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https://github.com/github/roskomnadzor
Just in case anyone who try to access repos from Russia get something like that:
And no I'm don't support any of this and strictly against any censorship, but still it's looks weird why GitHub agree to deal with Russians, but not Chinese.
This news about attack make me wonder why isn't GitHub just blocked these repositories for all Chinese IPs. It's would be logical after they censored certain repositories for Russian IPs: https://github.com/github/roskomnadzor Just in case anyone who try to access repos from Russia get something like that: http://imgur.com/ytD5VYx And no I'm don't support any of this and strictly against any censorship, but still it'…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Looks to me like it's time for a DDoS X-Prize. 1. SSDP Flood 21% 2. SYN Flood 19% 3. UDP Flood 13% 4. UDP Fragment 12% 5. NTP Flood 8% 6. GET Flood 7% 7. CharGEN Attack 5% 8. DNS Flood 5% 9. ICMP Flood 2% 10. SNMP Flood 2% Eliminating these 10 attack vectors would account for 94% of DDoS attacks according to this visualization[1], as witnessed by Akamai over the last 30 days. Just the top 3 is more than 50%. Seems li…
Most of these attack vectors just mean a great amount of a specific traffic of some sort. Traffic volume is not something that you can, or would want to, eliminate. You have to somehow identify and separate the unwanted requests from you regular traffic. That's why these cases are unique and needs to be handled manually, in cooperation with your uplink(s).
However, this is no doubt not a complete list of DDoS vectors as it doesn't account for application level exploits like demonstrated in the GitHub attacks. And obviously not everything that is a DDoS is a protocol flood.
Either there is a way to identify those types of attacks now, or improved attack identification should be included as a requirement for the X-Prize.
The github service is nice, but do you really want to put your [code|website|etc] somewhere that can become inaccessible if some [person|group|criminal|government] decides they don't like something about it?
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Thanks, so if I understand well, every js gotten from baidu cdn from outside China has a malicious code attacking github. Weird. It could be some test gone wrong, but I still don't buy Chinese gov attacking purposely and openly github like that. It's like showing your one time secret weapon way too early and on some wrong target. Or maybe it's a way to make some big noise to the left while the real target is discrete…
> Weird. It could be some test gone wrong, but I still don't buy Chinese gov attacking purposely and openly github like that. A "test" that specifically targets two projects that promote anti-censorship. Yeah, that's some "test"...
Hi, foreigner working in Chinese high tech company here. I wonder a bit, on which ground is this attack attributed to Chinese gov? It looks a bit unlikely to me. China has some cyber military but they are more likely to be pragmatic and choose wisely their targets. There's a bunch of script kiddies but they would choose also something else. However it seems possible that many servers hosted in China are not secured a…
The MITM on HTTPS traffic that seems to be involved in the first attack stages is actually pretty good evidence.
This news about attack make me wonder why isn't GitHub just blocked these repositories for all Chinese IPs. It's would be logical after they censored certain repositories for Russian IPs: https://github.com/github/roskomnadzor Just in case anyone who try to access repos from Russia get something like that: http://imgur.com/ytD5VYx And no I'm don't support any of this and strictly against any censorship, but still it'…
Its because the requests aren't actually coming from China. China is redirecting worldwide users from Baidu to GitHub. Sorry, I don't have the link handy, but it was in that WSJ article on the front page.