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Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

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Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#21

Post by crdoconnor »

xorcist wrote: post #14
ddingus wrote: post #5

SOAP BOX = 1 For what it's worth, e-voting isn't verifiable directly, unless it's done in a way linked to voter identities. Even then, it's highly exploitable, but it is verifiable, depending on the implementation. A trustworthy election embodies these four ideas to the maximum extent possible: 1. Anonymity. Votes cast are not linked to voters who cast them. 2. Transparency. The record of the voter intent, election l…

> Anonymity. Votes cast are not linked to voters who cast them. And as an extension to this: It is important that it is not possible to prove what you voted for. This means not only that the link from voter to cast vote must be absent even for the voter, but also that the actual physical circumstances when the vote is cast is subject to the transparency and oversight mentioned above. Anything else (voting from home,…

>Anything else (voting from home, or being presented with a slip linked to your cast vote, or any other such system) is subject to buying and selling votes and the result of such vote would never (and should never) be legitimate in the public eye.

Vote buying is a MUCH lesser problem than fraud by those running the ballot box. It's expensive; it's hard to do without being detected and on a large scale it becomes almost impossible.

Furthermore, it is impossible to create a system that simultaneously lets you prove that your own vote was counted correctly AND prevents vote buying (where the buyer can verify you voted correctly). If you can verify your vote was counted, so can the vote buyer. If you can't, you're trusting the person running the (electronic) ballot box instead.

Bearing that in mind, any fair electronic open source voting system should absolutely NOT prevent people from verifying their own votes. The person running the ballot box software is inherently less trustworthy than the person casting the vote.

Let the police deal with vote buyers. They can set up stings and catch them easily. The voting system should be primarily protected against the people who are running it.

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#22

Post by oruam »

br_smartass wrote: post #18
oruam wrote: post #6

fraud? in brazil anything is possible, because my country is a totally mess. NOTHING works properly here. so, why the e-voting will be an exception?

are you aware of how infantile you sound? Behold, readers, the brazilian inferiority complex.

no, it's not. it's just reality. infantility is not admit this (e-voting and another things) as REAL issue. love my country, but I have my foots on the ground.

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#23

Post by tokenizerrr »

ddingus wrote: post #5

SOAP BOX = 1 For what it's worth, e-voting isn't verifiable directly, unless it's done in a way linked to voter identities. Even then, it's highly exploitable, but it is verifiable, depending on the implementation. A trustworthy election embodies these four ideas to the maximum extent possible: 1. Anonymity. Votes cast are not linked to voters who cast them. 2. Transparency. The record of the voter intent, election l…

I don't recall the exact details, but one of the electronic voting systems would print out each vote behind a glass plate so that the voter could verify that their vote got processed correctly and in the event of any suspected fraud with the automated systems the paper ballots could still be counted.

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#24

Post by xorcist »

crdoconnor wrote: post #21
xorcist wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Anonymity. Votes cast are not linked to voters who cast them. And as an extension to this: It is important that it is not possible to prove what you voted for. This means not only that the link from voter to cast vote must be absent even for the voter, but also that the actual physical circumstances when the vote is cast is subject to the transparency and oversight mentioned above. Anything else (voting from home,…

>Anything else (voting from home, or being presented with a slip linked to your cast vote, or any other such system) is subject to buying and selling votes and the result of such vote would never (and should never) be legitimate in the public eye. Vote buying is a MUCH lesser problem than fraud by those running the ballot box. It's expensive; it's hard to do without being detected and on a large scale it becomes almo…

> Vote buying is a MUCH lesser problem than fraud by those running the ballot box.

If it is, it's either because 1) you don't know it's there, or 2) there are easier ways to cheat the system.

Please take note that buying votes does not need to be large scale to put the legitimacy of the outcome in question. It is enough if, for example, it is possible for abusive patriarchs to vote for family members.

> Furthermore, it is impossible to create a system that simultaneously lets you prove that your own vote was counted correctly AND prevents vote buying

Impossible is a strong word to use. There are several interesting theoretical systems proposed that make this possible. But are they practical?

