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NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

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Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#31
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A buddy who is an excellent reverse engineer assures me that this isn't a conspiracy. Crypto services had to be verified by a key; the NSA's crypto services were classified, so they couldn't let Microsoft sign them; therefore, they needed their own key. The key is only used to authenticate crypto services, which I think Douglas Adams would describe as Mostly Harmless. I don't have the reverse engineering skills/IDA P…

Answers from my POV: 1 - Privileged access to the dominant consumer operating system, also used by many corporations likely to be targeted. 2 - Minimal effort cost. Good will cost seems like something NSA ignores. Exposure to risk seems minimal given the existence of NDA contracts. 3 - I think anyone who isn't deluded and/or a member of the "nothing to hide; nothing to fear" camp already knows you can't trust Windows…

I doubt the NSA needs or desires a backdoor in Windows. If they were going to put that kind of pressure on Microsoft, they'd demand access to source code or perhaps a backdoor in its TLS implementation. These investments would pay off much better. I think you also vastly underestimate how much effort it would take. I sincerely doubt Microsoft would comply with a smile, and even after they won the (secret) court case keeping the operation under wraps would be even more laborious. Snowden is proof that people who sign contracts are still capable of disclosing secrets.

It is worth it for the NSA to backdoor crypto because, if the implementation is solid and the keys can't be stolen, then no matter how many resources they pour into cracking it the math will remain inflexible.

There is no computer in the world with that kind of security. If it is smartly configured, they'll use 0day. If its airgapped, they'll compromise a sysadmin's computer and wait for them to connect to it (think Stuxnet.) If that isn't feasible, they'll walk into the data center and put malicious hardware into a PCI slot.

If we persist in thinking of the NSA as a boogeyman logging every packet and backdooring every OS, rather than discussing their real capabilities and motivations - what they are, what they should be - we will become paralyzed to act against them, they will continue to operate without meaningful oversight, and our rights to privacy and to secure software will languish.

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#32
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Answers from my POV: 1 - Privileged access to the dominant consumer operating system, also used by many corporations likely to be targeted. 2 - Minimal effort cost. Good will cost seems like something NSA ignores. Exposure to risk seems minimal given the existence of NDA contracts. 3 - I think anyone who isn't deluded and/or a member of the "nothing to hide; nothing to fear" camp already knows you can't trust Windows…

I doubt the NSA needs or desires a backdoor in Windows. If they were going to put that kind of pressure on Microsoft, they'd demand access to source code or perhaps a backdoor in its TLS implementation. These investments would pay off much better. I think you also vastly underestimate how much effort it would take. I sincerely doubt Microsoft would comply with a smile, and even after they won the (secret) court case…

"A backdoor in Windows' TLS implementation" absolutely falls under the definition of "A backdoor in Windows".

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#33
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Answers from my POV: 1 - Privileged access to the dominant consumer operating system, also used by many corporations likely to be targeted. 2 - Minimal effort cost. Good will cost seems like something NSA ignores. Exposure to risk seems minimal given the existence of NDA contracts. 3 - I think anyone who isn't deluded and/or a member of the "nothing to hide; nothing to fear" camp already knows you can't trust Windows…

I doubt the NSA needs or desires a backdoor in Windows. If they were going to put that kind of pressure on Microsoft, they'd demand access to source code or perhaps a backdoor in its TLS implementation. These investments would pay off much better. I think you also vastly underestimate how much effort it would take. I sincerely doubt Microsoft would comply with a smile, and even after they won the (secret) court case…

I don't doubt the NSA has Windows source code; many companies already do have it (as well as a small number of individuals actually). It's not unusual to have access to the Windows source code TBH.

Saying that the NSA backdoored windows is not a boogeyman type claim; it's exactly within their real capabilities and seems like a very plausible path for them to have taken.

Nor does it mean we can't fight against it. We can use OpenBSD and have a higher confidence that it's not backdoored.

The first step to reeling in the unchecked power of the NSA is not to claim that they would not have done such a simple thing but to realize exactly how atrocious the scope of their acts are - not to become paralyzed with fear, but to incite change.

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#34
post #8
post #5

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't know much about crypto. This is bad I assume?

RSA-768 has been factored by academics in 2009[0]. It has long been speculated that NSA can factor 1024bit RSA (or DHE) using custom hardware, which is why in protocols like TLS and SSH the current recommendation is for keys, certificates and Diffie Hellman key exchange to be at least as strong as RSA-2048 (e.g. 256 bit elliptic curve crypto is strong enough). 0 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_numbers#RSA-768

If I got the maths right, due to the exponential relationship a 760-bit key should on average take roughly 1/256th of the time a 768-bit key takes to factor.

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#35
post #15

While US export control based on crypto have been changed, they still do exist http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Export_of_cryptography_from_the...

this is the source of e.g. Skype's installer requiring you to acknowledge you are not in Iran, NK, or Syria (that list might have changed recently)

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#36
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I doubt the NSA needs or desires a backdoor in Windows. If they were going to put that kind of pressure on Microsoft, they'd demand access to source code or perhaps a backdoor in its TLS implementation. These investments would pay off much better. I think you also vastly underestimate how much effort it would take. I sincerely doubt Microsoft would comply with a smile, and even after they won the (secret) court case…

I don't doubt the NSA has Windows source code; many companies already do have it (as well as a small number of individuals actually). It's not unusual to have access to the Windows source code TBH. Saying that the NSA backdoored windows is not a boogeyman type claim; it's exactly within their real capabilities and seems like a very plausible path for them to have taken. Nor does it mean we can't fight against it. We…

>We can use OpenBSD and have a higher confidence that it's not backdoored.

