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Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

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Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#351

This is an awesome idea. But I thought the whole idea of a certificate authority is so that we can trust that the CA has vetted the person/site that they have given the certificate to. If all they do is issue certs for free, all we get is encryption, but no identity verification.

With basic certs, the CA just verifies that the entity controls the website the cert is being issued for. The OP explains how Let's Encrypt will do that. (And if they appeared not to be doing that, no software vendors would include the CA in the trust list). With an "Extended Validation" cert, the CA additionally verifies that they are who they say they are on the cert (not just that they control the (web)sites the c…

Further upthread, Josh (one of the other people working on the project) explained that Let's Encrypt currently only has plans to issue DV certs, not EV certs.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8624634

This is because of the automation aspect. EV cert issuance involves a human being looking at offline identity; DV issuance involves proofs of control that can be checked online by a computer, just as existing DV issuance by existing CAs is based on such checks.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#352
post #237

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The thing that's causing the delay is not the client software development, it's the need to create the CA infrastructure and then perform a WebTrust audit. If we were ready on the CA side to begin issuing certificates today, we would be issuing them today.

I think I may have misunderstood all of you. Is the audit process itself really that time consuming? I can imagine the amounts of bureaucracy involved, but I can't image this takes much longer than, say, a month or so. Most of the time is probably spent waiting for someone or something, right? I mean we're talking about very capable people here who have done this kind of thing before.

You are lucky to not have had to deal with corporate beuracracy - these things take time :-) At work I'm integrating an API for a mobile operator, it's apparently working and ready to be used however I've been waiting a couple of months to get all the documentation and everything setup.

Even once they have the CA it needs to be added to browsers which will take time. Taking into account release cycles of embedded devices (read phones where the manufacturer hasn't released an update), summer 2015 seems rather optimistic.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#353
post #178
post #144

So this means that GoDaddy, Namecheap, Verisign and other sellers/resellers of SSL certificates will need to lower their prices soon, right? Because in a short time many websites won't need to purchase one since they can get it free. Also, have they built this system with a completely scalable distributed architecture? For it to be practical it needs to be performant. Also, does the NSA have access to the core of thi…

You can already get free certificates from startssl today: https://www.startssl.com/?app=1

Aren't those only for personal (i.e. non commercial) websites?

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#354
post #3

Free CA? This is cool. Why this wasn't done a long time ago is beyond me. (Also please support wildcard certs) An interesting thing happened at a meet-up at Square last year. Someone from google's security team came out and demonstrated what google does to notify a user that a page has been compromised or is a known malicious attack site. During the presentation she was chatting about how people don't really pay atte…

It wasn't done a long time ago because running a CA costs money (which is why they charge for certificates), so whoever signs up to run one is signing up for a money sink with no prospect of direct ROI, potentially for a loooooong time. This new CA is to be run by a non-profit that uses corporate sponsorship rather than being supported by the market; whether that's actually a better model in the long run is I suppose…

I'm curious. Whats the biggest cost in running a CA? As in, what makes those certs so expensive?

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#355

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> HTTP can be man-in-the-middled passively, and without detection; making dragnets super easy. Nothing can be man-in-the-middled passively, that makes no sense. That isn't what a MitM is. It requires active involvement by its very nature. > In order for HTTPS self signed certs to be effectively man-in-the-middled the attacker needs to be careful to only selectively MITM because if the attacker does it indiscriminatel…

> Nothing can be man-in-the-middled passively, that makes no sense. That isn't what a MitM is. It requires active involvement by its very nature. By this I mean record all form submissions done through HTTP. >> In order for HTTPS self signed certs to be effectively man-in-the-middled the attacker needs to be careful to only selectively MITM because if the attacker does it indiscriminately clients can record what publ…

>man-in-the-middled passively

"eavesdropped" is the word you're looking for.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#356

