The fact that they're able to "double your password" is a bad sign. Here's what this implies to me: * McGill had a database of everyone's password in plaintext at the time of Heartbleed * McGill is concerned about mitigating possible security compromises due to Heartbleed, including these plaintext passwords, which if they were compromised were compromised all at once * Despite this concern, McGill still has a databa…
McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
31–40 of 152 posts
Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#32No, It does not mean that the password is stored as plaintext. Simply keep a flag for "UpdatedRecently?", if the flag is false, then not only should the first half of the input correctly match the hash, but the first half the input should match the second half.
How is that helpful for mitigating security issues though?
Although I suppose this was done to force the users to change their password.
Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#33Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's quite easy to come up with a scheme to manipulate the password client-side. I'd assume an organization with any technology credence whatsoever knows not to store unencrypted passwords by now.
take a look at pearson's blackboard, they store passwords in plain text.
Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#34The fact that they're able to "double your password" is a bad sign. Here's what this implies to me: * McGill had a database of everyone's password in plaintext at the time of Heartbleed * McGill is concerned about mitigating possible security compromises due to Heartbleed, including these plaintext passwords, which if they were compromised were compromised all at once * Despite this concern, McGill still has a databa…
I can't count how many times I've seen something that could easily be done at login time and people conclude that the service must be storing plaintext or multiple hashes.
This isn't even a direct security measure in the first place. This is to annoy people into updating their passwords.
Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#35The only challenge then becomes what constant text to add.
I would suggest something like, ishouldlistentosecurity. :-)
Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#36Hash(pw) + Hash(pw) := Hash(pw + pw)
(NB: Where '+' above is really just a stand-in for any pair of combining functions, not necessarily arithmetic addition or string concatenation.)
But, I agree with many others here that the likelihood of stored plain text passwords is very high.
Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#37Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's quite easy to come up with a scheme to manipulate the password client-side. I'd assume an organization with any technology credence whatsoever knows not to store unencrypted passwords by now.
take a look at pearson's blackboard, they store passwords in plain text.
Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#38The fact that they're able to "double your password" is a bad sign. Here's what this implies to me: * McGill had a database of everyone's password in plaintext at the time of Heartbleed * McGill is concerned about mitigating possible security compromises due to Heartbleed, including these plaintext passwords, which if they were compromised were compromised all at once * Despite this concern, McGill still has a databa…
It's quite easy to come up with a scheme to manipulate the password client-side. I'd assume an organization with any technology credence whatsoever knows not to store unencrypted passwords by now.
McGill does some beautiful IT admin stuff. And then it does some scary-ass shit like this.
Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#39No, It does not mean that the password is stored as plaintext. Simply keep a flag for "UpdatedRecently?", if the flag is false, then not only should the first half of the input correctly match the hash, but the first half the input should match the second half.
How is that helpful for mitigating security issues though?
Re: McGill will double your password if you don’t do it first
#40The fact that they're able to "double your password" is a bad sign. Here's what this implies to me: * McGill had a database of everyone's password in plaintext at the time of Heartbleed * McGill is concerned about mitigating possible security compromises due to Heartbleed, including these plaintext passwords, which if they were compromised were compromised all at once * Despite this concern, McGill still has a databa…
I don't think that's necessarily true. Let's say they have all of the passwords stored as bcrypt hashes, and they also know the last time you changed your password. They could just update the application logic to check that your password is of the form if your last change date is before X. Then to check the password, they just take the first half and check that against the hash.