Since Keybase inevitably comes up in these PGP conversations, 2 things in advance: 1. I've really been very slow in letting people into Keybase. The wait time is still 6 months (last night I was letting in people who asked back in August.) But now that we've added HackerNews key proofs, I'll let people in today who notice this post who have more than 1 karma and write "I'm HN: {theirusername}" in the request form. 2.…
PGP: There’s Life in the Old Dog Yet
61–70 of 79 posts
Re: PGP: There’s Life in the Old Dog Yet
#62Since Keybase inevitably comes up in these PGP conversations, 2 things in advance: 1. I've really been very slow in letting people into Keybase. The wait time is still 6 months (last night I was letting in people who asked back in August.) But now that we've added HackerNews key proofs, I'll let people in today who notice this post who have more than 1 karma and write "I'm HN: {theirusername}" in the request form. 2.…
I was initially skeptical of Keybase, but I was happy to see the comments on HN of letting people use keybase without installing the CLI client were listened to. Seeing how many of my friends are on keybase now, that never had gpg setup before, I can't help but think it's filling a need that's otherwise unserved.
It's pretty straightforward if you already have a key pair / GPG installed. There's no Keybase software to run, and the site basically acts like a todo list / tutorial.
Re: PGP: There’s Life in the Old Dog Yet
#63I'm not really positioning TextSecure as a secure mail solution, but this article says that the TextSecure protocol can't support asynchronous operations or federated namespaces. To clarify, that's incorrect, the TextSecure protocol was actually designed from the ground up for asynchronous communication, and is designed to support a federated namespace: https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/ That leav…
Still would like to see your source for the "50k active user base" claim.
Is like people have forgotten that they should trust only the algorithms and the implementations, not the persona behind them. And that persona, should be the first saying "don't trust me! trust my algorithms!".
Re: PGP: There’s Life in the Old Dog Yet
#64Since Keybase inevitably comes up in these PGP conversations, 2 things in advance: 1. I've really been very slow in letting people into Keybase. The wait time is still 6 months (last night I was letting in people who asked back in August.) But now that we've added HackerNews key proofs, I'll let people in today who notice this post who have more than 1 karma and write "I'm HN: {theirusername}" in the request form. 2.…
Re: PGP: There’s Life in the Old Dog Yet
#65I'm not really positioning TextSecure as a secure mail solution, but this article says that the TextSecure protocol can't support asynchronous operations or federated namespaces. To clarify, that's incorrect, the TextSecure protocol was actually designed from the ground up for asynchronous communication, and is designed to support a federated namespace: https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/ That leav…
Still would like to see your source for the "50k active user base" claim.
Re: PGP: There’s Life in the Old Dog Yet
#66Since Keybase inevitably comes up in these PGP conversations, 2 things in advance: 1. I've really been very slow in letting people into Keybase. The wait time is still 6 months (last night I was letting in people who asked back in August.) But now that we've added HackerNews key proofs, I'll let people in today who notice this post who have more than 1 karma and write "I'm HN: {theirusername}" in the request form. 2.…
Re: PGP: There’s Life in the Old Dog Yet
#67Earlier quoted context omitted.
Still would like to see your source for the "50k active user base" claim.
He doesn't have one. Sometimes I wonder how difficult would be to sneak a sabouteur into the crypto community, who advocated for ditching proven and safe crypto tools, wanted his solutions on top of centralized servers owned by others, opposed distribution of signed binaries in FOSS markets, recommended the people to use stock OSs with binary and who-knows-what google libs inside, instead of installing the free count…
If you take every key uploaded to the key servers ever, then it's more like 4 million. However most of those aren't active.
TextSecure, in contrast, has vastly more users than PGP has ever had, despite being a lot newer.
Sometimes I wonder how difficult would be to sneak a sabouteur into the crypto community, who advocated for ditching proven and safe crypto tools
Sometimes I wonder if the best way to sabotage the crypto community would be to fill it with people aggressively advocating for obsolete technologies that have zero chance of any meaningful impact :)
Moxie is unusual in the strong crypto space, in that he is willing to make pragmatic engineering choices in order to ship a working product. That is why he and his team have had a lot more impact than most others have.
