Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system • Hacker News Board

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#31

Post by oggy » Sun, Oct 05, 2014, 6:26 PM UTC

spindritf wrote: post #13

oggy wrote: post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> For what it's worth, e-voting isn't verifiable directly, > unless it's done in a way linked to voter identities You're missing out on the last 20 years of crypto research. I'd say we're not there yet, but people have been thinking hard about things such as verifiability (with vote confidentiality of course!), coercion resistance etc, and have come up with really cool ideas. As with his other work, David Chaum has s…

Systems that can be understood by maybe 10% of the population aren't really transparent.

I assume you mean that its transparency can be understood by 10% of the population, not how you use them (Pret a Voter for instance is quite straightforward). Still, that's a fair objection.

I can counter it with two points, though. First, I don't really understand how the current system in my country works. There are constituencies, preferential voting, overhang seats, etc. Second, what is the process of ensuring transparency? Surely I, as an individual, could not just go and demand to see and count all the ballots myself. I would need to turn to somebody I trust. This would stay the same, except that this time that somebody could be anyone who understands mixnets and zero-knowledge proofs, rather than a select number of political organizations.

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#32

Post by specialist » Sun, Oct 05, 2014, 6:33 PM UTC

ddingus wrote: post #5

SOAP BOX = 1 For what it's worth, e-voting isn't verifiable directly, unless it's done in a way linked to voter identities. Even then, it's highly exploitable, but it is verifiable, depending on the implementation. A trustworthy election embodies these four ideas to the maximum extent possible: 1. Anonymity. Votes cast are not linked to voters who cast them. 2. Transparency. The record of the voter intent, election l…

voting happens over a period of a week or two, distributing the votes nicely in time, preventing attacks, surprises and other things that can corrupt an election when it's all got to happen in one significant day.

Replying to this separately.

I disagree.

By greatly increasing the window size of the election, vote by mail greatly increases the cost of running campaigns. Leading to the money chase. So the barrier to entry for aspirants is higher. Which is just another form of corruption.

It's called ballot chasing. I both door bell and phone bank for campaigns I support. Every campaign does it. It's not cheap. And I believe (but cannot prove) it ultimately suppresses voter turn out by alienating voters by constant harassment.

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#33

Post by oggy » Sun, Oct 05, 2014, 6:37 PM UTC

specialist wrote: post #28

oggy wrote: post #7

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> For what it's worth, e-voting isn't verifiable directly, > unless it's done in a way linked to voter identities You're missing out on the last 20 years of crypto research. I'd say we're not there yet, but people have been thinking hard about things such as verifiability (with vote confidentiality of course!), coercion resistance etc, and have come up with really cool ideas. As with his other work, David Chaum has s…

There is no crypto based system which is appropriate for actual elections in the USA. While cool for technophiles, all crypto based systems rely on hash collisions to protect voter privacy. It's a combinatorial problem. Given a typical general election ballot (say 10-30 issues, with 1-6 choices each), the pool of voters (ballots cast) would need to number in the 100,000s. Alas, elections are administered per precinct…

It sounds like one of us doesn't know what they are talking about, and I don't think it's me. How does, say, Pret a Voter rely on hash collisions to protect voter privacy?

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#34

Post by specialist » Sun, Oct 05, 2014, 6:38 PM UTC

oggy wrote: post #31

spindritf wrote: post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Systems that can be understood by maybe 10% of the population aren't really transparent.

I assume you mean that its transparency can be understood by 10% of the population, not how you use them (Pret a Voter for instance is quite straightforward). Still, that's a fair objection. I can counter it with two points, though. First, I don't really understand how the current system in my country works. There are constituencies, preferential voting, overhang seats, etc. Second, what is the process of ensuring tr…

Surely I, as an individual, could not just go and demand to see and count all the ballots myself.

Different jurisdiction, different rules, so YMMV (at least in the USA). Sometimes manual recounts are automatically triggered for highly contested races. And sometimes campaigns can pay for a recount.

I would need to turn to somebody I trust.

The system I "trust" is mutual distrust. If all the candidates (campaigns) agree on the count, then I am much more likely to accept the final tally.

Whenever someone in election administration says "trust us", I know I'm being conned.

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#35

Post by specialist » Sun, Oct 05, 2014, 6:44 PM UTC

oggy wrote: post #33

specialist wrote: post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There is no crypto based system which is appropriate for actual elections in the USA. While cool for technophiles, all crypto based systems rely on hash collisions to protect voter privacy. It's a combinatorial problem. Given a typical general election ballot (say 10-30 issues, with 1-6 choices each), the pool of voters (ballots cast) would need to number in the 100,000s. Alas, elections are administered per precinct…

It sounds like one of us doesn't know what they are talking about, and I don't think it's me. How does, say, Pret a Voter rely on hash collisions to protect voter privacy?

How does pret a voter protect voter privacy in a voter pool (precinct) of 400 with a ballot containing 30 issues.

Go ahead, work it out for yourself, manually, like I did.

I'll wait.

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#36

Post by oggy » Sun, Oct 05, 2014, 7:13 PM UTC

specialist wrote: post #35

oggy wrote: post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It sounds like one of us doesn't know what they are talking about, and I don't think it's me. How does, say, Pret a Voter rely on hash collisions to protect voter privacy?

