Will these certificates work with Internet Explorer and Chrome?
Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
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Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#42This certificate industry has been such a racket. It's not even tacit that there are two completely separate issues that certificates and encryption solve. They get conflated and non technical users rightly get confused about which thing is trying to solve a problem they aren't sure why they have. The certificate authorities are quite in love that the self-signed certificate errors are turning redder, bolder, and big…
That being said: Identity verification is important as the encryption is worthless if you can be trivially man-in-the-middled. All encryption assures is that two end points can only read communications between one another, it makes no assurances that the two end points are who they claim to be.
So verification is a legitimate requirement and it does have a legitimate cost. The problem is the LOWEST barriers to entry are set too high, this has become a particular problem when insecure WiFi is so common and even "basic" web-sites really need HTTPS (e.g. this one).
Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#43This certificate industry has been such a racket. It's not even tacit that there are two completely separate issues that certificates and encryption solve. They get conflated and non technical users rightly get confused about which thing is trying to solve a problem they aren't sure why they have. The certificate authorities are quite in love that the self-signed certificate errors are turning redder, bolder, and big…
Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#44The "How It Works" page, https://letsencrypt.org/howitworks/ , has me a bit worried. Anytime I see a __magic__ solution that has you running a single command to solve all your problems I immediately become suspicious at how much thought went into the actual issue. If I'm running a single web app on a single Ubuntu server using Apache then I'm set! If I'm running multiple web apps across multiple servers using a load…
Domain validation is done through a challenge (issued by a CA) to sign arbitrary data and put on a URL (covered by the domain) the CA can then query. This seems pretty solid. Better then email.
Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#45There's a scenario (simplified for illustration, but entirely possible) that's normally not a huge risk because there are many CAs, and they are private, for-profit companies that have an economic incentive to protect you and your certificate's ability to assure end users that a conversation's privacy won't be compromised.
1) browser requests site via SSL
2) MITM says, "let's chat - here's my cert"
3) browser asks, "is this cert legit for this domain?"
4) MITM says, "yes, CA gave us this, because of FISA, to give to you as proof"
5) browser says, "ok, let's chat"
I'm not trying to spread FUD, but if you're NSA and you've been asking CAs for their master keys for years, doesn't a single CA sound great (free and easy == market consolidation), and doesn't EFF seem like the perfect vector for a Trojan horse like this, given its popularity and trust among hacker types gained in recent years?
Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#46The "How It Works" page, https://letsencrypt.org/howitworks/ , has me a bit worried. Anytime I see a __magic__ solution that has you running a single command to solve all your problems I immediately become suspicious at how much thought went into the actual issue. If I'm running a single web app on a single Ubuntu server using Apache then I'm set! If I'm running multiple web apps across multiple servers using a load…
I don't get why they are releasing a command line, instead of just giving us a cert that we can install by ourselves.
Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#47This certificate industry has been such a racket. It's not even tacit that there are two completely separate issues that certificates and encryption solve. They get conflated and non technical users rightly get confused about which thing is trying to solve a problem they aren't sure why they have. The certificate authorities are quite in love that the self-signed certificate errors are turning redder, bolder, and big…
But a man-in-the-middle attack will remove any secrecy encryption provides and to prevent that, we require certificate authorities to perform some minimal checks that public keys delivered to your browser are indeed the correct ones.
You've got a point about how warnings are pushing incentives towards more verification, but they serve a purpose that aligns with secrecy of communication.
Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#48Re: Launching in 2015: A Certificate Authority to Encrypt the Entire Web
#49This certificate industry has been such a racket. It's not even tacit that there are two completely separate issues that certificates and encryption solve. They get conflated and non technical users rightly get confused about which thing is trying to solve a problem they aren't sure why they have. The certificate authorities are quite in love that the self-signed certificate errors are turning redder, bolder, and big…
The warning pages are really ridiculous. Why doesn't every HTTP page show a warning you have to click through? But it's not like MITM attacks are not real. CAs don't realistically do a thing about them, but it is true that you can't trust that your connection is private based on TLS alone. (unless you're doing certificate pinning or you have some other solution).