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Confabulation in the humanities

matthewlincoln.net

11–20 of 46 posts

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"You find that people cooperate, you say, ‘Yeah, that contributes to their genes' perpetuating.’ You find that they fight, you say, ‘Sure, that’s obvious, because it means that their genes perpetuate and not somebody else's. In fact, just about anything you find, you can make up some story for it."

What's wrong with that, if it works and is correct? What's the point made there?

The problem is Just-so stories[1] that have no basis in evidence, but can be moulded to sound plausible given any kind of phenomena. So imagine there are two mutually exclusive phenomena - chances are that you could come up with a plausible-sounding, "evolutionary psychology"-story for both scenarios. And how good is a framework if it can plausibly explain any and all phenomena? Useless.

This might have more to do with how "evolutionary psychology"-sounding theories are presented on Web fora than how they are used in a more academic setting. You can easily run across participants on Web fora who almost admit to just making up shit on the spot that fit with the phenomena that they are presented with, based on their expert knowledge of Stone Age humans.

[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just-so_story

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#12
post #9

F.A. Hayek[0] wrote in great depth about this "confabulation" (which he termed Scientism), and, ironically enough, lectured about it directly in his Nobel Prize speech of 1974[1]. "It can hardly be denied that such a demand quite arbitrarily limits the facts which are to be admitted as possible causes of the events which occur in the real world. This view, which is often quite naively accepted as required by scientif…

Since "confabulation" is our only option, Hayek warns against disguising it as science -- this is what happens in economics, he says. Most historians, on the other hand, understand the limits of their knowledge, don't try to make predictions (certainly not with the same definitiveness common to many economists), and don't disguise their narratives as physical science. The author of the article under discussion, though, seems to wish history was more like physics, which it just can't be.

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#14
post #12
post #9

F.A. Hayek[0] wrote in great depth about this "confabulation" (which he termed Scientism), and, ironically enough, lectured about it directly in his Nobel Prize speech of 1974[1]. "It can hardly be denied that such a demand quite arbitrarily limits the facts which are to be admitted as possible causes of the events which occur in the real world. This view, which is often quite naively accepted as required by scientif…

Since "confabulation" is our only option, Hayek warns against disguising it as science -- this is what happens in economics, he says. Most historians, on the other hand, understand the limits of their knowledge, don't try to make predictions (certainly not with the same definitiveness common to many economists), and don't disguise their narratives as physical science. The author of the article under discussion, thoug…

I think that was Hayek's exact point...that economics cannot be like physics either, and in fact goes on to postulate that very few of the sciences can and/or should be treated as hard.

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#15
post #12
post #9

F.A. Hayek[0] wrote in great depth about this "confabulation" (which he termed Scientism), and, ironically enough, lectured about it directly in his Nobel Prize speech of 1974[1]. "It can hardly be denied that such a demand quite arbitrarily limits the facts which are to be admitted as possible causes of the events which occur in the real world. This view, which is often quite naively accepted as required by scientif…

Since "confabulation" is our only option, Hayek warns against disguising it as science -- this is what happens in economics, he says. Most historians, on the other hand, understand the limits of their knowledge, don't try to make predictions (certainly not with the same definitiveness common to many economists), and don't disguise their narratives as physical science. The author of the article under discussion, thoug…

Interesting discussion here. I don't think you're representing the author's point correctly, though, given the larger context of the work he's doing and current debates in the historical field. Here's what he says:

"I suppose the point of this post is to articulate my growing concern that we are so damn good at coming up with post-facto historical explanations to contextualize any given observation, that we are particularly susceptible to confabulating these post-facto rationalizations with the idea that we somehow knew the results of this quantitative work already."

The implication here, I think, is simply that historians should be open to multiple ways of testing explanations (i.e., combining qualitative and quantitative approaches, if those are available). And in the larger context of debates about digital humanities, he's swatting down the argument that DH simply tells us what we already knew, because if done right it can be used to add a new perspective on existing arguments. The point isn't that history should be science but that "scientific"/quantitative approaches can be used to test the validity of historical claims based on more traditional historical work, like finding manuscripts in archives, doing a close reading of a key text, tracing correspondence networks, tracing the material history of a painting or object, etc. I agree with him.

Edited to add: also need to be careful about confusing prediction with explanation. Historians don't predict much, but we certainly try to explain things a lot! I read this post as being exclusively about the latter.

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#16
post #3

Evolutionary psychology fits this paradigm.

"You find that people cooperate, you say, ‘Yeah, that contributes to their genes' perpetuating.’ You find that they fight, you say, ‘Sure, that’s obvious, because it means that their genes perpetuate and not somebody else's. In fact, just about anything you find, you can make up some story for it."

Of course you can make up a story for pretty much everything you find. But could you hypothetically come up with just as compelling a story for things you don't find? I don't think so.

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"You find that people cooperate, you say, ‘Yeah, that contributes to their genes' perpetuating.’ You find that they fight, you say, ‘Sure, that’s obvious, because it means that their genes perpetuate and not somebody else's. In fact, just about anything you find, you can make up some story for it."

What's wrong with that, if it works and is correct? What's the point made there?

Creating a seemingly meaningful justification for behavior isn't science, it's just folk wisdom. Scientific theories need to be falsifiable, they need to have predictive value.

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#18
post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Since "confabulation" is our only option, Hayek warns against disguising it as science -- this is what happens in economics, he says. Most historians, on the other hand, understand the limits of their knowledge, don't try to make predictions (certainly not with the same definitiveness common to many economists), and don't disguise their narratives as physical science. The author of the article under discussion, thoug…

Interesting discussion here. I don't think you're representing the author's point correctly, though, given the larger context of the work he's doing and current debates in the historical field. Here's what he says: "I suppose the point of this post is to articulate my growing concern that we are so damn good at coming up with post-facto historical explanations to contextualize any given observation, that we are parti…

I agree with everything you say (although I read this article differently), but historians should be careful to steer away from Hayek's "scientism". History's underlying mathematical assumption -- an assumption that is almost surely correct -- is that society is a complex system, and therefore cannot be subject to predictions (or very few, qualitative predictions) in the long run. If historians feel quantitative analysis gives their explanations any sort of definitiveness (and "proving" the inevitability of past events is exactly the same as prediction), they will fall into the same trap as economists.

A different perspective -- absolutely; a quantitative theory -- no. In fact, quantitative theory, at least in a sense similar to physics, is nearly impossible even in subjects that are much closer to physics than history. The simplest non-linear differential equations defy quantitative study, and history (and even economics and biology) are nowhere near simple.

However, it is possible that even in a complex system, there should arise some temporary structures that can be described as linear processes, and therefore subject to some quantitative theory, but it will be short lived. Complex systems undergo phase-changes that tend to break and reform any structure. On the other hand, it can be argued that those phase changes are rare, and that human society is self-stabilizing on some global scale, so that the system -- at least for the moment -- is stable, and some quantitative analysis may apply. But I'm pretty sure no one would classify any specific society (i.e. a small subset of humankind) as stable.

Re: Confabulation in the humanities

#20

Not sure if the author is around here, but the style sheet on this seems to be broken on an iPad 2 in landscape mode. It seems to be right on the edge of a CSS breakpoint, and flips back and forth between two different layouts every time I scroll. Makes it very very hard to read...

blerg, sorry about that! Will fix when I'm done with the dissertation.
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