One possible solution is a BitCoin-like block chain of certificate proof, so that a website's certificate can be verified against the domain without a central authority.
That doesn't even remotely work, who has the private keys to authorize the certificates?
Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
101–110 of 476 posts
Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#102This certificate industry has been such a racket. It's not even tacit that there are two completely separate issues that certificates and encryption solve. They get conflated and non technical users rightly get confused about which thing is trying to solve a problem they aren't sure why they have. The certificate authorities are quite in love that the self-signed certificate errors are turning redder, bolder, and big…
> A self signed certificate warning means "Warning! The admin on the site you're connecting to wants this conversation to be private but it hasn't been proven that he has 200 bucks for us to say he's cool" no. It means "even though this connection is encrypted, there is no way to tell you whether you are currently talking to that site or to NSA which is forwarding all of your traffic to the site you're on". Treating…
Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#103Sorry agwa.
Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#104Earlier quoted context omitted.
> A self signed certificate warning means "Warning! The admin on the site you're connecting to wants this conversation to be private but it hasn't been proven that he has 200 bucks for us to say he's cool" no. It means "even though this connection is encrypted, there is no way to tell you whether you are currently talking to that site or to NSA which is forwarding all of your traffic to the site you're on". Treating…
Self-signed certificates are still better than http plain text. I understand not showing the padlock icon for self-signed certificates, I don't understand why you would warn people away from them when the worst case is that they are just as unsafe as when they use plain http. IMHO this browser behavior is completely nonsensical.
Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#105The "How It Works" page, https://letsencrypt.org/howitworks/ , has me a bit worried. Anytime I see a __magic__ solution that has you running a single command to solve all your problems I immediately become suspicious at how much thought went into the actual issue. If I'm running a single web app on a single Ubuntu server using Apache then I'm set! If I'm running multiple web apps across multiple servers using a load…
I run Apache httpd, and there's no way I'd let a wizard anywhere near my configuration files or private keys, much less run it on a production server. I think it's about time for a free CA that is recognized by all clients, but you still need to establish a trust chain to exchange a CSR for a signed certificate. This service needs to be server agnostic. The barrier to adoption isn't configuration, and HTTPS isn't the…
Because of the open protocol we also aspire to support users with more complex configurations and requirements, who are absolutely welcome and encouraged to write their own implementations of the protocol and integrate with their own existing certificate management and configuration methods. If you think of other barriers to adoption that we can help with, please let us know and we'll try to address them; if you just want our certs for free, please get them and enjoy!
Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#106Earlier quoted context omitted.
> no. It means "even though this connection is encrypted, there is no way to tell you whether you are currently talking to that site or to NSA which is forwarding all of your traffic to the site you're on". That would be correct if you could assume that the NSA couldn't fake certificates for websites. But it can, so it's wrong and misleading. It's certificate pinning, notary systems etc. that actually give some credi…
The NSA has no CA. The only attack they really have is brute force or server compromise - both of which undermine pinning.
Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#107The "How It Works" page, https://letsencrypt.org/howitworks/ , has me a bit worried. Anytime I see a __magic__ solution that has you running a single command to solve all your problems I immediately become suspicious at how much thought went into the actual issue. If I'm running a single web app on a single Ubuntu server using Apache then I'm set! If I'm running multiple web apps across multiple servers using a load…
We'll be doing quite a bit of work based on user feedback between now and when we go live. We're well aware that we need to cater to a variety of types of users.
Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#108This certificate industry has been such a racket. It's not even tacit that there are two completely separate issues that certificates and encryption solve. They get conflated and non technical users rightly get confused about which thing is trying to solve a problem they aren't sure why they have. The certificate authorities are quite in love that the self-signed certificate errors are turning redder, bolder, and big…
> A self signed certificate warning means "Warning! The admin on the site you're connecting to wants this conversation to be private but it hasn't been proven that he has 200 bucks for us to say he's cool" no. It means "even though this connection is encrypted, there is no way to tell you whether you are currently talking to that site or to NSA which is forwarding all of your traffic to the site you're on". Treating…
The self-signed cert risk has nothing to do with the NSA... if it's your cert or a known cert, you add it to the trust store, otherwise, you don't.
Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#109Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#110Earlier quoted context omitted.
IdenTrust will be cross-signing our roots while we apply to root programs.
Thanks for the clarification! You might want to add that point to your technical how-it-works section[1]. I was wondering how older browsers would accept a new CA's signature. Also, I really wish AOL would have donated their root certs to y'all[2] so you didn't have to set up a whole new CA. [1]: https://letsencrypt.org/howitworks/technology/ [2]: https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/000618....