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Confabulation in the humanities

matthewlincoln.net

31–40 of 46 posts

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"You find that people cooperate, you say, ‘Yeah, that contributes to their genes' perpetuating.’ You find that they fight, you say, ‘Sure, that’s obvious, because it means that their genes perpetuate and not somebody else's. In fact, just about anything you find, you can make up some story for it."

Of course you can make up a story for pretty much everything you find. But could you hypothetically come up with just as compelling a story for things you don't find? I don't think so.

I try to do this any time I get some new theory that seems to explain things: reverse it or switch around facts. Does it still sound like it might mean something? If it can explain reality and counterfactuals just as well, then it's probably useless.

I'm a bit upset with how many things I hear that might just be wrong or trying to influence me.

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#32
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Interesting discussion here. I don't think you're representing the author's point correctly, though, given the larger context of the work he's doing and current debates in the historical field. Here's what he says: "I suppose the point of this post is to articulate my growing concern that we are so damn good at coming up with post-facto historical explanations to contextualize any given observation, that we are parti…

I agree with everything you say (although I read this article differently), but historians should be careful to steer away from Hayek's "scientism". History's underlying mathematical assumption -- an assumption that is almost surely correct -- is that society is a complex system, and therefore cannot be subject to predictions (or very few, qualitative predictions) in the long run. If historians feel quantitative anal…

The simplest non-linear differential equations defy quantitative study, and history (and even economics and biology) are nowhere near simple.

This is nonsense. I think you are alluding to the fact that forward integration from an initial condition with a measurement error will have an error growing at the rate exp(liapunov_exponent x time).

This doesn't mean that ODEs "defy quantitative study". One still makes quantitative predictions about them - e.g., "what is the liapunov exponent", "at what precise parameter choice does a phase change occur", "is the system recurrent, and if so what is the recurrence time", etc.

Am I wrong in guessing you don't actually study nonlinear systems and are simply making guesses based on newspaper summaries and pop science?

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#33
post #9

F.A. Hayek[0] wrote in great depth about this "confabulation" (which he termed Scientism), and, ironically enough, lectured about it directly in his Nobel Prize speech of 1974[1]. "It can hardly be denied that such a demand quite arbitrarily limits the facts which are to be admitted as possible causes of the events which occur in the real world. This view, which is often quite naively accepted as required by scientif…

My impression of Hayek is that he was trying to shut down his opponents by saying "it's not possible to build models which are predictive". Since the models he was criticizing have been vety successful, I think we should take this stance with a grain of salt.

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#34
post #3

Evolutionary psychology fits this paradigm.

Yeah, and evopsych has the same problem as history, that it is not possible to change one variable and repeat the experiment. This makes it easy to make up explanation for observations, but hard to verify or falsify these explanations. It is surprisingly hard to disprove a historical theory, like "the decline of pirates in the Caribbean lead to the Russian revolution".

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#37
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I agree with everything you say (although I read this article differently), but historians should be careful to steer away from Hayek's "scientism". History's underlying mathematical assumption -- an assumption that is almost surely correct -- is that society is a complex system, and therefore cannot be subject to predictions (or very few, qualitative predictions) in the long run. If historians feel quantitative anal…

The simplest non-linear differential equations defy quantitative study, and history (and even economics and biology) are nowhere near simple. This is nonsense. I think you are alluding to the fact that forward integration from an initial condition with a measurement error will have an error growing at the rate exp(liapunov_exponent x time). This doesn't mean that ODEs "defy quantitative study". One still makes quanti…

Once again, fajitas, your literal mind fails you. I cannot write a precise discussion of every single idea I mention, or each of my comments would be the length of a book, and they are already far longer than they should be. I mention an idea, and leave it to the mind of the reader to fill in the missing pieces. Any reader, even a critical one, can understand these are broad strokes, but not an adversarial one such as yourself.

Still, in this particular case, you are right that I have not discussed simulation as a valuable tool. It may certainly be; I would find it fascinating. But does it qualify as a quantitative theory? Maybe. If you have a theory of each of the system's elements, and the simulation follows reality for some non negligible time. But would it be a model of history or a model of psychology?

Would it make us understand history as a process more than we do now? In the end, if you simulate the entire universe accurately, you could predict any physical, chemical, biological, psychological and historical process. But would you understand them better? I don't think our knowledge of particle physics helps us understand human psychology, even if if some day it is able to predict it (Dostoyevsky touched on this very point 150 years ago[1]). Every level of abstraction demands its own models.

I am afraid studied my studies of nonlinear systems ended back at university, many years ago. I must say, though, that I am a bit surprised at your comment. As I was writing my previous ones, I was imagining you saying that what I say here contradicts things I've said to you before about the validity of historical knowledge. I contemplated writing a few more paragraphs that explain the difference, but feared it would make the comment even less readable. Can you see it?

In any event, fajitas, literal, adversarial readings tend to suffuse the discussion with a very autistic feel. I suggest that before classifying my words as "nonsense" -- though this classification does have a nice, succinct, quality -- you would try to understand what I am saying; this usually leads to a more interesting discussion.

