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NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

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Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#21

Post by yuhong »

tptacek wrote: post #20
wolf550e wrote: post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Factoring RSA-2048 in 2020 sounds impossible. tptacek said it's extraordinarily unlikely NSA can scalably factor RSA-1024 today [1]. Look at how difficulty increases in the Yafu with GGNFS benchmark on wikipedia [2]. 1 - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8844239 2 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_%28cryptosystem%29#Integer...

By "scalably factor", I was referring to their ability to take arbitrary 1024 bit public keys as they appeared in random TLS sessions on the Internet and factor them on demand. NSA can virtually certainly target a specific, hardcoded 1024 bit key and break it. In fact, leaving out the cost and difficulty of recruiting the team to actually put the pieces together, the typical California venture capital firm has the re…

Yea, this is one reason why I don't consider 1024-bit end entity certs (as opposed to roots) that much of a threat.

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#22

Post by skolor »

na85 wrote: post #18
fabulist wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A buddy who is an excellent reverse engineer assures me that this isn't a conspiracy. Crypto services had to be verified by a key; the NSA's crypto services were classified, so they couldn't let Microsoft sign them; therefore, they needed their own key. The key is only used to authenticate crypto services, which I think Douglas Adams would describe as Mostly Harmless. I don't have the reverse engineering skills/IDA P…

Answers from my POV: 1 - Privileged access to the dominant consumer operating system, also used by many corporations likely to be targeted. 2 - Minimal effort cost. Good will cost seems like something NSA ignores. Exposure to risk seems minimal given the existence of NDA contracts. 3 - I think anyone who isn't deluded and/or a member of the "nothing to hide; nothing to fear" camp already knows you can't trust Windows…

So, serious question:

Why would they backdoor Windows, when apparently they could just buy an exploit for $X00k[1]? Its seems buying an exploit serves all those same factors, at a similar price range, while making it much harder to point a finger at the NSA when it eventually gets discovered.

Its probably a safe assumption that if someone is found using a backdoor in Windows, its probably the US Government that put it there. If its an exploit, its a hell of a lot harder to point that finger at anyone in particular.

[1]: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR610.html

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#23

Post by acqq »

tptacek wrote: post #16
nailer wrote: post #3

There was also a key marked as 'NSAKEY' in a normally encrypted part of Windows NT that was revealed in a Service Pack. However Microsoft said it had another purpose. http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSAKEY

Nobody credible believes NSAKEY to have been a backdoor. Schneier debunked it back in the '90s. Microsoft already held a key that had the same authority that "NSAKEY" had, so the conspiracy theory here requires you to believe that NSA subverted Windows NT to add a key labeled "NSA KEY" despite having access to another key that did the same thing.

Still, the explanation given by Microsoft has even less sense than the "backdoor" theory:

"Microsoft said that the key's symbol was "_NSAKEY" because the NSA is the technical review authority for U.S. export controls, and the key ensures compliance with U.S. export laws."

No sense at all. But if you read between the lines, it's the key without which Windows couldn't be exported. So it's a key which at least allows weaker encryption outside of the US.

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#24

Post by tptacek »

acqq wrote: post #23
tptacek wrote: post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Nobody credible believes NSAKEY to have been a backdoor. Schneier debunked it back in the '90s. Microsoft already held a key that had the same authority that "NSAKEY" had, so the conspiracy theory here requires you to believe that NSA subverted Windows NT to add a key labeled "NSA KEY" despite having access to another key that did the same thing.

Still, the explanation given by Microsoft has even less sense than the "backdoor" theory: "Microsoft said that the key's symbol was "_NSAKEY" because the NSA is the technical review authority for U.S. export controls, and the key ensures compliance with U.S. export laws." No sense at all. But if you read between the lines, it's the key without which Windows couldn't be exported. So it's a key which at least allows we…

That there is some bizarre legal reason having to do with 90s export control policy that would lead MSFT to have a special registry token for NSA is far more plausible than the backdoor story, which is implausible by the very nature of the key we're talking about.

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#25

Post by acqq »

tptacek wrote: post #24
acqq wrote: post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Still, the explanation given by Microsoft has even less sense than the "backdoor" theory: "Microsoft said that the key's symbol was "_NSAKEY" because the NSA is the technical review authority for U.S. export controls, and the key ensures compliance with U.S. export laws." No sense at all. But if you read between the lines, it's the key without which Windows couldn't be exported. So it's a key which at least allows we…

That there is some bizarre legal reason having to do with 90s export control policy that would lead MSFT to have a special registry token for NSA is far more plausible than the backdoor story, which is implausible by the very nature of the key we're talking about.

