Copies of malware used by intelligence agencies to spy on journalists • Hacker News Board

Re: Copies of malware used by intelligence agencies to spy on journalists

#71

Post by pessimizer » Tue, Sep 16, 2014, 1:08 PM UTC

aliquis wrote: post #55

throwaway876876 wrote: post #53

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What has the message to do with the messenger, in this case? Sure we should be skeptical to all sources - media, individuals, government. Isn't this common sense? The presented information, however, stands on its own, no matter who the person who delivered them represents. What exactly would we gain from discussing the messenger? Would that move anything forward? What if we found out Snowden was paid by some russian…

You're probably correct that it's the language barrier. The message has very little to do with the messenger, and I can't see who's claimed otherwise. The difference seems to be about whether we SHOULD discuss the messenger. Assange still has the power to decide what to publish, and maybe more importantly when to publish it. Everyone who has a message to convey will wait for the right time to do so. This is true for…

>A discussion about the messenger shouldn't be seen as a dicussion about the truthfulness of the message.

If it isn't seen as a discussion about the truthfulness of the message, it should be seen as completely worthless gossip. Why would I be discussing Snowden as a person if I don't know him personally and I don't dispute the truth of his disclosures? Can't we pick a prettier celebrity to discuss to no particular end?

The only purpose in gossiping about people who disclose information which nobody seriously disputes is to confuse the simple-minded.

Re: Copies of malware used by intelligence agencies to spy on journalists

#72

Post by CaptainZapp » Tue, Sep 16, 2014, 1:14 PM UTC

__P wrote: post #69

meowface wrote: post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have not looked at the materials but I suspect most or all Western countries using this toolkit are using it for specific investigations where warrants have been issued. I personally have no qualms with the FBI planting malware as just another form of surveillance (if they have a warrant to search your home and tap your phone, why shouldn't they be able to get a warrant to monitor your computer?). The problem with…

There is a weird "Us and Them" vibe from your comment. Is the US/Australia/Uk's treatment of Julian Assange (as an example) not count as "oppressive regimes" and "...dissidents, protesters, and political opponents."? How is that different to ? (I ask honestly, not rhetorically)

I'd wager that the difference is that your chances in the US, Australia, or the UK that a bunch of thugs kicks in your door at three am, grabs you and disappears you forever are a whole lot smaller than in some of the real oppressive countries.

I'm not claiming that everything is perfect in those western countries, but compared to them there are some truly evil regimes around in countries where absolutely no checks and balances exists to rein abuse in.

While this may get me down-voted into oblivion, since the author may be easily one of the most hated people in the tech world, I recommend Evgeny Morozovs "The Net Delusion" which is a quite insightful take on the abuse of tech by oppressive regimes.

Re: Copies of malware used by intelligence agencies to spy on journalists

#73

Post by jfallon » Tue, Sep 16, 2014, 1:17 PM UTC

meowface wrote: post #50

jamesk_au wrote: post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

(I'm also in NSW)-- The list of "support requests" on the customers page suggests that the tools are used only in accordance with duly-issued warrants. Access would need to be removed once the purpose of the warrant had been fulfilled, but we may never know whether they get that right in practice. Ben Grubb has collated some background information on the operation of those laws.[1] [1] http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/go…

I have not looked at the materials but I suspect most or all Western countries using this toolkit are using it for specific investigations where warrants have been issued. I personally have no qualms with the FBI planting malware as just another form of surveillance (if they have a warrant to search your home and tap your phone, why shouldn't they be able to get a warrant to monitor your computer?). The problem with…

"I have not looked at the materials but I suspect most or all Western countries using this toolkit are using it for specific investigations where warrants have been issued."

You're an idiot.

Re: Copies of malware used by intelligence agencies to spy on journalists

#74

Post by logn » Tue, Sep 16, 2014, 1:21 PM UTC

throwaway876876 wrote: post #53

aliquis wrote: post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, I'd agree with you, but the way you phrased it made me feel uneasy. Are you saying that source criticism in journalism is overrated, or that Assange should be an exception to the rules? This is the Internet. Isn't there enough room here for discussions about both the message and the messenger? Or is it that when the message gets strong or important enough, the messenger gets irrelevant in comparison?

What has the message to do with the messenger, in this case? Sure we should be skeptical to all sources - media, individuals, government. Isn't this common sense? The presented information, however, stands on its own, no matter who the person who delivered them represents. What exactly would we gain from discussing the messenger? Would that move anything forward? What if we found out Snowden was paid by some russian…

Information doesn't necessarily stand on its own. Credibility, ethics, and trust are all important aspects and the public should always be prepared to question the messengers.

Think of everyday life. Ever been told only half the story? Been around gossip? Ever played the game 'telephone'? In all of these, you are receiving information, but the motivations and morals of the messenger can affect the impact and reaction to a message.

Re: Copies of malware used by intelligence agencies to spy on journalists

#75

Post by zak_mc_kracken » Tue, Sep 16, 2014, 2:26 PM UTC

throwaway876876 wrote: post #53

aliquis wrote: post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well, I'd agree with you, but the way you phrased it made me feel uneasy. Are you saying that source criticism in journalism is overrated, or that Assange should be an exception to the rules? This is the Internet. Isn't there enough room here for discussions about both the message and the messenger? Or is it that when the message gets strong or important enough, the messenger gets irrelevant in comparison?

What has the message to do with the messenger, in this case? Sure we should be skeptical to all sources - media, individuals, government. Isn't this common sense? The presented information, however, stands on its own, no matter who the person who delivered them represents. What exactly would we gain from discussing the messenger? Would that move anything forward? What if we found out Snowden was paid by some russian…

> Everyone stop changing passwords and re-issuing certificates, guys, everything's fine; he got paid by the russians", and the slides with router passwords would suddenly disappear from the face of earth?

