Might want to check out OpenBSD's OpenNTPD: http://www.openntpd.org/
The portable version (for Linux and other OSes) is unmaintained and the last release is from 2006. I don't use it on that basis alone. Also, the last release of non-portable openntpd is from 2009.
Multiple vulnerabilities released in NTP
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Re: Multiple vulnerabilities released in NTP
#22Re: Multiple vulnerabilities released in NTP
#23Re: Multiple vulnerabilities released in NTP
#24NTP is one of those old school Internet protocols that was developed in "a more civilized age". The reference implementation "growed like Topsy" in an academic setting. So it's not surprising that it has serious vulnerabilities. Many years ago OpenBSD threw up their hands and just decided to roll their own, named OpenNTPD. It's not nearly as full featured as the reference implementation, but it works fine for most pe…
NTP's author, Eric Fair, is actually the son of the founder of Fair-Issac. Very smart cat, but this was all written so, so long ago it was bound to be exploitable sooner or later.
Re: Multiple vulnerabilities released in NTP
#25In the meantime Miroslav's chrony is a good alternative: http://chrony.tuxfamily.org/
If you are looking for the fixed version you can grab 4.2.8 from archive.ntp.org which is still responding to requests: http://archive.ntp.org/ntp4/ntp-4.2/ntp-4.2.8.tar.gz
Re: Multiple vulnerabilities released in NTP
#26Re: Multiple vulnerabilities released in NTP
#27Better just replace it with tlsdate.
Re: Multiple vulnerabilities released in NTP
#28The best solution is not to use ntp anyway. It's an unencrypted, unauthenticated protocol vulnerable to Man in the Middle attacks. There was a pretty neat attack presented at BH Europe circumventing HSTS with a MitM-attack on NTP. Better just replace it with tlsdate.
Or can you circumvent certificate revocations this way?
Re: Multiple vulnerabilities released in NTP
#29The best solution is not to use ntp anyway. It's an unencrypted, unauthenticated protocol vulnerable to Man in the Middle attacks. There was a pretty neat attack presented at BH Europe circumventing HSTS with a MitM-attack on NTP. Better just replace it with tlsdate.
I don't understand what attacks are possible... making an enemy late for work when his alarm goes off several hours late? Or can you circumvent certificate revocations this way?
Being able to control he time could theoretically let you control any PRNGs that rely on it.