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Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

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Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#421

Post by wooster20 »

digitalsushi wrote: post #32

This certificate industry has been such a racket. It's not even tacit that there are two completely separate issues that certificates and encryption solve. They get conflated and non technical users rightly get confused about which thing is trying to solve a problem they aren't sure why they have. The certificate authorities are quite in love that the self-signed certificate errors are turning redder, bolder, and big…

I'm all for CAs to burn in a special hell. The other cost, though, was always getting a unique IP. Is that still a thing? Has someone figured out multiple certificates for different domains on the same IP? Weren't we running out of IPv4 at some point?

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#422

Post by corobo »

lorenzhs wrote: post #407
dscrd wrote: post #402

Earlier quoted context omitted.

... and then you do rm .ssh/known_hosts and try again :P

ssh-keygen -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts -R 123.45.67.89

You have probably just saved me.. minutes of time over the course of a year!

But seriously thanks, I was going into the known_hosts file and manually deleting the offending line :)

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#423

Post by schoen »

chmike wrote: post #416

Wouldn't this result in putting all the eggs in a single basket ? Beside, as an European, I'm not so excited that such initiative is under control of American Law. I suspect that American interests will prevail.

Would you like to spell out more explicitly which effects of U.S. jurisdiction you're most concerned with?

I agree that there are several possible effects of jurisdiction on CAs that people could reasonably be concerned with (whether as would-be certificate requestors or would-be relying parties), but I'm wondering which ones are concerning you most.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#424

Post by schoen »

wooster20 wrote: post #421
digitalsushi wrote: post #32

This certificate industry has been such a racket. It's not even tacit that there are two completely separate issues that certificates and encryption solve. They get conflated and non technical users rightly get confused about which thing is trying to solve a problem they aren't sure why they have. The certificate authorities are quite in love that the self-signed certificate errors are turning redder, bolder, and big…

I'm all for CAs to burn in a special hell. The other cost, though, was always getting a unique IP. Is that still a thing? Has someone figured out multiple certificates for different domains on the same IP? Weren't we running out of IPv4 at some point?

Yes, there are two main mechanisms, each with its own limitations.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SubjectAltName https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#425

Post by jules »

pilif wrote: post #111
Joeri wrote: post #102

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Self-signed certificates are still better than http plain text. I understand not showing the padlock icon for self-signed certificates, I don't understand why you would warn people away from them when the worst case is that they are just as unsafe as when they use plain http. IMHO this browser behavior is completely nonsensical.

How would a browser know that the the self-signed certificate that was just presented for www.mybank.com is intended to be self-signed (show no error, but also show no padlock) or whether it's the result of a MITM attack because www.mybank.com is supposed to present a properly signed certificate (show error)? How would you inform people going to www.mybank.com which is presenting a self-signed cert in a way that a) t…

How would a browser know that the fact that www.mybank.com doesn't use SSL at all is intended by the bank, or the result of a MITM attack? At the end of the day it all relies on the user seeing the (lack of) a padlock in his browser. So as long as you don't show a padlock (or a different kind of padlock) for www.mybank.com when the certificate is self signed, you're good.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#426

Post by erpellan »

lorenzhs wrote: post #407
dscrd wrote: post #402

Earlier quoted context omitted.

... and then you do rm .ssh/known_hosts and try again :P

ssh-keygen -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts -R 123.45.67.89

If you get past the terrifying warning, it even gives you the command to copy and paste. You don't even have to type it!

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#427

Post by lmm »

kaoD wrote: post #160
Joeri wrote: post #102

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Self-signed certificates are still better than http plain text. I understand not showing the padlock icon for self-signed certificates, I don't understand why you would warn people away from them when the worst case is that they are just as unsafe as when they use plain http. IMHO this browser behavior is completely nonsensical.

No. Self-signed certificates are much worse because they bring a false sense of security. A self-signed certificate is trivially MITMed unless you have a way to authenticate the certificate. At the moment CAs are the best known way to do that (and before anyone brings certificate pinning or WoT, they come with their own problems, please read this comment of mine https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8616766 ). EDIT: Y…

> A self-signed certificate is trivially MITMed unless you have a way to authenticate the certificate.

Trivial? Yes. As trivial as intercepting plain HTTP? No.

The NSA or adversary du jour can vacuum up anything sent over plain HTTP with zero risk. Self-signed HTTPS forces the attacker to commit some resources and, more importantly, run the risk of exposure. Security is not a binary (no encryption scheme is perfect), it's about increasing the cost to attackers.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#428

Post by lmm »

Buge wrote: post #202
digitalsushi wrote: post #32

This certificate industry has been such a racket. It's not even tacit that there are two completely separate issues that certificates and encryption solve. They get conflated and non technical users rightly get confused about which thing is trying to solve a problem they aren't sure why they have. The certificate authorities are quite in love that the self-signed certificate errors are turning redder, bolder, and big…

I just bought a cert on Saturday for $9. It's less than the domain name.

$9 is a big step up from free, which is what the rest of my blog costs.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#429

Post by pluma »

schoen wrote: post #423
chmike wrote: post #416

Wouldn't this result in putting all the eggs in a single basket ? Beside, as an European, I'm not so excited that such initiative is under control of American Law. I suspect that American interests will prevail.

Would you like to spell out more explicitly which effects of U.S. jurisdiction you're most concerned with? I agree that there are several possible effects of jurisdiction on CAs that people could reasonably be concerned with (whether as would-be certificate requestors or would-be relying parties), but I'm wondering which ones are concerning you most.

NSLs? US agencies are legally able to perform MITM attacks under US jurisdiction.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#430

Post by rakoo »

seszett wrote: post #410
lunarcave wrote: post #404

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> SSH has. IMHO no. We don't SSH to the same 46 servers everyday. But we do log into that many (or more) websites. Can you imagine the amount of homework users need to do in order for this to work? Not to mention the amount of non-tech savvy users who just won't put up with it.

Quite the contrary: SSH's system means that you only have to "do your homework" when first connecting to the server. It seems I have 64 lines in my ~/.ssh/known_hosts (there are probably quite a few duplicates, because this seems high to me) and almost never have SSH tell me the key has changed and someone could be doing something nasty. When it does, I almost always know why, and when I don't then I try to contact t…

Or you can install Certificate Patrol (https://addons.mozilla.org/fr/firefox/addon/certificate-patr...). And then you'll cry at the amount of sites badly configured.
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