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The Rent Hypothesis

esoltas.blogspot.com

81–90 of 150 posts

Re: The Rent Hypothesis

#81
post #31

> Rents are not always bad. Protections for intellectual property make sense not in spite of the rents they generate, but rather because of them. A patent, after all, is a temporary monopoly. These monopoly rents give incentives for innovation and allow innovators to cover the costs of research and development. This is a weird way to talk about IP and rent. Is profit from IP necessarily rent? The problem is that "ren…

The philosophy behind patents is that they encourage the sharing of research so that the total cost of rnd to society is minimized. Whithout ip protection, firms would rely on trade secrets. They would still charge more for their products but a competitor would have to spend the money on research to compete. I don't know if you would still call the premium they could charge rent or if you would amortize rnd over the…

I think most times its worth the "redundancy" in cost of multiple parties discovering the same thing, because then at least they can use it. The way things stand now, plenty of biotech companies just shelve patented things and then its no good to anyone. This can't be easily remedied by "adjusting" the laws, since the lawmakers will always and quite practically be behind the technology, and sometimes not ever understand the technology or consequences.

Either way there is a cost to use: either paying for the rights to the patent, "paying" in completely arbitrary time determined by patent laws which do very little to distinguish completely different technologies and lifespans, or paying to reinvent in trade secret scenarios.

I feel like with trade secrets its much more in our control to remedy situations where many people need access to a technology quickly. It allows for dynamic solutions. For example, private contracts could handle the patent use case without necessarily having IP. They could provide the end product as a service, or provide know-how to build the product under a "subscription-service" where the client agrees to pay a very large fee over the course of several years/dependent on unit sales/etc (the analog to the royalties/licensing fees), with the punishment being spelled out in the contract that if the tech is replicated in some other way or leaked, the client company must pay a large "breakup" fee. That way the client is incentivized to use the tech and keep it secret as well. Client companies can then assess whether these fees are better than the cost of R&D they would have to undertake to develop it themselves. Just look at software: there's plenty of stuff I could build myself, but I happily pay for an existing solution despite not being "forced" to. I think we very early on decided on a patent model and just threw up our hands and said 'no one would possibly invent otherwise!'

Re: The Rent Hypothesis

#83
post #31

> Rents are not always bad. Protections for intellectual property make sense not in spite of the rents they generate, but rather because of them. A patent, after all, is a temporary monopoly. These monopoly rents give incentives for innovation and allow innovators to cover the costs of research and development. This is a weird way to talk about IP and rent. Is profit from IP necessarily rent? The problem is that "ren…

I don't know if I've got it wrong or the author does, but I think about it like actual rents.

Landlords don't make money by providing a service or selling goods. They make money by sitting on something no one else is allowed to have. They don't have to do anything more than sit back and collect checks. Sure, they bought the land originally, but there's no more investment to be made after that. They can invest in a nicer building or grounds, or compete on services such as "free" utilities or quicker repairs, but those are above and beyond the "rent-seeking" part of his revenue. He could just rent an empty lot, like a trailer park or campground.

This is analogous to, for example, telephone lines. They cost a lot to initially build out, but once they're there, the phone company only has to charge people for access. They provide a service back at the switching station, but most of what they're getting money for is owning lines that already exist. It's harder to separate rent from their other revenue, but it's there.

It generalizes to all revenue that is of the "sit back and collect checks" variety. Cellular carriers sitting on a chunk of spectrum they can sell access to. They can just rent it out to MVNOs if they don't want to provide those services themselves. Film studios sitting on a catalog of work they can sell, license, etc. So yes, IP revenues are definitely rents.