> Let the police deal with vote buyers. They can set up stings and catch them easily.

You don't seem to understand why vote secrecy is desirable.

It is not (primarily) to protect against criminal gangs, but serves to make voting legitimate in the democratic system. Part of that is to make sure no one can prove how they voted for their bosses, husbands etc.

> The voting system should be primarily protected against the people who are running it.

Not traditionally. That is normally achieved through transparency. When anyone and everyone can participate on equal means in the voting process, and that process is transparent to everyone involved, that is enough to guarantee legitimacy.

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#25

Post by marcosdumay »

olh wrote: post #4

Brazilian here. Possible? Maybe, because computers. Did this Aranha guy get it right? Probably not, but drama is money.

You mean he got what wrong exactly?

In 2012 the TSE did call professors to test the system, he did demonstrate an attack that recovered the identity of most of the votes registered at the device's memory, and it was widely published. Since then, there was no other test.

It's clearly an unverifiable system, where we don't have even guarantees that the tested software is the one running on it. And the government is not responding to request of improving the overall system.

What part exactly are you saying he got wrong?

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#26

Post by br_smartass »

oruam wrote: post #22
br_smartass wrote: post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

are you aware of how infantile you sound? Behold, readers, the brazilian inferiority complex.

no, it's not. it's just reality. infantility is not admit this (e-voting and another things) as REAL issue. love my country, but I have my foots on the ground.

Stop being such a wimp. All the places everywhere in the world through all history have had issues(something you're probably ignorant of, I suppose), get over it.

ps downvoter.: Sorry if it's too agressive but the point I'm trying to make here is that ignorant opinions and defeatism aren't going to take us anywhere, people really need to get over this IMO. As the quote of "a little learning is a dangerous thing", shallow knowledge intoxicates the mind, but drinking it largely sobers us again ;)

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#27

Post by crdoconnor »

xorcist wrote: post #24
crdoconnor wrote: post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Anything else (voting from home, or being presented with a slip linked to your cast vote, or any other such system) is subject to buying and selling votes and the result of such vote would never (and should never) be legitimate in the public eye. Vote buying is a MUCH lesser problem than fraud by those running the ballot box. It's expensive; it's hard to do without being detected and on a large scale it becomes almo…

> Vote buying is a MUCH lesser problem than fraud by those running the ballot box. If it is, it's either because 1) you don't know it's there, or 2) there are easier ways to cheat the system. Please take note that buying votes does not need to be large scale to put the legitimacy of the outcome in question. It is enough if, for example, it is possible for abusive patriarchs to vote for family members. > Furthermore,…

>If it is, it's either because 1) you don't know it's there, or 2) there are easier ways to cheat the system.

No, it is difficult because it doesn't scale. After a certain (relatively low) point it becomes prohibitively expensive and your likelihood of being caught approaches near-certainty. This (along with enforcement) is why it is rare.

>Please take note that buying votes does not need to be large scale to put the legitimacy of the outcome in question.

Please also note that you do not have to be able to verify the outcome to be able to successfully offer a bribe and get a vote in return. It simply makes it somewhat easier.

Policing and enforcement of the law is the answer to this problem - not clever cryptography. That should be used to prove that the people running the voting machines didn't corrupt them.

>Impossible is a strong word to use. There are several interesting theoretical systems proposed that make this possible.

Impossible because it essentially implies a trustless system. Clever cryptographic techniques only go so far and they do not let you run a system where nobody can be trusted.

>You don't seem to understand why vote secrecy is desirable.

I understand why it is desirable, but I also understand that every system must face a trade off between placing trust in the administrators of the voting system and the voters themselves.

>It is not (primarily) to protect against criminal gangs, but serves to make voting legitimate in the democratic system. Part of that is to make sure no one can prove how they voted for their bosses, husbands etc.

If they can't do this then they cannot truly know whether their vote was counted at all. Maybe it was lost, ignored or counted towards the opposition.

