Why not DANE in browsers
imperialviolet.org
Why not DANE in browsers
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Re: Why not DANE in browsers
#2The meatiest bit of this article, which is great:
Attackers control connectivity. Connectivity is expensive. Connectivity is also unreliable: captive portals, proxies, and firewalls break it. These factors make OCSP certificate revocation unworkable. For similar reasons, they make DANE's ostensible safeguard against malicious CAs unworkable. In practice, DANE would probably only be usable as an additional CA; it would not be able to effectively overrule any of the 1482 existing CAs.
Re: Why not DANE in browsers
#3Thomas: Would you agree that DNSSEC is a solution looking for a problem?
Re: Why not DANE in browsers
#4Thomas: Would you agree that DNSSEC is a solution looking for a problem?
There are a lot of real problems that DNSSEC can help solve.
However, it is important to note that DNSSEC and DANE are two different things. Much of the recent discussion here has lumped them together.
Re: Why not DANE in browsers
#5Thomas: Would you agree that DNSSEC is a solution looking for a problem?
There are a lot of real problems that DNSSEC can help solve. However, it is important to note that DNSSEC and DANE are two different things. Much of the recent discussion here has lumped them together.
What would those problems be?
Re: Why not DANE in browsers
#6Earlier quoted context omitted.
There are a lot of real problems that DNSSEC can help solve. However, it is important to note that DNSSEC and DANE are two different things. Much of the recent discussion here has lumped them together.
What would those problems be?
Broadly? General MITM, Kaminsky, etc.
DANE as an application of DNSSEC is interesting (and based on the recent string of editorials, contentious as well). Using DANE to constrain CAs could add an additional layer of protection against a rogue CA. Using it as an additional CA could help facilitate moving towards "HTTPS-everywhere".
The takeaway of course in implementing it in any manner is that it is just another layer, not a panacea.
Outside of DANE, there are other applications such as IPSECKEY and SSHFP that have utility.
Re: Why not DANE in browsers
#7Earlier quoted context omitted.
What would those problems be?
Broadly? General MITM, Kaminsky, etc. DANE as an application of DNSSEC is interesting (and based on the recent string of editorials, contentious as well). Using DANE to constrain CAs could add an additional layer of protection against a rogue CA. Using it as an additional CA could help facilitate moving towards "HTTPS-everywhere". The takeaway of course in implementing it in any manner is that it is just another laye…
How does securing DNS lookups solve the MITM problem if the underlying traffic remains unencrypted? If you encrypt the traffic, you don't need secure DNS anymore.
Re: Why not DANE in browsers
#8Earlier quoted context omitted.
Broadly? General MITM, Kaminsky, etc. DANE as an application of DNSSEC is interesting (and based on the recent string of editorials, contentious as well). Using DANE to constrain CAs could add an additional layer of protection against a rogue CA. Using it as an additional CA could help facilitate moving towards "HTTPS-everywhere". The takeaway of course in implementing it in any manner is that it is just another laye…
How does securing DNS lookups solve the MITM problem if the underlying traffic remains unencrypted? If you encrypt the traffic, you don't need secure DNS anymore.
The DNS traffic doesn't need to be secret ("encrypted"), it just needs to be authenticated (i.e. the payload has not been modified and there is a chain of trust).
If a client is pre-seeded with trusted root keys, DNSSEC protected payload can be validated to the apex.
Re: Why not DANE in browsers
#9The fact that TXT records don't work for some people shouldn't stop us. Anything that isn't currently widely used is broken for lots of people, because that's how networks are administered. Once it gets deployed and people start complaining, any specific network problem will get fixed.
Delaying proper network security because it won't currently work for a few percent of people seems like a recipe for never getting there.
Re: Why not DANE in browsers
#10Earlier quoted context omitted.
How does securing DNS lookups solve the MITM problem if the underlying traffic remains unencrypted? If you encrypt the traffic, you don't need secure DNS anymore.
The DNS traffic doesn't need to be secret ("encrypted"), it just needs to be authenticated (i.e. the payload has not been modified and there is a chain of trust). If a client is pre-seeded with trusted root keys, DNSSEC protected payload can be validated to the apex.
If traffic is end-to-end protected with cryptography --- as, for instance, it is in the SSH protocol --- why does it matter if DNS records are authenticated? If you forge a DNS record, the SSH protocol will kill the session. SSH doesn't even need to care what the DNS says; all that matters are the cryptographic secrets.