An interesting point that I didn't see the author bring up is the concept of how Docker images can be built in a layered fashion, and the potential for a false sense of security.
For example, you start with some sort of base image -- say phusion/baseimage-docker[1] -- and proceed to layer your application on top of it. You "trust" Phusion. They do Phusion Passenger, it's a real piece of software you heard of, and it's not some random person on the internet.
At some point, there's a bug, a problem, a security flaw, and you're waiting on them to fix it... nothing, nothing. Maybe they get hacked and their base image is now infected. I haven't bothered to look, but I'm guessing it would be a trivial amount of work to start the process of culling the most popular base images used by public Dockerflles, looking for the biggest trojan horse.
It seems like the whole model is ripe for pushing an understanding of what is actually running on a machine -- soup to nuts -- to the way side, and establishing a non-existent trust on the building blocks you're using, lulling people into a false sense of security about their containers. A lot of people already believe that they're already doing something much more secure by running containers, and arguably, they are... except for all of the places where malicious software can be added in, and the potential container breakout techniques.
[1] https://github.com/phusion/baseimage-docker