's what we have to worry about. The tech is good enough to weaponize right now. And I see no way out of it, except with education. Perhaps high schools should eventually include a visual and aural literacy course as part of the curriculum.

Re: Ctrl Shift Face: A growing ‘deepfakes’ YouTube channel

#120

Post by jobigoud » Fri, May 31, 2019, 7:40 AM UTC

gambler wrote: post #22

buildzr wrote: post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It'd be too easy to fake, just replace the sensor in an approved camera with your own data feed. And that's assuming it wouldn't be somewhat trivial to dump keys from one or more cameras on the market to create a an easy tool or resignvideo.com... which is a massive assumption. As the movie industry has already seen, cryptography doesn't help you when you push out the keys to everyone. It'd be about as effective as D…

You're not thinking this through. The problem isn't that creators can make fake videos (which would be analogous to DRM). Let them. There is no harm in it. The problem is that users have no way of verifying true videos. This can be solved with cryptography, because both parties involved (creators and viewers) would want this to work. In other words, DRM is about forcing everyone to do a thing. Verification is about a…

> Companies could make tamper-proof sensor modules that do the signing right where it matters.

Just film a screen displaying the fake video. As soon as it's possible for a bad actor to create signed fake content it invalidates the entire protocol.

Oh, ok, I see what you mean now. The viewer already trusts the creators, so the threat model is not about an attacker creating fake videos. But if you already trust the creator why do you need further proof? Identity is already solved. The problem at stake here is videos released to the general public where the source is unknown, or not trusted by all stakeholders, i.e, during a trial.