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Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You

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Re: Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You

#11

Post by pstrateman »

jrcii wrote: post #8
brynet wrote: post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

GnuPG is complicated, the gpg(1) man page is quite extensive compared to signify. I imagine very few people have set up PGP without the help of a search engine. $ man gpg | pr | grep Page | awk '{print $6}' | tail -1 58 $ man signify | pr | grep Page | awk '{print $6}' | tail -1 2

I'm surprised that there seems to be a consensus here that using the GPG command line tool is complicated when the HN community regularly discusses, for example, time complexity of algorithms.

Using gnupg unfortunately requires a fairly complete understanding of the specific Web of Trust model used.

On top of that the interface is atrocious, go find someone with an image in their pubkey and try to display it from the command line.

Good luck.

Re: Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You

#12

Post by sliverstorm »

pstrateman wrote: post #3
atmosx wrote: post #2

@tedu writes: > There was a PGP usability study conducted a few years ago where a group of technical people were placed in a room with a computer and asked to set up PGP. Two hours later, they were never seen or heard from again. This argument doesn't hold ground. If "technical people" can not setup a new GnuPG key in 20 minutes, they are obviously not "technical" in this context. I'm 100% sure OpenBSD is absolutely…

He's written a tool that solves one problem using one set of algorithms and a very simple format in a few thousand lines of c. It almost certainly contains fewer bugs than gnupg.

Do one thing, and do it well

Re: Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You

#13

Post by nickpsecurity »

atmosx wrote: post #2

@tedu writes: > There was a PGP usability study conducted a few years ago where a group of technical people were placed in a room with a computer and asked to set up PGP. Two hours later, they were never seen or heard from again. This argument doesn't hold ground. If "technical people" can not setup a new GnuPG key in 20 minutes, they are obviously not "technical" in this context. I'm 100% sure OpenBSD is absolutely…

You made a good point: OpenBSD is way more complicated than GPG. I set up GPG with one command I got off the Internet. I also got a cheat sheet giving common commands I need for common scenarios. These people weren't just barely technical: they were unable to use Google as well. I'm dismissing the study as having little value. Need a new one with people who can follow steps they find on Google. If they fail, the author's point would stand.

One more thing they forgot to mention: GPG is apparently so secure that Snowden leaks show that NSA hates running into it and even uses it internally. Biggest endorsement one can get. I'd replace the interface for sure, though, where users would never see it.

Re: Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You

#14

Post by nickpsecurity »

brynet wrote: post #4
atmosx wrote: post #2

@tedu writes: > There was a PGP usability study conducted a few years ago where a group of technical people were placed in a room with a computer and asked to set up PGP. Two hours later, they were never seen or heard from again. This argument doesn't hold ground. If "technical people" can not setup a new GnuPG key in 20 minutes, they are obviously not "technical" in this context. I'm 100% sure OpenBSD is absolutely…

GnuPG is complicated, the gpg(1) man page is quite extensive compared to signify. I imagine very few people have set up PGP without the help of a search engine. $ man gpg | pr | grep Page | awk '{print $6}' | tail -1 58 $ man signify | pr | grep Page | awk '{print $6}' | tail -1 2

I got back on GnuPG recently because an associate wouldn't communicate without it. We came up with a trustworthy way to exchange keys. After that, I just cut and pasted crap from this:

http://irtfweb.ifa.hawaii.edu/~lockhart/gpg/

Been working fine so far. I'm sure there's all kinds of complicated ways to use it but it just takes a few commands to do most of the work. I only use two these days: one for sending and one for receiving. I scripted the more complicated one (send) where I type an alias and a text file with it doing the rest. The decrypt command, -d (file), is easy to remember. Pretty simple compared to trying to learn OpenBSD.

Not to say they're wrong for making something easier or the interface couldn't be way better. Just that me using this thing with almost no thought argues against all this difficulty people are bringing up.