How does pret a voter protect voter privacy in a voter pool (precinct) of 400 with a ballot containing 30 issues. Go ahead, work it out for yourself, manually, like I did. I'll wait.

The premise of whatever it was that you were manually working out was that "all crypto based systems rely on hash collisions to protect voter privacy". Again, pray tell, how does Pret a Voter rely on hash collisions?

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#37

Post by oggy » Sun, Oct 05, 2014, 7:22 PM UTC

specialist wrote: post #34

oggy wrote: post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I assume you mean that its transparency can be understood by 10% of the population, not how you use them (Pret a Voter for instance is quite straightforward). Still, that's a fair objection. I can counter it with two points, though. First, I don't really understand how the current system in my country works. There are constituencies, preferential voting, overhang seats, etc. Second, what is the process of ensuring tr…

Surely I, as an individual, could not just go and demand to see and count all the ballots myself. Different jurisdiction, different rules, so YMMV (at least in the USA). Sometimes manual recounts are automatically triggered for highly contested races. And sometimes campaigns can pay for a recount. I would need to turn to somebody I trust. The system I "trust" is mutual distrust. If all the candidates (campaigns) agre…

Are you saying that you, just by the virtue of being a voter in your constituency, can go to the local election office, and demand that you yourself count all the ballots?

Anyway mutual distrust is what the proposed e-voting systems rely on. You need to trust k out of n (where k can be tuned between 1 and n) parties involved that your vote privacy won't be compromised. Maybe you're not prepared to trust any single one of them and that's a valid objection.

On the other hand, you do get more verifiability with e-voting - anyone who is able to comprehend how the system works can verify that the votes have been tallied correctly.

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#38

Post by marcosdumay » Sun, Oct 05, 2014, 8:00 PM UTC

specialist wrote: post #30

ddingus wrote: post #5

SOAP BOX = 1 For what it's worth, e-voting isn't verifiable directly, unless it's done in a way linked to voter identities. Even then, it's highly exploitable, but it is verifiable, depending on the implementation. A trustworthy election embodies these four ideas to the maximum extent possible: 1. Anonymity. Votes cast are not linked to voters who cast them. 2. Transparency. The record of the voter intent, election l…

Your enthusiasm for vote by mail is unwarranted. Who will deliver the ballots once the USPS goes away? The push for e-voting will really heat up then. I encourage you learn how your local jurisdiction handles mail ballots. It's more or less making sausage. The UAA is 1% (both directions). A large percent are challenged during signature verification. Ballots are electronically scanned (like a fax or OCR) as they arriv…

> The only meaningful future electronic mediated system must be completely transparent ... Sacrificing voter privacy to ensure election integrity.

It's possible to get a quite good amount of privacy by the use of pseudonyms. You won't get a system with verifiable guarantees of both confidentiality and accuracy, as that's impossible, but there's no reason we can not make it as good as paper ballots.

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#39

Post by xorcist » Sun, Oct 05, 2014, 8:37 PM UTC

crdoconnor wrote: post #27

xorcist wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Vote buying is a MUCH lesser problem than fraud by those running the ballot box. If it is, it's either because 1) you don't know it's there, or 2) there are easier ways to cheat the system. Please take note that buying votes does not need to be large scale to put the legitimacy of the outcome in question. It is enough if, for example, it is possible for abusive patriarchs to vote for family members. > Furthermore,…

>If it is, it's either because 1) you don't know it's there, or 2) there are easier ways to cheat the system. No, it is difficult because it doesn't scale. After a certain (relatively low) point it becomes prohibitively expensive and your likelihood of being caught approaches near-certainty. This (along with enforcement) is why it is rare. >Please take note that buying votes does not need to be large scale to put the…

> After a certain (relatively low) point it becomes prohibitively expensive

Look, vote secrecy is nothing new. Let's not have a discussion about the basic tenets of voting systems unless you have a grasp of the fundamentals.

I'm not saying it is an axiom of democracy that must never be breached. I'm saying if you advocate against it, the very least you must do if you want to be taken seriously is to counter the basic arguments why we have voting secrecy in the current system, and what there is to be gained and lost with an alternative system.

The common vote secrecy is not to protect from large scale manipulation, although it does achieve that as well. It is to gain legitimacy by protecting against many small ones. Only then can it be argued that a vote is truly vox populi.

> What the fuck does tradition have to do with it? This is about security.

Please try to keep it serious.

Security is not a one dimensional variable. Traditionally voting security is designed to obtain legitimacy, not protect against a corrupt voting administrator. The latter is not ignored though, it is merely achieved by other means.

If your system cannot offer voting secrecy, and has no other benefits compared to a publicly auditable pen and paper system, it is overall less secure.

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#40

Post by oruam » Sun, Oct 05, 2014, 10:04 PM UTC

br_smartass wrote: post #26

oruam wrote: post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

no, it's not. it's just reality. infantility is not admit this (e-voting and another things) as REAL issue. love my country, but I have my foots on the ground.

Stop being such a wimp. All the places everywhere in the world through all history have had issues(something you're probably ignorant of, I suppose), get over it. ps downvoter.: Sorry if it's too agressive but the point I'm trying to make here is that ignorant opinions and defeatism aren't going to take us anywhere, people really need to get over this IMO. As the quote of "a little learning is a dangerous thing", sha…

so, let's pretend everything's OK. after all, "ignorance is bliss".