"On devices running iOS 8, your personal data such as photos, messages (including attachments), email, contacts, call history, iTunes content, notes, and reminders is placed under the protection of your passcode. Unlike our competitors, Apple cannot bypass your passcode and therefore cannot access this data" This is key. The way we engineer software and services can have a major impact on the war against overly invas…
Apple – Privacy – Government Information Requests
141–150 of 217 posts
Re: Apple – Privacy – Government Information Requests
#142Earlier quoted context omitted.
That sort of order is out of scope of anything a US court can order, and I believe that an Apple employee would leak it before they complied with such an order.
> That sort of order is out of scope of anything a US court can order How do you know that? Secret court orders are secret. "National security" trumps everything these days. LavaBit chose to shut down rather to insert a backdoor that was forced on them. I doubt Apple will shut down over that. And thanks to Snowden we know Apple's products have been backdoored already. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog…
Re: Apple – Privacy – Government Information Requests
#143"On devices running iOS 8, your personal data such as photos, messages (including attachments), email, contacts, call history, iTunes content, notes, and reminders is placed under the protection of your passcode. Unlike our competitors, Apple cannot bypass your passcode and therefore cannot access this data" This is key. The way we engineer software and services can have a major impact on the war against overly invas…
What's keeping government agencies from putting keylogging code on the SIM card or baseband processor (whichever has the best access to host cpu/memory) via the carriers to obtain the passcode? Not much I guess. Has Apple publicly claimed that they will also refuse to push individualized compromising code updates to devices on demand by gov't authorities?
Security is always a convenience/security trade-off. iOS is about as good as you can get before inconvenience will turn people to less secure devices.
Re: Apple – Privacy – Government Information Requests
#144Earlier quoted context omitted.
Which doesn't help them much because the fingerprint will only reveal the passcode if they gain physical access to the device's "secure element" and its contents (which is reportedly hard).
It is really surprising how much HN turns a blind eye to / lacks imagination for potential security issues just because it's Apple. Well, actually it isn't surprising at all.
Re: Apple – Privacy – Government Information Requests
#145Earlier quoted context omitted.
You're not limited to 4 digits. In fact, when you set up Touch ID, the phone prompts you to enter a longer text-based passcode on the basis that you shouldn't have to enter it often.
The government has your fingerprint.
Re: Apple – Privacy – Government Information Requests
#146Earlier quoted context omitted.
The US government forced Lavabit to install a back door that didn't exist before (or go out of business, which isn't really an option for Apple). I wonder what is to legally stop the government from forcing Apple to do the same? I guess one answer is that Apple has more resources to fight or lobby.
Lavabit wasn't forced to install a backdoor, the guy running it just kept refusing to comply with previous legal requests which were much narrower in scope. Since he didn't comply they took the nuclear option (which he could have easily prevented).
Re: Apple – Privacy – Government Information Requests
#147"On devices running iOS 8, your personal data such as photos, messages (including attachments), email, contacts, call history, iTunes content, notes, and reminders is placed under the protection of your passcode. Unlike our competitors, Apple cannot bypass your passcode and therefore cannot access this data" This is key. The way we engineer software and services can have a major impact on the war against overly invas…
Re: Apple – Privacy – Government Information Requests
#148Re: Apple – Privacy – Government Information Requests
#149Earlier quoted context omitted.
What's keeping government agencies from putting keylogging code on the SIM card or baseband processor (whichever has the best access to host cpu/memory) via the carriers to obtain the passcode? Not much I guess. Has Apple publicly claimed that they will also refuse to push individualized compromising code updates to devices on demand by gov't authorities?
>keylogging code on the SIM card or baseband processor That won't work. >Has Apple publicly claimed that they will also refuse to push individualized compromising code updates to devices on demand by gov't authorities? No, and even though I strongly doubt the government would even try to do this and even more strongly doubt Apple would comply, their new tech (apple pay and touch ID use hardware support to even protec…
Re: Apple – Privacy – Government Information Requests
#150Earlier quoted context omitted.
Is this directed at me? I'm not outraged at Apple at all, I think they're trying to play the long game here. I'm just sick of the word games, deception, and legalese from anyone regarding privacy. It's hard enough fully understanding exactly how all the pieces fit together (technology, laws, politics, etc.) for people that are genuinely interested in this, let alone the average consumer. Pointing out loopholes in wor…
Well, I think whatever Apple says, you will find a "loophole" in the wording that supposedly allows them to do evil things. Try it: pretend you are Apple and just try writing a statement that you would consider acceptable and that you wouldn't call "word games, deception and legalese". Myself, I think they did fairly well, certainly the best of any tech company out there today.
Until then I assume it is unsecure.