I don't yet have down vote privilege, but I have to imagine The GP (your original comment) got nuked because it is both needlessly inflammatory and also lacks a substantive argument. As for your response to dragonwriter, you appear to be talking past one another; of course markets are matchmaking services for buyers and sellers by definition, but what you've done here is mistake this specific case of relatively frictionless movement between employers increasing the surplus of the employees for an indictment of regulation in general.
This particular case seems to realize said friction (and consequently, the surplus/benefit for the drivers) precisely because the service itself being offered by Lyft/Uber is market like, and the end-consumer product is in fact offered by the drivers themselves. It is not clear to me (or the others disagreeing with you here evidently) that regulation has any bearing on this conversation -- in a world where both Lyft and Uber's respective operations are regulated by the state, the power is still in the drivers' hands because Lyft and Uber are competing to offer the drivers' services.
This is not exactly the common formula for most employee-employer relationships, although it may become more common as this business model takes off. What dragonwriter seems to be saying IMO is that there are certainly cases that don't fit this mold that are good arguments for state intervention; among them are cases where there is greater friction for the employees themselves due to the nature of the business; lack of information about compensation, working hours, or other metrics to evaluate the given positions; or, as dragonwriter said, physical proximity to the workplace itself.
If you would be so kind, please elucidate how you feel this particular seemingly unique scenario is generalizable to regulation in general.
PS: Apologies if this is wordy and difficult to follow, I have a hard time writing coherently into this tiny box.