Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't care what you call it; the point is, it doesn't save you from anything that the correct SSH configuration doesn't already protect you from. If you really believe that OpenSSH is too scary to expose to the Internet for fear of memory corruption flaws, don't stop at a half-measure like "port authentication". After all: once you "authenticate" the port, the attacker can simply hijack your TCP connection to trigg…
Yes, an AES-CTR transformation would be more secure than any port knocking variety such as SPA, at the cost of being more complicated. But the point in port knocking is not its intrinsic security, which is not worth to talk about: its point is actually the obscurity it adds to some other secure access method such as SSH, and its ease of implementation and usage. With it you get much shorter and less noisy logs to mon…
I also dispute that a plugboard proxy is "more complicated" than "cryptographic port knocking".