No, but surely such a discovery should alter how we interpret the message, right? Suddenly, it's impossible to discern something that US government is doing to its citizens vs/ something than an enemy of the US wants you to believe.

I really don't understand why Assange and Snowden are getting such a pass. If anything, their motivations and the source of what they are releasing should be scrutinized ten times as much as any previous whistle blower or journalist.

Re: Copies of malware used by intelligence agencies to spy on journalists

#76

Post by [deleted] » Tue, Sep 16, 2014, 2:29 PM UTC

pessimizer wrote: post #71

aliquis wrote: post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're probably correct that it's the language barrier. The message has very little to do with the messenger, and I can't see who's claimed otherwise. The difference seems to be about whether we SHOULD discuss the messenger. Assange still has the power to decide what to publish, and maybe more importantly when to publish it. Everyone who has a message to convey will wait for the right time to do so. This is true for…

>A discussion about the messenger shouldn't be seen as a dicussion about the truthfulness of the message. If it isn't seen as a discussion about the truthfulness of the message, it should be seen as completely worthless gossip. Why would I be discussing Snowden as a person if I don't know him personally and I don't dispute the truth of his disclosures? Can't we pick a prettier celebrity to discuss to no particular en…

[deleted]

Re: Copies of malware used by intelligence agencies to spy on journalists

#77

Post by zak_mc_kracken » Tue, Sep 16, 2014, 2:29 PM UTC

pessimizer wrote: post #71

aliquis wrote: post #55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're probably correct that it's the language barrier. The message has very little to do with the messenger, and I can't see who's claimed otherwise. The difference seems to be about whether we SHOULD discuss the messenger. Assange still has the power to decide what to publish, and maybe more importantly when to publish it. Everyone who has a message to convey will wait for the right time to do so. This is true for…

>A discussion about the messenger shouldn't be seen as a dicussion about the truthfulness of the message. If it isn't seen as a discussion about the truthfulness of the message, it should be seen as completely worthless gossip. Why would I be discussing Snowden as a person if I don't know him personally and I don't dispute the truth of his disclosures? Can't we pick a prettier celebrity to discuss to no particular en…

> I don't dispute the truth of his disclosures?

That's the problem you should at least be questioning that truth just like you question the truth of what the government tells you.

Re: Copies of malware used by intelligence agencies to spy on journalists

#78

Post by meowface » Tue, Sep 16, 2014, 11:01 PM UTC

__P wrote: post #69

meowface wrote: post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have not looked at the materials but I suspect most or all Western countries using this toolkit are using it for specific investigations where warrants have been issued. I personally have no qualms with the FBI planting malware as just another form of surveillance (if they have a warrant to search your home and tap your phone, why shouldn't they be able to get a warrant to monitor your computer?). The problem with…

There is a weird "Us and Them" vibe from your comment. Is the US/Australia/Uk's treatment of Julian Assange (as an example) not count as "oppressive regimes" and "...dissidents, protesters, and political opponents."? How is that different to ? (I ask honestly, not rhetorically)

It depends. Countries like the US are ruthless to those whom they consider enemies of the state or traitors, but let's be honest, the qualifications to be an enemy of the state are much higher in the US than they are in a country like Tunisia, Pakistan, or Iran. The FBI is not going to plant malware on your computer just because you say "fuck Obama" or are planning a protest, but this could very well happen in many oppressive countries.

The US treats certain people very unethically, including Assange, but in these cases it's more a sense of vengeance for having our top secret dirty laundry aired, compared to simply disagreeing with or disliking the government. We still have a long way to go to, but the freedom to express yourself is simply a lot higher in most Western European and North American countries.

Re: Copies of malware used by intelligence agencies to spy on journalists

#79

Post by meowface » Tue, Sep 16, 2014, 11:03 PM UTC

jfallon wrote: post #73

meowface wrote: post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I have not looked at the materials but I suspect most or all Western countries using this toolkit are using it for specific investigations where warrants have been issued. I personally have no qualms with the FBI planting malware as just another form of surveillance (if they have a warrant to search your home and tap your phone, why shouldn't they be able to get a warrant to monitor your computer?). The problem with…

"I have not looked at the materials but I suspect most or all Western countries using this toolkit are using it for specific investigations where warrants have been issued." You're an idiot.

Thanks for the counterpoint.

If you take a look at the actual licensing by countries, you will see my suspicions are indeed confirmed. The support tickets issued by Australian law enforcement, for example, mention that use is only permitted through warrants and even specifically states their reporting and documentation requirements.

>Our Warrants authorize the use of the the FF intrusion capability as well as the individual modules that are used. At the conclusion of a warrant there is a requirement that a report is made on every date / time each module captures information. For example, if a key logger captures data at 1pm 2/1/2013 we need to report this to our legal system. This time/date is important for reporting procedures as there is a requirement to record every instance a module is used. Is there some way of just extracting the time/date and module name to a report?

This does not constitute unethical use of this software. This is simply a way of placing a "wire tap" on a computing device.

Re: Copies of malware used by intelligence agencies to spy on journalists

#80

Post by indrax » Wed, Sep 17, 2014, 12:35 PM UTC

girvo wrote: post #19

So, it seems the NSW police here in Australia are a customer and use this. Ignore for a moment whether it's a good or bad thing that police use tools like these. What I want to know is, what happens once they "get their guy", so to speak. Does the malware stay on that computer forever, violating the privacy of family members, or other users of the computer should it be sold on and not wiped correctly? What happens if…

If I were the company writing this, I'd include a remote uninstall command that left as few traces as possible, and encourage its use. It lowers the probability of discovery.

Since law enforcement typically wants convictions, it could be a selling point to prompt for uninstall when a warrant expires.