The EFF has a bad track record in this area. The last time they tried something to identify web sites, it was TRUSTe, a nonprofit set up by the EFF and headed by EFF's director. Then TRUSTe was spun off as a for-profit private company, reduced their standards, stopped publishing enforcement actions, and became a scam operation. The Federal Trade Commission just fined them: "TRUSTe Settles FTC Charges it Deceived Cons…

Regarding your first paragraph, I agree: all CAs need continuing scrutiny. Certificate Transparency, for example. Regarding the rest of your post, however, I'm calling bullshit. You give very bad advice. Deploy TLS on every website . Deploy HTTP Strict-Transport-Security wherever you can. The sites people visit are confidential, and yes, are not protected enough at the moment. (That will eventually improve, piece by…

[deleted]

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#357
post #354

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It wasn't done a long time ago because running a CA costs money (which is why they charge for certificates), so whoever signs up to run one is signing up for a money sink with no prospect of direct ROI, potentially for a loooooong time. This new CA is to be run by a non-profit that uses corporate sponsorship rather than being supported by the market; whether that's actually a better model in the long run is I suppose…

I'm curious. Whats the biggest cost in running a CA? As in, what makes those certs so expensive?

Your mileage may vary, but the biggest upfront cost is the WebTrust audit. Certly got quoted $150k for a reasonable root and its subordinates. This is a yearly cost. HSMs are not cheap either, plus you have to host them securely, hire validation staff, etc...

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#358
post #3

Free CA? This is cool. Why this wasn't done a long time ago is beyond me. (Also please support wildcard certs) An interesting thing happened at a meet-up at Square last year. Someone from google's security team came out and demonstrated what google does to notify a user that a page has been compromised or is a known malicious attack site. During the presentation she was chatting about how people don't really pay atte…

It wasn't done a long time ago because running a CA costs money (which is why they charge for certificates), so whoever signs up to run one is signing up for a money sink with no prospect of direct ROI, potentially for a loooooong time. This new CA is to be run by a non-profit that uses corporate sponsorship rather than being supported by the market; whether that's actually a better model in the long run is I suppose…

> imposed by the CA/Browser Forum require (I think!)

That's something imposed by the audit criteria (WebTrust/ETSI). What you detailed is also why roots are left disconnected from the internet - if you compromise an intermediary, that can be blacklisted as opposed to the entire root.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#359
post #60

This certificate industry has been such a racket. It's not even tacit that there are two completely separate issues that certificates and encryption solve. They get conflated and non technical users rightly get confused about which thing is trying to solve a problem they aren't sure why they have. The certificate authorities are quite in love that the self-signed certificate errors are turning redder, bolder, and big…

> A self signed certificate warning means "Warning! The admin on the site you're connecting to wants this conversation to be private but it hasn't been proven that he has 200 bucks for us to say he's cool" no. It means "even though this connection is encrypted, there is no way to tell you whether you are currently talking to that site or to NSA which is forwarding all of your traffic to the site you're on". Treating…

> or to NSA which

Nah. The NSA, or any adversary remotely approaching them in resources, has the ability to generate certificates that are on your browser's trust chain. Self-signed and unknown-CA warnings suggest that a much lower level attacker may be interfering.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#360
post #354

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It wasn't done a long time ago because running a CA costs money (which is why they charge for certificates), so whoever signs up to run one is signing up for a money sink with no prospect of direct ROI, potentially for a loooooong time. This new CA is to be run by a non-profit that uses corporate sponsorship rather than being supported by the market; whether that's actually a better model in the long run is I suppose…

I'm curious. Whats the biggest cost in running a CA? As in, what makes those certs so expensive?

Ensuring physical security of CA private keys is expensive. This requires things like sturdy padlocks, closed-circuit security cameras, and up-to-date hardware and software.

These are the things you pay for when you buy a certificate from a CA. In fact, I would be 100% opposed to obtaining my website's cert from a CA if it were free-of-charge, because I know good physical security is expensive. However, I already trust the EFF and the Umich researchers (and their assurances of physical security), so I'm absolutely happy with obtaining a free certificate from them.

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