An obvious place for a backdoor is in remote management CPUs embedded in the network card.
http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/csw-trustnetworkcard.pdf
Network cards which support RMCP/IPMI protocol are obvious points of attack. They can reboot machines, download boot images, install a new OS, patch memory, emulate a local console, and control the entire machine. CERT has some warnings:
https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-207A
If there's a default password in a network card, that's a backdoor. Here's a list of the default passwords for many common systems:
https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2013/...
"admin/admin" is popular.
The network card stores passwords in non-volatile memory. If anyone in the supply chain gets hold of the network card briefly, they can add a backdoor by plugging the card into a chassis for power, connecting a network cable, and adding a extra user/password of their own using Linux "ipmitool" running on another machine. The card, when delivered to the end user, now has a backdoor installed. If you have any servers you're responsible for, try connecting with IPMI and do a "list" command to see what users are configured. If you find any you didn't put there, big problem.
CERT warns that, if you use the same userid/password for multiple machines in your data center, discarded boards contain that password. So discarded boards must be shredded.