I went to Best Buy as well today and picked up a laptop to look into this further. The Superfish software is not properly passing the validation state of the public cert when it connects to a website like Bank of America as an example. There's no need to export their private and use it in a MitM transparent proxy. The software is simply not triggering appropriate warnings when provided an obviously fake certificate t…
Browser Vulnerability to Superfish: A Fact-Finding Trip to Best Buy [pdf]
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Re: Browser Vulnerability to Superfish: A Fact-Finding Trip to Best Buy [pdf]
#42Shouldn't Lenovo be issuing a recall and pulling all the inventory in their distribution channel? In other words, Best Buy shouldn't be selling these things!
http://news.lenovo.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=1929 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9074676 http://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/superfish
Re: Browser Vulnerability to Superfish: A Fact-Finding Trip to Best Buy [pdf]
#43I went to Best Buy as well today and picked up a laptop to look into this further. The Superfish software is not properly passing the validation state of the public cert when it connects to a website like Bank of America as an example. There's no need to export their private and use it in a MitM transparent proxy. The software is simply not triggering appropriate warnings when provided an obviously fake certificate t…
I suppose they were relying on the prepending of "verify_fail" to the hostname (with an invalid character - '_') to cause the browser to fail the certificate name check, so Superfish is doing certificate checking? Shouldn't the browser then complain with a "certificate's hostname does not match the site's" warning? ...Or am I looking at this in the wrong way?
Re: Browser Vulnerability to Superfish: A Fact-Finding Trip to Best Buy [pdf]
#44While this whole Superfish/Lenovo thing is certainly quite scary, let's not forget the very important fact that, currently, the user ultimately still has the ability to modify the software on the machines he/she owns, which includes among other things (un)installing software like Superfish, and also adding/removing trusted certificates. There will be those who advocate locking down the certificate stores and other ar…
http://boingboing.net/2012/08/23/civilwar.html
http://boingboing.net/2012/01/10/lockdown.html
The future really scares me. And yes, backlash from Superfish fiasco will probably only make things worse.
Re: Browser Vulnerability to Superfish: A Fact-Finding Trip to Best Buy [pdf]
#45Earlier quoted context omitted.
I suppose they were relying on the prepending of "verify_fail" to the hostname (with an invalid character - '_') to cause the browser to fail the certificate name check, so Superfish is doing certificate checking? Shouldn't the browser then complain with a "certificate's hostname does not match the site's" warning? ...Or am I looking at this in the wrong way?
You're close. I'm not in the business of telling people how to exploit this and am assuming those who already know were already doing it based on what would be a "best practice" (for a bad guy that is) when it comes to generating a self-signed cert.
Re: Browser Vulnerability to Superfish: A Fact-Finding Trip to Best Buy [pdf]
#46This is a PDF attached to this issue, requesting blacklisting of the Superfish certificate: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1134506
I'm somewhat puzzled by the single certificate. Couldn't they have generated a new signing request and self-signed on each machine - at least ensuring that each customer has a unique cert for their proxy?
Re: Browser Vulnerability to Superfish: A Fact-Finding Trip to Best Buy [pdf]
#47While this whole Superfish/Lenovo thing is certainly quite scary, let's not forget the very important fact that, currently, the user ultimately still has the ability to modify the software on the machines he/she owns, which includes among other things (un)installing software like Superfish, and also adding/removing trusted certificates. There will be those who advocate locking down the certificate stores and other ar…
Re: Browser Vulnerability to Superfish: A Fact-Finding Trip to Best Buy [pdf]
#48Earlier quoted context omitted.
You're close. I'm not in the business of telling people how to exploit this and am assuming those who already know were already doing it based on what would be a "best practice" (for a bad guy that is) when it comes to generating a self-signed cert.
...is it blindly copying any x509v3 attributes present on the certificate, or just the one that you seem to be carefully not mentioning? Can you email me (one is listed in my HN profile)? I just thought of a pretty horrible exploit. 2199399413f2e63e6291a3f3e60f3475518aaf88215434222c65d6bc6fe41f34
The shocking thing is that the certificate name matching algorithm has been standardised for over 15 years and yet those who wrote the cert generation code weren't aware of how browsers implement it.
Re: Browser Vulnerability to Superfish: A Fact-Finding Trip to Best Buy [pdf]
#49Shouldn't Lenovo be issuing a recall and pulling all the inventory in their distribution channel? In other words, Best Buy shouldn't be selling these things!
Re: Browser Vulnerability to Superfish: A Fact-Finding Trip to Best Buy [pdf]
#50Earlier quoted context omitted.
TIL Google is ok if you get backdoored by your boss.
The company I work for has a strict policy of no direct outbound connections from the corporate network. This is to prevent (or just make harder) for compromised machines from "phoning home". This has the unfortunate side effect that all internet traffic must go through a proxy, they have to MiTM SSL traffic. I just use my smartphone's data for any personal internet browsing.