Apple’s dangerous game
washingtonpost.com
Apple’s dangerous game
1–10 of 113 posts
Re: Apple’s dangerous game
#2I don't think the genie can be put back into the bottle. If Congress passes laws to require it on US-bound devices, I could see interested parties importing from Asia and Europe and/or embargoes on our devices abroad.
It could hurt US companies abroad because they will rightfully think the US Gov't has a backdoor. I think Apple and Google would use their lobbying funds to make sure the author's hopes never happen.
Re: Apple’s dangerous game
#3[deleted]
Re: Apple’s dangerous game
#4The article asks:
> How is the public interest served by a policy that only thwarts lawful search warrants?
Perhaps the answer is that judges act as rubber stamps now, authorizing way too many search warrants. The author assumes that the judges are fairly applying the 4th amendment.
Re: Apple’s dangerous game
#5"Apple’s design change [is] one it is legally authorized to make, to be clear."
That's really all that matters to me.
Re: Apple’s dangerous game
#6The only really consistent position will become to treat a person's digital trace as we treat the contents of their head. The two are merging sooner rather than later.
Re: Apple’s dangerous game
#7I'll leave it to other hackers to put it more eloquently. Any means to bypass the encryption on iOS 7 and before are vulnerabilities that adversaries can use to bypass the encryption on iOS 7 and before. Apple is basically saying that they didn't build in back doors, which this author is making the case for. iOS 8 data is still available to the government by other means than warrants and at much, much, much higher expense.
Re: Apple’s dangerous game
#8So, when BlackBerry was doing it, it was all good. Now that it's Apple, it's bad?
Re: Apple’s dangerous game
#9I'll leave it to other hackers to put it more eloquently. Any means to bypass the encryption on iOS 7 and before are vulnerabilities that adversaries can use to bypass the encryption on iOS 7 and before. Apple is basically saying that they didn't build in back doors, which this author is making the case for. iOS 8 data is still available to the government by other means than warrants and at much, much, much higher ex…
are you sure they built in a real backdoor?
i thought they salted user PINs with a hard-wired nonce that's specific to every device - then when the fuzz needs to get the device unlocked apple looks up what the hard-wired nonce is for that specific device, and then crack the 4 digit pin.
anyone have details on how apple actually unlocked devices?
Re: Apple’s dangerous game
#10"The first question is whether the government can lawfully compel the telephone’s owner to divulge the passcode. I believe the answer is that yes, a person can in fact face punishment for refusal to enter in the password to decrypt his own phone. If the government obtains a subpoena ordering the person to enter in the passcode, and the person refuses or falsely claims not to know the passcode, a person can be held in contempt for failure to comply."
Soooooooooo... there already is a legal mechanism to force the phone's owner to divulge the password. Why isn't that enough?