Why? As a non-technical user, from my POV I'm simply trading my trust that NSA hasn't backdoored MS with trusting that your, or De Raadt's authority is meaningful. I can't review the source code I'm running (without a prohibitively large time investment), and as we saw with Heartbleed, the "many eyes" theory is flawed as well.

As an individual, non-technical user I have no reason to be anymore confident in OpenBSD than in Windows. At some point you have to rely on a chain of trust (or develop the silicon yourself) and I view the "NSA paid/forced MS" boogeyman just as likely as the "NSA paid/forced OpenSSL" to merge heartbleed. Am I to believe that the NSA gagged with thousand or so developers who work on windows, or just the 10 who manage OpenSSL?

The parent post has a very important point, and the history better aligns with what he/she said. The NSA didn't coerce Google into giving up user data - they simply took advantage of the fact that their inter-DC traffic was unencrypted and use their resources to attack that fact. It didn't take a secret court nor did it take a gag order. They experienced an attack that could have been done by anyone dedicated enough - government or blackhat - and its likely that keeping your software secure against such attacks is very effective at protecting user privacy.

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#37
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

RSA-768 has been factored by academics in 2009[0]. It has long been speculated that NSA can factor 1024bit RSA (or DHE) using custom hardware, which is why in protocols like TLS and SSH the current recommendation is for keys, certificates and Diffie Hellman key exchange to be at least as strong as RSA-2048 (e.g. 256 bit elliptic curve crypto is strong enough). 0 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_numbers#RSA-768

If I got the maths right, due to the exponential relationship a 760-bit key should on average take roughly 1/256th of the time a 768-bit key takes to factor.

No, that is not how factorization scales. The time difference between a 760 and 768-bit modulus is less than a factor of 2.

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#38
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't doubt the NSA has Windows source code; many companies already do have it (as well as a small number of individuals actually). It's not unusual to have access to the Windows source code TBH. Saying that the NSA backdoored windows is not a boogeyman type claim; it's exactly within their real capabilities and seems like a very plausible path for them to have taken. Nor does it mean we can't fight against it. We…

> We can use OpenBSD and have a higher confidence that it's not backdoored. Why? As a non-technical user, from my POV I'm simply trading my trust that NSA hasn't backdoored MS with trusting that your, or De Raadt's authority is meaningful. I can't review the source code I'm running (without a prohibitively large time investment), and as we saw with Heartbleed, the "many eyes" theory is flawed as well. As an individua…

>as we saw with Heartbleed, the "many eyes" theory is flawed as well.

I don't think Heartbleed counts as some sort of evidence against the "many eyes" paradigm. There are so many better bugs for that, as Heartbleed is really low hanging fruit. OpenSSL is a total nightmare. I've posted elsewhere about this at length - but in short OpenSSL is really an example of what a good program _shouldn't_ do. How a good program _shouldn't_ be written. There is a list of sins a mile long on http://opensslrampage.org/.

The truth is that there is no guarantee that Windows, Linux, or BSD are not backdoored by the NSA, GCHQ, or FSB. There's no guarantee you didn't get owned and Chuck Blackhat installed a backdoor on your computer. The real reason to use OpenBSD is because it's had less remote exploits in the past 15 years than Windows has had in the past year. The real reason to use Linux and BSD is because that software respects your freedom. If you don't care about things like software freedom or if you feel the security of Windows is "good enough" for what you're doing then of course you don't care about Linux and BSD.

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#39
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I doubt the NSA needs or desires a backdoor in Windows. If they were going to put that kind of pressure on Microsoft, they'd demand access to source code or perhaps a backdoor in its TLS implementation. These investments would pay off much better. I think you also vastly underestimate how much effort it would take. I sincerely doubt Microsoft would comply with a smile, and even after they won the (secret) court case…

"A backdoor in Windows' TLS implementation" absolutely falls under the definition of "A backdoor in Windows".

Fair enough.

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#40
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I doubt the NSA needs or desires a backdoor in Windows. If they were going to put that kind of pressure on Microsoft, they'd demand access to source code or perhaps a backdoor in its TLS implementation. These investments would pay off much better. I think you also vastly underestimate how much effort it would take. I sincerely doubt Microsoft would comply with a smile, and even after they won the (secret) court case…

I don't doubt the NSA has Windows source code; many companies already do have it (as well as a small number of individuals actually). It's not unusual to have access to the Windows source code TBH. Saying that the NSA backdoored windows is not a boogeyman type claim; it's exactly within their real capabilities and seems like a very plausible path for them to have taken. Nor does it mean we can't fight against it. We…

I guess what I meant was, "We now have a huge amount of evidence about what they really are doing, lets talk about that and where the line should be drawn; speculating gets us nowhere."
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