Why aren't national authorities limited to their country's TLD? I'd imagine they'd want this, and the public would want this.
Its so obvious, what am I missing?
61–70 of 76 posts
Why aren't national authorities limited to their country's TLD? I'd imagine they'd want this, and the public would want this.
Its so obvious, what am I missing?
Central CAs is almost as broken security as credit cards with the card number readable in cleartext on the front of the card.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I have marked CNNIC root cert untrusted on all of systems I can control. It bothers me sometimes when some providers with "good" reputation uses them, like azure china. I had to manually add the server certificate to trusted list, just to manage my vms. Otherwise, I barely notice the issue. It looks that even CNNIC certs themselves weren't widely deployed, correct me if I'm wrong, most of Chinese sites who wants to e…
If you think the company that has agreed to collaborate with a Chinese company to make a different version of Skype (Tom-Skype), for the sole purpose of letting the Chinese government spy on Chinese citizens' communications in real-time, can be "trusted" to not have backdoored cloud services in China, then I have a bridge to sell you. Microsoft has proven again and again that it's willing to make any concessions to t…
It is interesting that when the CNNIC root certificate was added to Firefox, this is exactly what many people had warned against: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=476766
FWIW, here's what I just did on my (Arch) Linux machine: $ for f in /etc/ssl/certs/*.pem; do sudo ln -sfn "$f" /etc/ca-certificates/trust-source/blacklist/; done $ sudo update-ca-trust This will block all currently installed CAs (as well as double-block some, but that doesn't really matter). You then need to add them back in. Restart your browser, and go to websites you access frequently (change them to https:// if n…
I see that in the OS X keychain I have 213 "system roots" that are trusted, I wonder how many of them I really need...
FWIW, here's what I just did on my (Arch) Linux machine: $ for f in /etc/ssl/certs/*.pem; do sudo ln -sfn "$f" /etc/ca-certificates/trust-source/blacklist/; done $ sudo update-ca-trust This will block all currently installed CAs (as well as double-block some, but that doesn't really matter). You then need to add them back in. Restart your browser, and go to websites you access frequently (change them to https:// if n…
(FYI, looks like SSL Shopper uses GoDaddy for SSL)
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I have marked CNNIC root cert untrusted on all of systems I can control. It bothers me sometimes when some providers with "good" reputation uses them, like azure china. I had to manually add the server certificate to trusted list, just to manage my vms. Otherwise, I barely notice the issue. It looks that even CNNIC certs themselves weren't widely deployed, correct me if I'm wrong, most of Chinese sites who wants to e…
If you think the company that has agreed to collaborate with a Chinese company to make a different version of Skype (Tom-Skype), for the sole purpose of letting the Chinese government spy on Chinese citizens' communications in real-time, can be "trusted" to not have backdoored cloud services in China, then I have a bridge to sell you. Microsoft has proven again and again that it's willing to make any concessions to t…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Looks like Mozilla has this data in aggregate, if I'm understanding this web page right: http://telemetry.mozilla.org/#filter=nightly%2F39%2FCERT_VAL... Ignore the graph and match up the table below with this C array: https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/mana... If I'm understanding the meaning of "Bin Number" right, not all of the 0s are surprising. But some are. For instance, the AOL CA hasn't be…
You can look at the local telemetry for your current Firefox session, including this variable, by going to about:telemetry, which sort of gets you what pbhjpbhj was looking for, albeit in an inconvenient and limited fashion.
The fact that it's CNNIC that has issued these dangerous certificates is not exactly relevant to the problem at hand; More than one root authority has made mistakes in delegation, and several have made the mistake of not checking the delegation bit and allowing third-parties to request intermediate certificates. Still, it bears repeating that CNNIC, which is effectively a branch of the chinese government, has a root…
I'm on FF 36.0 on Kubuntu 14.10 - I removed the certs for CNNIC and then to test went to the CNNIC website and rewrote the address as https. Website still shows the lock symbol and still shows the cert verified by the CNNIC root CA?!? Seems the removal is slightly glitchy somehow, third time worked. 2 things I notice: 1) there are a lot of default trusted suppliers, seems that this should perhaps be selected on insta…
EDIT: while the cert reappears, I do get a warning going to the website with https. Nevermind.