We know, apple knows, everybody knows. Marketing.
This feature gives them some great marketing, and it works.
Fingerprints Are Usernames, Not Passwords (2013)
41–50 of 106 posts
Re: Fingerprints Are Usernames, Not Passwords (2013)
#42His argument proves too much. If he thinks fingerprints are too insecure to be allowed, then he must think the same of low-entropy passwords. Yet I don't see him advocating that Ubuntu force users to choose high-entropy passwords and rotate them regularly. If he's fine letting users choose a low level of security by picking simple passwords, why not also let them choose to auth with fingerprints? Also, I think he mis…
Why must high entropy passwords be rotated regularly anyway? Shouldn't they only need rotating after a certain number of incorrect logins? Shouldn't that number be decently high?
Regularly changing your password reduces the impact of an undetected security breach by shortening the maximum amount of time a leaked password remains useful.
Re: Fingerprints Are Usernames, Not Passwords (2013)
#43Earlier quoted context omitted.
A fingerprint is trivially stolen and duplicated, and once they have physical access to you it's trivial to coerce you to use it too.
People have been saying this kind of thing since the 5s debuted - is there any evidence that it's actually happened outside of the fevered imaginations of Whatif Warriors?
This is only an issue to people on the left hand side of this: http://xkcd.com/538/
Re: Fingerprints Are Usernames, Not Passwords (2013)
#44Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm sure he -does- think low entropy passwords are bad. However, once compromised, those can be changed. That's the point. (Plus, passwords aren't routinely collected and shared by governmental agencies. Just throwing that out there). As you say, with Apple's TouchID, you are actively choosing a less secure method to access your device, for convenience. But...that's also pretty close to what the author said. "Biometr…
I think convenience is important in this comparison because that generates a context in which TouchID is actually more secure, because it's more likely to be used than remembering and typing a passcode/phrase. Apple have shown the usage stats. There is also the inconvenience for attackers of reproducing a fingerprint through an elaborate process, which again makes TouchID more secure (in my opinion) in practice than…
Right, and I don't think the author necessarily disagrees with the idea of including TouchID in Apple products as an alternative to 'completely unlocked'.
As the author indicates, "This isn't a knock on Apple, as Thinkpad have embedded fingerprint readers for nearly a decade. My intention is to help stop and think about the place of biometrics in security."
The danger is viewing biometrics as a secure alternative to passwords; it's not. But comparatively few people are technically inclined enough to realize that; with Apple embracing it for convenience, we run the risk of people not understanding the security implications; the author saw evidence of that when asked to implement biometrics for file encryption, which is a terrible idea.
Re: Fingerprints Are Usernames, Not Passwords (2013)
#45Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think convenience is important in this comparison because that generates a context in which TouchID is actually more secure, because it's more likely to be used than remembering and typing a passcode/phrase. Apple have shown the usage stats. There is also the inconvenience for attackers of reproducing a fingerprint through an elaborate process, which again makes TouchID more secure (in my opinion) in practice than…
Right, and I don't think the author necessarily disagrees with the idea of including TouchID in Apple products as an alternative to 'completely unlocked'. As the author indicates, "This isn't a knock on Apple, as Thinkpad have embedded fingerprint readers for nearly a decade. My intention is to help stop and think about the place of biometrics in security." The danger is viewing biometrics as a secure alternative to…
I think I remember the issues: good passwords are arbitrary, hard to guess, can be changed at any time, are used for one purpose only. Biometrics (fingerprints) are none of these things.
Re: Fingerprints Are Usernames, Not Passwords (2013)
#46His argument proves too much. If he thinks fingerprints are too insecure to be allowed, then he must think the same of low-entropy passwords. Yet I don't see him advocating that Ubuntu force users to choose high-entropy passwords and rotate them regularly. If he's fine letting users choose a low level of security by picking simple passwords, why not also let them choose to auth with fingerprints? Also, I think he mis…
I'm sure he -does- think low entropy passwords are bad. However, once compromised, those can be changed. That's the point. (Plus, passwords aren't routinely collected and shared by governmental agencies. Just throwing that out there). As you say, with Apple's TouchID, you are actively choosing a less secure method to access your device, for convenience. But...that's also pretty close to what the author said. "Biometr…
>> "Plus, passwords aren't routinely collected and shared by governmental agencies"
Y U no read Greenwald? Not sure if trolling.
Re: Fingerprints Are Usernames, Not Passwords (2013)
#47Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Yet I don't see him advocating that Ubuntu force users... He doesn't have to for his point to be valid.
He won't allow fingerprint reader support in eCryptfs, yet he has put no effort into adding password complexity rules to eCryptfs.
I think part this is the fact that a lower complexity password can always be changed if compromised. If your fingerprint is compromised, you can't just generate a new one.
Re: Fingerprints Are Usernames, Not Passwords (2013)
#48Earlier quoted context omitted.
Fingerprints can be changed as easily as a username. Simply never use the "raw" fingerprint output of the device, instead XOR it with some key (like either something from factors 2 or 3, or simply a static key).
That's not changing the fingerprint that's using another password.
[deleted]
Re: Fingerprints Are Usernames, Not Passwords (2013)
#49Earlier quoted context omitted.
>they don't accept TouchID on first login after a restart That's because the hash of the print is stored on an encrypted volume of some kind, which requires your regular password to decrypt after a cold boot. Once the hash is in memory, the fingerprint can be used instead.
I'm not sure I'm following what you're saying a 100%, but based on this [1] i don't think the fingerprint hash is ever in memory. The TouchID camera sends the fingerprint hash directly to the secure enclave, where it is compared to the one saved there, and then the secure enclave sends a yes or no to memory, at least that's my interpretation 1. http://support.apple.com/kb/HT5949?viewlocale=en_US&locale=e...
I believe he meant "once the [password] hash is in memory"
Re: Fingerprints Are Usernames, Not Passwords (2013)
#50Something I feel that's always missed in these discussions is context: Who is the adversary you're attempting to protect against?
Your kids screwing around with your phone? TouchID does the job.
Random people screwing around with your phone if they find it? Same thing.
Government gets ahold of it? Yeah.. notsomuch.
Considering that the primary adversaries of an average smartphone user are other mere mortals, not dedicated spy agencies, a fingerprint login strikes a very good balance between usability and security.
Consider the alternative - either requiring a standard alphanumeric password on unlock (just about zero usability), or a 4 digit pin code (less usable than the fingerprint while providing identical, maybe slightly less security than that option), or more likely than not, no password of any kind, the whole touch ID thing is a massive jump forward in the security posture of the average iOS user.
Most iOS users I know have it enabled simply because it means they don't have to keep re-keying their app store password.