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Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

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Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#111
post #102
post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> A self signed certificate warning means "Warning! The admin on the site you're connecting to wants this conversation to be private but it hasn't been proven that he has 200 bucks for us to say he's cool" no. It means "even though this connection is encrypted, there is no way to tell you whether you are currently talking to that site or to NSA which is forwarding all of your traffic to the site you're on". Treating…

Self-signed certificates are still better than http plain text. I understand not showing the padlock icon for self-signed certificates, I don't understand why you would warn people away from them when the worst case is that they are just as unsafe as when they use plain http. IMHO this browser behavior is completely nonsensical.

How would a browser know that the the self-signed certificate that was just presented for www.mybank.com is intended to be self-signed (show no error, but also show no padlock) or whether it's the result of a MITM attack because www.mybank.com is supposed to present a properly signed certificate (show error)?

How would you inform people going to www.mybank.com which is presenting a self-signed cert in a way that a) they clearly notice but that b) doesn't annoy you when you connect to www.myblog.com which also is presenting a self-signed cert?

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#113
post #104
post #102

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Self-signed certificates are still better than http plain text. I understand not showing the padlock icon for self-signed certificates, I don't understand why you would warn people away from them when the worst case is that they are just as unsafe as when they use plain http. IMHO this browser behavior is completely nonsensical.

The warning is designed to let people know that who you're talking to can't be proven, which is important when someone tries to impersonate a bank, or your email provider, or any other number of important sites.

CA-signed certificates don't prove you're talking to who you think you are either as any CA trusted by your browser/OS can sign any certificate.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#114
post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> A self signed certificate warning means "Warning! The admin on the site you're connecting to wants this conversation to be private but it hasn't been proven that he has 200 bucks for us to say he's cool" no. It means "even though this connection is encrypted, there is no way to tell you whether you are currently talking to that site or to NSA which is forwarding all of your traffic to the site you're on". Treating…

> no. It means "even though this connection is encrypted, there is no way to tell you whether you are currently talking to that site or to NSA which is forwarding all of your traffic to the site you're on". That would be correct if you could assume that the NSA couldn't fake certificates for websites. But it can, so it's wrong and misleading. It's certificate pinning, notary systems etc. that actually give some credi…

> FWIW, (valid) rogue certificates have been found in the wild several times, CAs have been compromised etc. ...

And it's only going to get worse as SHA-1 become more and more affordable to crack.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#115

So, one CA to rule then all? There's a scenario (simplified for illustration, but entirely possible) that's normally not a huge risk because there are many CAs, and they are private, for-profit companies that have an economic incentive to protect you and your certificate's ability to assure end users that a conversation's privacy won't be compromised. 1) browser requests site via SSL 2) MITM says, "let's chat - here'…

The NSA (or any other agency) only has to coerce any single CA to cooperate. As long as it's in the standard set shipped with browsers, its certificates are accepted.

And pretty much every major government directly or indirectly controls one or multiple CAs that are in the standard set.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#116
post #102
post #60

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> A self signed certificate warning means "Warning! The admin on the site you're connecting to wants this conversation to be private but it hasn't been proven that he has 200 bucks for us to say he's cool" no. It means "even though this connection is encrypted, there is no way to tell you whether you are currently talking to that site or to NSA which is forwarding all of your traffic to the site you're on". Treating…

Self-signed certificates are still better than http plain text. I understand not showing the padlock icon for self-signed certificates, I don't understand why you would warn people away from them when the worst case is that they are just as unsafe as when they use plain http. IMHO this browser behavior is completely nonsensical.

[deleted]

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#117

Very interesting, it looks like they're working with IdenTrust on this. I wonder if it supports wildcard certs. Like StartCom selling Class 2/3, running a CA is very expensive and I wonder how they plan on recouping the fees for this.

> running a CA is very expensive and I wonder how they plan on recouping the fees for this

Is it? Seems like it should be dirt cheap to me. It's basically just an API for generating and revoking certs.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#119
post #60

This certificate industry has been such a racket. It's not even tacit that there are two completely separate issues that certificates and encryption solve. They get conflated and non technical users rightly get confused about which thing is trying to solve a problem they aren't sure why they have. The certificate authorities are quite in love that the self-signed certificate errors are turning redder, bolder, and big…

> A self signed certificate warning means "Warning! The admin on the site you're connecting to wants this conversation to be private but it hasn't been proven that he has 200 bucks for us to say he's cool" no. It means "even though this connection is encrypted, there is no way to tell you whether you are currently talking to that site or to NSA which is forwarding all of your traffic to the site you're on". Treating…

Browsers shouldn't silently accept self-signed, but there is a class of servers where self-signed is the best we've got: connecting to embedded devices. If I want to talk to the new printer or fridge I got over the web, they have no way of establishing trust besides Tacking my first request to them.

Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web

#120
post #113
post #104

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The warning is designed to let people know that who you're talking to can't be proven, which is important when someone tries to impersonate a bank, or your email provider, or any other number of important sites.

CA-signed certificates don't prove you're talking to who you think you are either as any CA trusted by your browser/OS can sign any certificate.

This is true for most sites now, but is being solved gradually, with hard-coded certificate pinning already shipping in Firefox and Chrome, and the HTTP Public Key Pinning extension coming soon.
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