> The gossip algorithm instead is doing peer-to-peer (N-to-N instead of 1-to-1) in a half-duplex model.
Unless you mean you're doing multicast, you're still doing 1-to-1 connections.
> We did develop the algorithm in the open and made a call on the community to provide feedback to help improve the design of the system.
I wouldn't trust myself, let alone many unknown people who are just volunteering their time and have no known credentials as a cryptographer.
> instead stuck to the best practices around the most modern systems.
Except for the whole "don't role your own crypto system" one.
There are just so many things that can go wrong and when crypto fails it can do so very quietly. Additionally, if you ever want anyone to interoperate with you it'll just be a PITA for them, and depending on who it is, a PITA for you.
The overhead of a proper protocol like (D)TLS isn't that much.
> "On our production frontend machines, SSL/TLS accounts for less than 1% of the CPU load, less than 10 KB of memory per connection and less than 2% of network overhead. Many people believe that SSL/TLS takes a lot of CPU time and we hope the preceding numbers will help to dispel that."
- Adam Langley, Google