Wargh, I use KeePass.
KeePass – questionable security
201–210 of 231 posts
Re: KeePass – questionable security
#202Earlier quoted context omitted.
Just to be clear this is not directed at you tptacek. However, I am genuinely confused at HN, whenever it comes to security/privacy most yell "Open Source Only" and yet a good chuck of them use 1Password, which I believe is closed source. It really doesn't make any sense. Why trust one over all the others? Obviously given that open source does not equate to security and closed source does not equate to vulnerabilitie…
I like open source but certainly do not believe that it is always the best choice when it comes to security.
Why? Interested in your reasons. One plausible one is that trusting an author you know can be more practical than examining every line of a massive open source code base. Could that be a reason? Others?
Re: KeePass – questionable security
#203What are the alternatives really? I'd love to get rid of KeePass, it's GUI is awful, it really doesn't support OS X (unless some really technical person installs it). I'm unwilling to use commercial closed, cloud based password databases.
Re: KeePass – questionable security
#204Earlier quoted context omitted.
I like open source but certainly do not believe that it is always the best choice when it comes to security.
Why? Interested in your reasons. One plausible one is that trusting an author you know can be more practical than examining every line of a massive open source code base. Could that be a reason? Others?
Shotgun blast: open source software is easier to read. Is the quality higher? Depends: there are some terrible vendors, and there are some very shoddy open source security projects. Open source software, with a couple of exceptions, are rarely audited professionally. Widely used open source projects get shaken out for memory corruption and XSS. They do not as a rule get thoroughly evaluated for cryptographic flaws.
A more precise way to state my preferences:
I trust _crypto_ from Microsoft, Apple, or (especially) Google more than I trust _crypto_ from a developer I've never heard of before. I do not as a rule trust rando closed-source projects.
Re: KeePass – questionable security
#205I don't know that an HN thread is the best venue to discuss crypto design flaws (you might be better off writing a POC of some kind and then publishing that), but yes, it is a little disquieting to see a sensitive application using AES without an authenticator. To the many readers of this thread who believe they don't care about the integrity of their password vault, just its confidentiality: The problem is you can't…
I don't think offline or online is a criterium here for if this should be acceptable. Physical access security is just as important as online remote.
The concept of storing your sensitive data (Keepass and alike) in an app somebody else wrote specifically to store sensitive data, while not knowing anything about the quality (something getting addressed by the OP) of the actual product a very very weird idea.
Though not much different then storing your money at a bank, at least there somebody is sort of responsible and you can chase them down the street using a pitchfork and a torch in case something goes wrong with your deposited money.
The password managers to me, feel a bit like the lockers in a swimming pool, sure you'll put your wallet, car keys and cellphone in there. But everybody knows those lockers have the security of a cardboard box… yet we still all do it. And once your stuff is gone, the swimming pool management will point at the sign, not responsible for any theft.
As we all know here, nothing on a computer is safe, specially not when physical access is involved.
Re: KeePass – questionable security
#206What about pass ( http://www.passwordstore.org/ )? No "funky file formats" -- just GPG and a convenient CLI.
started using pass a few months ago, never looked back
Re: KeePass – questionable security
#207Honest question. What's wrong with the function? I have a similar function to ironically enough compare Hmacs in an encryption program I wrote in Java and C# When I release the source code for the java version I replaced my function with java's own Arrays.equals though
Timing attacks. It's not a valid concern in this context, however, because an attacker attempting to bruteforce it can simply code the more efficient comparison and use it. Timing attacks are a concern on network applications or when considering a block-box type attack.
Don't they also generally depend on the attacker either having access to a steady stream of crypto-events, or being able to cause them? i.e. you either watch a loaded system doing encryption, or create some load and time it yourself.
Neither of which would be relevant to an offline file format.
Re: KeePass – questionable security
#208[deleted]
Re: KeePass – questionable security
#209If you are such a great expert .NET programmer what sees others errors, stop complaining and help him. You have his git and you can pull request.
Re: KeePass – questionable security
#210What are the alternatives really? I'd love to get rid of KeePass, it's GUI is awful, it really doesn't support OS X (unless some really technical person installs it). I'm unwilling to use commercial closed, cloud based password databases.
In regards to OSX, Kypass is usable, but it's not great, or free!