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This kills BYOD, right, at least for now? "Employees can only access corporate applications with a device that is procured and actively managed by the company"
This kills BYOD, right, at least for now? "Employees can only access corporate applications with a device that is procured and actively managed by the company"
It also means you allow your device to be managed remotely by the company (i.e. purged if lost/stolen).
Earlier quoted context omitted.
with modern software, it's only hard to do right if they're not at their laptop/workstation. which means they're doing some other shit other than working. our entire team is remote. it's really obvious when someone isn't at their computer. it's basically the only hard requirement of the job beyond the work product - be at your computer when you say you are going to be at your computer.
Really? some times the crucial part of the job is done away from the computer. I remember doing a quick fix for one of the attractions at the melenium dome - the core part of the work was working out on paper all the permutations and what should happen the coding at a terminal was the trivial part. BTW the program correctly run first time and was delivered in less than a day.
The probably falls in the general category of a Good Thing™ for employees and people developing B2B applications since internal systems are more easily accessible but, this will be a gut check/squeaky bum time for traditional on-premises B2B vendors like PeopleSoft/SAP/IBM and the like. The corporate firewall has always been a bastion of security they have been able to hide their applications behind. As the concept o…
Apologies for being off topic.. > squeaky bum time Never heard this expression before. Quick search defines it as "An exciting part of a sporting event, particularly the final minutes of a close game or season". Unfortunately, I still don't really get the reference. Could someone spell this out for me?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Fair enough, but that still limits potential employees to a certain physical proximity to Google offices. While there are a number of those, and I aim to bring one here eventually, it is still a limitation.
But why would anyone not be willing to leave their family, friends, and life behind and move to one of the most expensive cities in the world in order to work at Google? Isn't work important to you?
I wonder which "cloud hosting provider" they will choose. Microsoft? Amazon? Does it make a difference? If my company starts selling cloud hosting and then I announce my company will be hosting its internal applications in "the cloud" (i.e., in my own data centers), what are the security implications for my company? Are they the same if some other company asks me to host their applications in my data centers? Is this…
What if I plug a pendrive in one of these devices and install an app that reads every network activity? If I have the same sequence of packages required to authenticate, I'm in?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
There are other, valid reasons to not run a public access point. Not wanting neighbors to steal your bandwidth, run a TOR node off it, or host illegal content, for example. All of these activities could get you removed from your ISP, and even taken to court. While you could probably prove your innocence in court, I can not imagine why taking the risk for absolutely no personal benefit is worth the risk. I don't reall…
Do you think Schneier is ignorant of the risks?
For example in the above column he repeats an urban myth: that running an open WiFi access point provides an affirmative defense against prosecution for things like piracy, hacking, or child porn.
I call it an urban myth because, personally, I have yet to find a court case in which such an argument was made, let alone one in which it was a determinant in the verdict. It's endlessly repeated online, with seemingly no evidence that it is true. (If someone reading this is aware of such a case, please reply with it! I would love to know.)
Also be aware that this was written when WEP was the state of the art in encrypting WiFi, and long before tools like Firesheep were widely available. You can't expect Schneier to make security arguments that will be true forever. Today it is so easy to snoop on open WiFi traffic that any given 11 year old could do--and today WPA2 is sufficently good to stop that.
At the same time, Bruce can be really right about things too, like how to properly secure a laptop. If anyone could run open WiFi and still be secure, it's a security expert. As opposed to my dad, who until recently was running Windows XP SP1 on his computer. He benefits from an encrypted WiFi signal as the first layer of the security onion.
Finally, the zero trust network has its day. I've been following this for quite a while, especially since this kind of architecture makes even more sense for smaller businesses than large ones that can pay for sophisticated network-edge protection. Edit: Great talk at lisa in 2013: https://www.usenix.org/conference/lisa13/enterprise-architec...