bandwidth & other info on mozilla's relays: https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/mozilla
kudos to mozilla for getting involved!
Deploying Tor Relays
31–40 of 91 posts
Re: Deploying Tor Relays
#32I hope they are going to be deploying exit nodes as well. It's not very safe to run an exit node but I doubt the FBI will be raiding Mozilla and other big companies for them if this practice continues.
It is plenty safe to run exit nodes. If your host complains, there is even form letters to send. The government knows that seizing an exit node will not help them in anyway (one can go online immediately.) Do you think Amazon gets raided? Do you know how many exit nodes are in AWS? My guess is lots because I know 2 people who have them and I don't know a lot of people.
AWS specifically says "no" to hosting exit relays. In fact, here's a large list of ISPs and their policies: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/GoodBadISP...
It's also worth noting that there are a large set of tips and guidelines to follow for exit relay operators: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki//doc/TorExitGu...
Re: Deploying Tor Relays
#33Earlier quoted context omitted.
Part of the problem of running an exit node is that it's unclear how "safe" it actually is, and as a result there is a lot of rumor and paranoia. Every country has different laws that affect the legal status of an exit node operator. For example, an Austrian man was arrested in 2011 for running an exit node and charged with being an accomplice to crimes that were carried out over Tor using his exit node. He was ultim…
What would be great is if a foundation came along that offered people a way to sponsor a Tor node without having to own or operate it themselves.
Re: Deploying Tor Relays
#34Earlier quoted context omitted.
Probably not from any foreign countries but I would bet 110% that they are an open book to the US government.
A problem that is not exclusive to Facebook. In fact, all U.S. companies are open books to U.S. Government employees wielding the right documents. My point was that a Tor Hidden Service provides anonymity to users in countries whose _links_ to Facebook's servers are policed.
Tor also provides censorship-resistance, through bridges. It is one of the only consistent ways to access the open internet from Iran or China.
Re: Deploying Tor Relays
#35Earlier quoted context omitted.
No way. In the US, at least, you're liable for the illegal traffic you route onto the internet as an individual.
Has that ever been proven? I suspect it's as unproven as the theory that Tor operators are "common carriers" and as liable for the traffic that passes over their connection as an ISP is for the traffic that passes over its connections.
I'd like to suggest
https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq.html.en
which was written by my colleagues at EFF. (It doesn't mention particular legal theories that may help exit node operators, though I think CDA §230 and DMCA §512 might be among the laws you're thinking of that have historically protected ISPs, since ISPs have resisted being classified as common carriers in the U.S.)
Re: Deploying Tor Relays
#36Can we donate to support this specific initiative?
Donate to the Tor Project. They currently rely on mostly government grants for funding their important work.
TorServers.net has also been mentioned already.
Re: Deploying Tor Relays
#37This is, of course, great news.
However, it's my impression that there is a surplus of entry and middle nodes, and a serious shortage of exit nodes, especially fast ones. Also, I've read that the geographic diversity of exit nodes is inadequate. I base these comments on discussions on the tor-talk and tor-relays lists, and from posts on the Tor Project blog.
Re: Deploying Tor Relays
#38Earlier quoted context omitted.
What would be great is if a foundation came along that offered people a way to sponsor a Tor node without having to own or operate it themselves.
IANAL, but would this just require someone incorporating or starting an LLC and then paying for the exit nodes in the name of that entity? Would that be sufficient protection?
Also not a lawyer, but you can still be charged criminally in the USA:
"Charging a corporation, however, does not mean that individual directors, officers, employees, or shareholders should not also be charged. Prosecution of a corporation is not a substitute for the prosecution of criminally culpable individuals within or without the corporation"
from http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999...
Re: Deploying Tor Relays
#39Earlier quoted context omitted.
> It is plenty safe to run exit nodes ... in someone else's data center. Never, ever in your own home. If you are raided ALL your computers and ancillaries will be seized.
I've ran an exit node in my home for several years and the worst I've seen as a result of it is several DMCA notices and one polite call from the police in another state.
Even that is too much contact for some people. A sane average person wants as little contact with the legal system and authority types as humanly possible, and for good reason.
Re: Deploying Tor Relays
#40I hope they are going to be deploying exit nodes as well. It's not very safe to run an exit node but I doubt the FBI will be raiding Mozilla and other big companies for them if this practice continues.
Its much easier to raid a big company because they have a clear physical prescence and a strong interest to focus on their core buisness. For example, some people in the company may defend their tor node, but managers will look to the interests of the company as a whole, concluding that the loss of dozens of jobs is not worth risking over something that is not a core competancy.
It seems like you're arguing from a pure realpolitik perspective. The FBI is going to raid your Tor node because they know it will make your boss unhappy.
Even under that assumption, what is the FBI's motivation for doing this supposed to be? They can obviously only do this for Tor nodes within their jurisdiction, but that's where they want them to be because it's easier to capture their traffic. It's not like exit node operators have any actual connection to the crimes the government may be investigating. The main thrust of the other Tor article on the front page[1] is that the primary source of criminality on Tor is hidden services that don't use exit nodes.