Re: The Rent Hypothesis

#86
post #31

> Rents are not always bad. Protections for intellectual property make sense not in spite of the rents they generate, but rather because of them. A patent, after all, is a temporary monopoly. These monopoly rents give incentives for innovation and allow innovators to cover the costs of research and development. This is a weird way to talk about IP and rent. Is profit from IP necessarily rent? The problem is that "ren…

Soltas (the author) here. What I meant by "rents are not always bad" is that "rent" is a positive (i.e., value-free) concept, not a normative (moral) one. "Rent" in economics merely implies that the profits are in excess of a competitive-equilibrium outcome/allocation. In this case, the competitive outcome is perverse -- nobody innovates because, without IP, you pay for the cost of R&D but "copycats" can steal the idea without paying. (It's a prisoners' dilemma.) So profits from a patent are rent, insofar as they come from the protection per se. As I acknowledge, I think those rents are economically useful -- as an economist, I don't have anything interesting to say as to whether they are morally acceptable, as you discuss in your post. For example, it's a fair argument to say that "ideas should be free," and that the purpose of IP is not to enrich/honor/etc the innovator but merely to give him the incentive to contribute the idea to the social good. Or you might argue the opposite of that. I don't really have an opinion. Hopefully this clarifies the way economists use the word "rent."

Re: The Rent Hypothesis

#87
post #43
post #31

> Rents are not always bad. Protections for intellectual property make sense not in spite of the rents they generate, but rather because of them. A patent, after all, is a temporary monopoly. These monopoly rents give incentives for innovation and allow innovators to cover the costs of research and development. This is a weird way to talk about IP and rent. Is profit from IP necessarily rent? The problem is that "ren…

I've always seen rent defined as payment collected in excess of the seller's cost to make and hand over the product (not the whole product line, just the individual item). In a perfectly competitive market, price is driven down to match that cost, but the comparison with production cost is easier to apply in markets that aren't perfectly competitive (like licenses for a particular patent). Once an invention has been…

Yep, and I define it at the top of the most that way. Rent = profit in excess of opportunity cost of the production factor.

Re: The Rent Hypothesis

#88
post #73

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The way I reconcile it is usually, "Monopolies are okay when the the good in question only exists because of the monopolist." My monopoly on SilasX's labor? No problem. Creator's monopoly on patterns that only exist because that creator found them? Reasonable. Monopoly on all trade in salt? No, just no. (It gets trickier for physical property because of what counts as creating, but you get the point.)

Monopoly on life-saving medicine created by a scientist? Sold at prices out of reach for most people?

[deleted]

Re: The Rent Hypothesis

#89
post #69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The philosophy behind patents is that they encourage the sharing of research so that the total cost of rnd to society is minimized. Whithout ip protection, firms would rely on trade secrets. They would still charge more for their products but a competitor would have to spend the money on research to compete. I don't know if you would still call the premium they could charge rent or if you would amortize rnd over the…

Linux and the open source movement pretty much disproves that theory. Better (or "at least as good") quality kernels than the two biggest software companies and biggest defenders of intellectual property rights on the planet could manage. We should really look at the evidence rather than repeating the mantra.

I don't know if Linux/Open Source/Free Software disproves the theory, or actually proves it.

The argument would be: Microsoft and Apple feel that existing IP protections on software would not sufficiently prevent competitors or consumers from 'stealing' the results of their work. So, they don't release the source code. Because they don't release the source code, there's a duplication of effort between Microsoft, Apple, and any other kernel-writers.

If there existed extremely strong IP protection laws for software, that required release of source (like a patent, basically), then Apple and Microsoft might release source, duplicate less effort, and their disadvantage to Linux would be reduced.

Open Source is what happens when you have a system that encourages these secrets to be shared. The only difference is, Linux manages to get R&D effort without the benefit of a monopoly-grant, or indeed, without any direct profit motivation.

Re: The Rent Hypothesis

#90
post #44

See also: The Law of Rent Land, and natural opportunities in general, are the original and most fundamental source of rent. Even the electromagnetic spectrum is monopolized. And although the holders of these exclusive rights do pay the FCC, they pay very little compared to the actual value. Likewise, people pay very little in taxes compared to the true value of their land. Imagine if instead of having to pay income t…

As an interesting thought experiment -

What if we taxed land, but the tax rate was based entirely on the size of the parcel, and the total valuation (land + improvements) of all nearby parcels, not including the current one.

In theory, this adjusts the price of holding the land based on how desirable it is, encouraging either efficient use, or selling, and doesn't encourage trickery where someone tries to keep their appraisal low so as to reduce their tax burden.

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