>Not traditionally.

What the fuck does tradition have to do with it? This is about security.

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#28

Post by specialist »

oggy wrote: post #7
ddingus wrote: post #5

SOAP BOX = 1 For what it's worth, e-voting isn't verifiable directly, unless it's done in a way linked to voter identities. Even then, it's highly exploitable, but it is verifiable, depending on the implementation. A trustworthy election embodies these four ideas to the maximum extent possible: 1. Anonymity. Votes cast are not linked to voters who cast them. 2. Transparency. The record of the voter intent, election l…

> For what it's worth, e-voting isn't verifiable directly, > unless it's done in a way linked to voter identities You're missing out on the last 20 years of crypto research. I'd say we're not there yet, but people have been thinking hard about things such as verifiability (with vote confidentiality of course!), coercion resistance etc, and have come up with really cool ideas. As with his other work, David Chaum has s…

There is no crypto based system which is appropriate for actual elections in the USA.

While cool for technophiles, all crypto based systems rely on hash collisions to protect voter privacy. It's a combinatorial problem. Given a typical general election ballot (say 10-30 issues, with 1-6 choices each), the pool of voters (ballots cast) would need to number in the 100,000s.

Alas, elections are administered per precinct, which typically number 1 - 1,000 voters.

To use crypto election administration would require splitting our ballots into a ballot per issue, greatly increasing the size of precincts, or both.

But whatever the case, the burden of proof for this hair brained ideas is on the proponents. And until they (you) assume the responsibility of proving these systems work for real world elections, I'm not interested.

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#29

Post by specialist »

tokenizerrr wrote: post #23
ddingus wrote: post #5

SOAP BOX = 1 For what it's worth, e-voting isn't verifiable directly, unless it's done in a way linked to voter identities. Even then, it's highly exploitable, but it is verifiable, depending on the implementation. A trustworthy election embodies these four ideas to the maximum extent possible: 1. Anonymity. Votes cast are not linked to voters who cast them. 2. Transparency. The record of the voter intent, election l…

I don't recall the exact details, but one of the electronic voting systems would print out each vote behind a glass plate so that the voter could verify that their vote got processed correctly and in the event of any suspected fraud with the automated systems the paper ballots could still be counted.

Few voters look at the "voter verified paper audit trail" (VVPAT).

There's no reason to believe what's printed is what was cast or recorded.

Having observed the "audit" of the VVPAT, touch screens, etc. in my jurisdiction, when the paper tape was damaged, they just reprinted it. Which verified the printer was still working, at best.

Re: Fraud possible in Brazil's e-voting system

#30

Post by specialist »

ddingus wrote: post #5

SOAP BOX = 1 For what it's worth, e-voting isn't verifiable directly, unless it's done in a way linked to voter identities. Even then, it's highly exploitable, but it is verifiable, depending on the implementation. A trustworthy election embodies these four ideas to the maximum extent possible: 1. Anonymity. Votes cast are not linked to voters who cast them. 2. Transparency. The record of the voter intent, election l…

Your enthusiasm for vote by mail is unwarranted.

Who will deliver the ballots once the USPS goes away? The push for e-voting will really heat up then.

I encourage you learn how your local jurisdiction handles mail ballots. It's more or less making sausage. The UAA is 1% (both directions). A large percent are challenged during signature verification. Ballots are electronically scanned (like a fax or OCR) as they arrive and pre-counted (which is illegal). Correcting for voter intent is done by modifying the database, which is difficult to "audit" during recount. I could go on and on.

The correct election administration system is the Australian Ballot (private voting, public counting) issued, cast, and counted at each precinct the night of the election, issuing postal ballots as needed to enfranchise people.

The only meaningful future electronic mediated system must be completely transparent, as in immediately posting ballots online as they are received. Sacrificing voter privacy to ensure election integrity.

I'm against all electronic mediated systems, but it seems inevitable, so I advocate a system which can be verified.

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