Re: Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You

#15

Post by nickpsecurity »

jedisct1 wrote: post #6

Another tool that generates compatible signatures: https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/ The main addition is a "trusted comment" line, that can be used to verify metadata, instead of just the content, for example to verify a timestamp and prevent unwanted downgrades. This is not an issue with packages, but it can be an issue with files that don't contain any version/timestamp. And since keys are very short, they can…

That's definitely an improvement and pretty easy to use as well.

Re: Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You

#16

Post by nickpsecurity »

Quick comment regarding key sizes. NSA has a patent on ECC, expects licenses for commercial use, and has some kind of conditions you must adhere to if applying for a license. I'll let your imagination wonder on that last part as mine does. The choice is easy for me between asymmetric crypto that's patent-free and a kind the NSA controls. This might not apply to your personal use but it can to any company using such a tool.

Given the leaked BULLRUN slide, I'd rather not be in a position of NSA showing up with plans for my product along with a legal claim on it. RSA or DH it is, then! Or clever symmetric schemes that avoid that stuff entirely. I do that, too. I haven't missed not using ECC as I rarely need to transmit asymmetric keys.

EDIT: The few legitimate responses to this showed NSA patents are expired, Certicom's 130+ still require license from new owner Blackberry, and Bernstein's curves might be exempt. I appreciate those updates. Status quo: forms of ECC are covered by patents and you need to consult an attorney if doing it commercially.

Re: Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You

#17

Post by nickpsecurity »

vacri wrote: post #7

It's bizarre that they consider https as an alternative to cryptographic signing, rather than an unrelated addition.

My reading was they did the exact opposite: considered https to be a failure of end-to-end security they wanted. It was various users that apparently wanted HTTPS. I could see how they got to that: I access the site with HTTP; an intercept might happen; HTTPS protects HTTP; let's protect it with HTTPS! Fortunately, the experts knew better and avoided that nonsense.

Re: Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You

#18

Post by nickpsecurity »

pstrateman wrote: post #11
jrcii wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm surprised that there seems to be a consensus here that using the GPG command line tool is complicated when the HN community regularly discusses, for example, time complexity of algorithms.

Using gnupg unfortunately requires a fairly complete understanding of the specific Web of Trust model used. On top of that the interface is atrocious, go find someone with an image in their pubkey and try to display it from the command line. Good luck.

You actually just need a reliable way to get information from them once plus a good cheat sheet (see above comment) on GPG. So, you both use cut and paste to (a) generate keys, (b) add keys, (c) send messages and (d) receive messages. Exchanging the key file is the only step that requires slight thought and there's a dozen ways to do that.

I still don't use or fully understand the web of trust model as I haven't studied it in ages. I do use GPG every night with the right person on the other end, though. Still don't know anything else about it. Don't want to, either.

Re: Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You

#19

Post by sdevlin »

nickpsecurity wrote: post #16

Quick comment regarding key sizes. NSA has a patent on ECC, expects licenses for commercial use, and has some kind of conditions you must adhere to if applying for a license. I'll let your imagination wonder on that last part as mine does. The choice is easy for me between asymmetric crypto that's patent-free and a kind the NSA controls. This might not apply to your personal use but it can to any company using such a…

Ed25519 and Curve25519 are not encumbered by any patents, see http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/patents.html and http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html.

You should prefer state-of-the-art elliptic curve systems to RSA and finite field DH.

Re: Signify: Securing OpenBSD from Us to You

#20

Post by kylebgorman »

vacri wrote: post #9
elchief wrote: post #5

A recent reddit post where a (US) user ordered OpenBSD by mail: http://www.reddit.com/r/openbsd/comments/369vmw/looks_like_i...

Given the NSA's reputation for doing things on the sly, isn't this a little clumsy to attribute to them? As one of the commentators says, it was more likely to be a border agent on the lookout for new music. At one place I worked, we had USB security dongles for license management. We started sending them out in envelopes, and found that few reached their destination intact - the envelope would arrive, with a hole in…

Could it be that they were damaged by the postal equipment? Envelopes with keys often undergo this fate too, unless you pad the key with something of similar thickness.
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