The fact that they're able to "double your password" is a bad sign. Here's what this implies to me: * McGill had a database of everyone's password in plaintext at the time of Heartbleed * McGill is concerned about mitigating possible security compromises due to Heartbleed, including these plaintext passwords, which if they were compromised were compromised all at once * Despite this concern, McGill still has a databa…
Theoretically, they could have HAD the password in plaintext, then doubled it, salted it and hashed it in the new DB.
McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
41–50 of 152 posts
Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#42Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't think that's necessarily true. Let's say they have all of the passwords stored as bcrypt hashes, and they also know the last time you changed your password. They could just update the application logic to check that your password is of the form if your last change date is before X. Then to check the password, they just take the first half and check that against the hash.
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Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#43If so, it's pretty clever.
Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#44The fact that they're able to "double your password" is a bad sign. Here's what this implies to me: * McGill had a database of everyone's password in plaintext at the time of Heartbleed * McGill is concerned about mitigating possible security compromises due to Heartbleed, including these plaintext passwords, which if they were compromised were compromised all at once * Despite this concern, McGill still has a databa…
I don't think that's necessarily true. Let's say they have all of the passwords stored as bcrypt hashes, and they also know the last time you changed your password. They could just update the application logic to check that your password is of the form if your last change date is before X. Then to check the password, they just take the first half and check that against the hash.
"password123password123".match(/^(.+)\1$/)[1]Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#45I think that the goal here is not to increase password strength, but to make typing your old, short password so annoying that you pick a different one (that complies with the current password strength rules). That is, this isn't aimed at attackers; it's aimed at users. If so, it's pretty clever.
Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#46Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#47 The McGill Password length has also been increased from exactly eight
characters to a variable length of eight to 18 characters.
So they're not using bcrypt (usable length 72). Even PBKDF2 would have been acceptable, but my guess is that they were sold a "layer over" on their stack with this. I can already tell this is a hacky patch. Every year, about 1,200 to 1,500 McGill accounts are compromised in
one way or another.
Phishing + guessing. I know someone who gets about 2-3 emails a week asking to enter their login info into some site in Brazil or the Czech Republic.If every site properly salted and hashed passwords, reuse isn't even a problem. But as we know :
- Most people choose crappy passwords.
- Most sites use crappy hashing schemes (if they hash at all)
When other sites are compromised, there's an easy list of ready passwords to try against other potential targets.McGill's problem isn't Heartbleed.
Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#48Earlier quoted context omitted.
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Doubling doesn't provide a benefit, no matter how well they hash or don't hash.
Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#49Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#50The fact that they're able to "double your password" is a bad sign. Here's what this implies to me: * McGill had a database of everyone's password in plaintext at the time of Heartbleed * McGill is concerned about mitigating possible security compromises due to Heartbleed, including these plaintext passwords, which if they were compromised were compromised all at once * Despite this concern, McGill still has a databa…
They can put a flag on the database and check that the cleartext you send them when logging in is doubled before hashing half of it. I can't count how many times I've seen something that could easily be done at login time and people conclude that the service must be storing plaintext or multiple hashes. This isn't even a direct security measure in the first place. This is to annoy people into updating their passwords…