-----------

[1]:

...science itself will teach man (though to my mind it's a superfluous luxury) that he never has really had any caprice or will of his own, and that he himself is something of the nature of a piano-key or the stop of an organ, and that there are, besides, things called the laws of nature; so that everything he does is not done by his willing it, but is done of itself, by the laws of nature. Consequently we have only to discover these laws of nature, and man will no longer have to answer for his actions and life will become exceedingly easy for him. All human actions will then, of course, be tabulated according to these laws, mathematically, like tables of logarithms up to 108,000, and entered in an index; or, better still, there would be published certain edifying works of the nature of encyclopaedic lexicons, in which everything will be so clearly calculated and explained that there will be no more incidents or adventures in the world

...

A PROPOS of nothing, in the midst of general prosperity a gentleman with an ignoble, or rather with a reactionary and ironical, countenance were to arise and, putting his arms akimbo, say to us all: "I say, gentleman, hadn't we better kick over the whole show and scatter rationalism to the winds, simply to send these logarithms to the devil, and to enable us to live once more at our own sweet foolish will!" That again would not matter, but what is annoying is that he would be sure to find followers

...

Ha! ha! ha! But you know there is no such thing as choice in reality, say what you like," you will interpose with a chuckle. "Science has succeeded in so far analysing man that we know already that choice and what is called freedom of will is nothing else than--

...

And that is not all: even if man really were nothing but a piano-key, even if this were proved to him by natural science and mathematics, even then he would not become reasonable, but would purposely do something perverse out of simple ingratitude, simply to gain his point. And if he does not find means he will contrive destruction and chaos, will contrive sufferings of all sorts, only to gain his point! He will launch a curse upon the world, and as only man can curse (it is his privilege, the primary distinction between him and other animals), may be by his curse alone he will attain his object--that is, convince himself that he is a man and not a piano-key! If you say that all this, too, can be calculated and tabulated--chaos and darkness and curses, so that the mere possibility of calculating it all beforehand would stop it all, and reason would reassert itself, then man would purposely go mad in order to be rid of reason and gain his point! I believe in it, I answer for it, for the whole work of man really seems to consist in nothing but proving to himself every minute that he is a man and not a piano-key! It may be at the cost of his skin, it may be by cannibalism! And this being so, can one help being tempted to rejoice that it has not yet come off, and that desire still depends on something we don't know?

-- Notes from Underground

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What's wrong with that, if it works and is correct? What's the point made there?

Creating a seemingly meaningful justification for behavior isn't science, it's just folk wisdom. Scientific theories need to be falsifiable, they need to have predictive value.

This ain't actually how science works, it's just an idealized account. Special relativity wasn't technically falsifiable compared to its competing theory by Lorentz, because both produced mathematically equivalent predictions. If you pick up a random science paper these days, odds are you'll find all sorts of unfalsifiable claims. Does this mean modern scientists are doing it wrong? No, but even if you think it does, it still shows modern historians are on the same footing.

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#39
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Anyone concerned with this stuff should read: "Everything is Obvious (once you know the answer)" by Duncan Watts. http://www.amazon.com/Everything-Obvious-Common-Sense-Fails/... It isn't a great book, but it does clearly identify the difference between explanatory and predictive accounts, and makes a strong case that explanatory, after-the-fact, accounts are simply noise. The exercise the author engages in here, of "…

You are doing nothing but generating noise if you try to treat this knowledge the same as hard scientific knowledge. You generate something very valuable if you treat it as a different kind of knowledge. I like to give this example: the statement, "the moon is made of cheese" is false when treated as a scientific statement of fact. It can -- and, in fact, has -- been falsified. On the other hand, if taken as a litera…

> On the other hand, if taken as a literary statement, it can hold some truth -- or maybe many truths. Except that is a different kind of truth.

We can learn from people telling stories, we don't need to call these stories "truths" to do that. No need to muddle up the terminology. There's a hilarious proverb about kinds of truth BTW, but I can't manage to translate it to English, idioms just work differently.

> It would be one that believes that anything not quantifiable is not worth knowing, and would try to plug any missing holes in our knowledge with data and quantitative theory, even if that's mathematically impossible.

I think you misunderstood. It's not that it's not worth knowing. It's that you don't really know it if you can't quantify it. You're just slapping together some explanation to feel better.

> But just like we'll likely never write a computer program that can fully reason about other computer programs

Not about ALL the possible computer programs, but about many useful ones - why not? If our brains can do it - surely turing machines can do it too. At worst it would take exponential time and space.

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#40
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I agree with everything you say (although I read this article differently), but historians should be careful to steer away from Hayek's "scientism". History's underlying mathematical assumption -- an assumption that is almost surely correct -- is that society is a complex system, and therefore cannot be subject to predictions (or very few, qualitative predictions) in the long run. If historians feel quantitative anal…

This is true, but not entirely relevant. Life-based complex systems often share a propensity for punctuated stability specifically due to their own nature, because of the same circularity inherent in evolution (those that can survive to replicate, do). In this case, systems whose parameters tend towards stabilization persist specifically because they tend towards stabilization. The least self-undermining regularities…

Well, this is what historians do -- try to provide a model of a certain society at a certain time. Yet, it is important to warn of scientism (I really like that word!) When we come up with more quantitative models (as economists do) would we be able to resist the urge to believe they are scientifically predictive?

And economics is a perfect example. It appears easily amenable to quantitative study, yet it does not yield very predictive models, does it (at least not nearly as predictive as we'd like)? And history is more complex than just economics.

Of course we can do clever things at those stable points, but defying math isn't one of them. Predicting presidential elections is a good example. We're not really (generally) able to do that (at least, not yet). The best we do is try to get a valid statistical picture, spot a trend, and extrapolate for very short durations.

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