UK parliament to get binding vote on final Brexit deal

Perhaps but there are plenty of scenarios in which unilateral revocation of an intent to leave is entirely justified. What if a band of member states block a reasonable deal from happening even against the interest of the other member states? What if the leaving member endures a change in government and comes to a different view? What if unilateral revocation is the only means to save millions of jobs and avoid economic carnage? And what protections would the leaving member have (still a fully signed up paying member during the 2 year time frame mind you) if the EU27 wasn't negotiating in good faith?

>The net effect was a lot of poorer EU citizens did go to the UK to essentially go on welfare because it was more than they could reasonably earn (if they could even get jobs) in their home countries.

And the UK could have easily told them off.

[2]

>"The Court of Justice points out that, under the [EU freedom of movement] directive, the host member state is not obliged to grant social assistance during the first three months of residence," the ruling reads.

>In case people stay longer than three months but less than five years and have no job, they "must have sufficient resources on their own," the court added.

>"A member state must therefore have the possibility of refusing to grant social benefits to economically inactive Union citizens who exercise their right to freedom of movement solely in order to obtain another member state’s social assistance although they do not have sufficient resources to claim a right of residence," the judges ruled.

>And that situation is untenable.

[3]

EEA (EU+) migrants are contributing more than native citizens, if you believe a study cited by the bbc

>So now the EU doesn't want any discussions on trade and other issues until the UK agrees to a "divorce settlement". The problems with this tactic are that the UK handing over huge sums of cash to the EU was second to immigration as a reason for people to vote Leave and, more importantly, how can you agree on a price for something and then go on to negotiate what you've bought?

Afaik the EU position is, that the divorce bill isn't a price for what the UK will get, it is what the UK owes from its time as a member.

[1]

>The EU hasn’t officially asked for any particular sum of money, but does say that “the United Kingdom must honour its share of the financing of all the obligations undertaken while it was a member”.

>The EU actually needs the money from the UK to balance their own budget so the EU has got a lot to lose here.

But if the EU can deal with the loss of UK money, this would also end the whole UK special deal stuff.

[1] https://fullfact.org/europe/eu-divorce-bill/

[2] https://euobserver.com/justice/126466

[3] http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-24813467

You're not actually addressing the myriad of cases in which the principle of unilateral revocation is warranted. You're merely asserting that it's improbable that member states would negotiate in bad faith or vote in a hostile manner contrary to the leaving member's interests.

A50 was not just constituted to protect the remaining members when a member departs, it was to show members that leaving is possible. If the leaving member has no power in this process and with bilateral revocation the UK in this case has very little leverage, it precisely sets up the circumstances in which any number of member states can muck up the process in a way that harms the welfare of the leaving country. That can't be right.

Unilateral revocation in the only way it is possible keeps the EU27 honest if it were intent on not being reasonable. Mind you there are plenty of people in the UK who feel the EU is not negotiating in good faith as it stands. Unilateral revocation certainly diminishes their leverage and it is undesirable to have to deal with it from the EU27's point of view, but this is a good thing. The EU27 should not have absolute power over a member who expressed a desire to leave.

The only scenario in which unilateral revocation encourages shenanigans is a hypothetical scenario that simply doesn't work. As I've explained in a previous comment, if the leaving member initiates revocation as a means of resetting the negotiation window or as a means of exacting new concessions, it will backfire, the benefits would be nullified and it would be a stupendously high risk to take. After all, if the UK negotiates in bad faith, the EU27 would contest it in the CJEU with the possibility of losing. It would be entirely unprepared to take the blow of a cliff edge Brexit and kill any chances of a favourable FTA from happening for years if not decades.

Note that in all cases bilateral revocation is preferable and probably is how things would go, but you don't need to stretch your imagination that far to imagine whether unilateral revocation should be a right when only one of the EU27 is needed to block bilateral revocation and send the UK into unmitigated chaos.

A50 is specifically worded as to notify an intent to leave. Intent can change, the A50 text sets nothing in stone other than the fact that barring any further intervention the exit date ends 2 years from the notification date. That's it.

I think you're discounting the fact that up to the departure date the UK is a full member with the ability to exercise its rights, including the right to change its mind, especially if the conditions merit it. We both agree that all parties must conduct the A50 process in good faith. You haven't convinced me why the option of unilateral revocation discourages good faith negotiation, or how it encourages bad faith negotiation.

Note that the legal arguments in favour of unilateral revocation specifically relate back to other EU laws, international law and the EU principle of closer union.