Re: PGP: There’s Life in the Old Dog Yet
#68Earlier quoted context omitted.
https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/ https://whispersystems.org/blog/advanced-ratcheting/ https://whispersystems.org/blog/simplifying-otr-deniability/
> With the initial key exchange out of the way, both parties can then continue communicating with an OTR-style protocol as usual. Since the server never hands out the same prekey twice (and the client would never accept the same prekey twice), we are able to provide forward secrecy in a fully asynchronous environment. So, my laptop is off-line, and I have access to a recipients public key. How do I encrypt my message…
The pre-key is needed when you have never talked to someone (I guess it's also needed when the last conversation is really old, I haven't dug throuh the code); it's a necessary bootstrap step. After that all you need is inside your client.
> So, my laptop is off-line, and I have access to a recipients public key. How do I encrypt my message, before moving it to a machine that's on-line for sending via smtp?
You encrypt it on your laptop, transfer the encrypted blob to your online machine and send the blob through it. All state is managed by your laptop, intermediary machines are just forwarding the message (which is merely an opaque blob at this point, possibly with a "destination" to ease routing to the recipient(s)).
> Nor does it appear to work for writing and encrypting an sms while on an air-plane
From a user pov, there is no difference between:
- I type the message and hit send, the message is encrypted now and sent when I have connectivity
- I type the message and hit send, the message is encrypted and sent when I have connectivity
The problem here will not be technical but purely UX (the software has to allow deferring encryption and sending when resources are available)
> It also carries more state around (on the "server" and on the "client") so it's not decentralized.
The little state there is on the server really doesn't sound centralized to me in that it is really simple (the server must be able to store a given list of blobs sent by the client, and the server must not send twice the same blob, ever) and a client can choose any server (there is no concept of "registration", but the client has to trust the server it will not misbehave).
The state on the client is really client-specific, it wouldn't make sense to share a client's ratchet state: as a comparison you wouldn't share the current bucket list of your DHT client with other machines because it doesn't make sense, you would rebuild it from scratch on another machine. Effectively this means every device of yours is considered another independent "peer".
I think it's important at this point to say that this mechanism is the Axolotl ratchet (more details here: https://github.com/trevp/axolotl/wiki). It only describes how to exchange encrypted messages between two DH keys, asynchronously, and with forward secrecy. It doesn't care about :
- what is the relationship between DH keys ("should I encrypt to 2 DH keys because they belong to the same user ?")
- how do get someone's key, and is it the good one (the key distribution management)
- how can I have a coherent message history between my phone and my computer
These are all real problems that TextSecure aims to solve, but they're a whole another thing.
Re: PGP: There’s Life in the Old Dog Yet
#69Since Keybase inevitably comes up in these PGP conversations, 2 things in advance: 1. I've really been very slow in letting people into Keybase. The wait time is still 6 months (last night I was letting in people who asked back in August.) But now that we've added HackerNews key proofs, I'll let people in today who notice this post who have more than 1 karma and write "I'm HN: {theirusername}" in the request form. 2.…
Re: PGP: There’s Life in the Old Dog Yet
#70People who say that security is meant to be hard are missing the point, OTR has been around for a long time and is not only much more secure than PGP but more useable. If you want truly secure asynchronous messaging you should checkout Pond by Adam Langley, which is arguably the only traffic analysis and metadata resistant messaging protocol on the planet. Unfortunately PGP has been designed in a way that careful key management is pretty much a requirement if you want. PGP key verification is extremely painful on every implementation I've ever seen, and unless you do it you are vulnerable to extremely potent attacks which are the result of plaintext key sharing algorithms like HKP and LDAP.
I'm with moxie on this one, I get sad that people are still trying to build modern 'secure' architecture based on a ~20 year old cryptosystem. It sets everyone who cares about useable security back because you are continually encouraging people to cling on to the old paradigm. Unfortunately there is no clear, universal successor to the PGP kingdom... yet.