So if that was a key which allowed the NSA access to the communication that was otherwise unreachable to it, it's not a backdoor to the computer, just to the communication, and therefore you deny it to be a backdoor at all? Or do we just play the game of the "proper" names? How can we call the key which allows the access to the encrypted communication? Wikipeda calls that a backdoor too:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#26

Post by [deleted] »

acqq wrote: post #25
tptacek wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That there is some bizarre legal reason having to do with 90s export control policy that would lead MSFT to have a special registry token for NSA is far more plausible than the backdoor story, which is implausible by the very nature of the key we're talking about.

So if that was a key which allowed the NSA access to the communication that was otherwise unreachable to it, it's not a backdoor to the computer, just to the communication, and therefore you deny it to be a backdoor at all? Or do we just play the game of the "proper" names? How can we call the key which allows the access to the encrypted communication? Wikipeda calls that a backdoor too: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/…

[deleted]

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#27

Post by geofft »

acqq wrote: post #25
tptacek wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That there is some bizarre legal reason having to do with 90s export control policy that would lead MSFT to have a special registry token for NSA is far more plausible than the backdoor story, which is implausible by the very nature of the key we're talking about.

So if that was a key which allowed the NSA access to the communication that was otherwise unreachable to it, it's not a backdoor to the computer, just to the communication, and therefore you deny it to be a backdoor at all? Or do we just play the game of the "proper" names? How can we call the key which allows the access to the encrypted communication? Wikipeda calls that a backdoor too: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/…

There may have been a key that allowed the NSA that access, there may have been a backdoor, but the object with the name "_NSAKEY" was not it.

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#28

Post by mynameisvlad »

skolor wrote: post #22
na85 wrote: post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Answers from my POV: 1 - Privileged access to the dominant consumer operating system, also used by many corporations likely to be targeted. 2 - Minimal effort cost. Good will cost seems like something NSA ignores. Exposure to risk seems minimal given the existence of NDA contracts. 3 - I think anyone who isn't deluded and/or a member of the "nothing to hide; nothing to fear" camp already knows you can't trust Windows…

So, serious question: Why would they backdoor Windows, when apparently they could just buy an exploit for $X00k[1]? Its seems buying an exploit serves all those same factors, at a similar price range, while making it much harder to point a finger at the NSA when it eventually gets discovered. Its probably a safe assumption that if someone is found using a backdoor in Windows, its probably the US Government that put i…

Bingo, or even creating their own exploit and releasing it in a way that does not tie back to them.

Realistically, a backdoor is the worst option for the NSA. A backdoor would be known by the people who implemented it, who, assuming it's a cooperative venture, would most likely be at the company itself. A backdoor would also be most likely living in the real codebase, able to be discovered by others, and, if somehow it leaks, it'll point directly at the NSA.

An exploit does not live in the codebase, could be blamed on others, and will produce the same results.

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#29

Post by mynameisvlad »

na85 wrote: post #18
fabulist wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A buddy who is an excellent reverse engineer assures me that this isn't a conspiracy. Crypto services had to be verified by a key; the NSA's crypto services were classified, so they couldn't let Microsoft sign them; therefore, they needed their own key. The key is only used to authenticate crypto services, which I think Douglas Adams would describe as Mostly Harmless. I don't have the reverse engineering skills/IDA P…

Answers from my POV: 1 - Privileged access to the dominant consumer operating system, also used by many corporations likely to be targeted. 2 - Minimal effort cost. Good will cost seems like something NSA ignores. Exposure to risk seems minimal given the existence of NDA contracts. 3 - I think anyone who isn't deluded and/or a member of the "nothing to hide; nothing to fear" camp already knows you can't trust Windows…

> I think anyone who isn't deluded and/or a member of the "nothing to hide; nothing to fear" camp already knows you can't trust Windows

You drastically overestimate the general public's perception. I guarantee you that if you go down the street and ask random people if they trust Windows, they will say yes (or no, and say they trust OSX instead). In HN-land, sure, that can be assumed, but I highly doubt that viewpoint is shared outside tech circles.

Re: NSA's Backdoor Key from Lotus Notes

#30

Post by na85 »

skolor wrote: post #22
na85 wrote: post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Answers from my POV: 1 - Privileged access to the dominant consumer operating system, also used by many corporations likely to be targeted. 2 - Minimal effort cost. Good will cost seems like something NSA ignores. Exposure to risk seems minimal given the existence of NDA contracts. 3 - I think anyone who isn't deluded and/or a member of the "nothing to hide; nothing to fear" camp already knows you can't trust Windows…

So, serious question: Why would they backdoor Windows, when apparently they could just buy an exploit for $X00k[1]? Its seems buying an exploit serves all those same factors, at a similar price range, while making it much harder to point a finger at the NSA when it eventually gets discovered. Its probably a safe assumption that if someone is found using a backdoor in Windows, its probably the US Government that put i…

Exploits get fixed.
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