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Correlation is usually not causation. But why not?

gwern.net

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Re: Correlation is usually not causation. But why not?

#61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I do agree with you that science doesn't show causation, but I think your interpretation of science is incorrect: > Therefore, all scientific analysis is unverifiable. I disagree. It's verified by experiment. (Here I'm using "verify" to mean that contradictions have not (yet) been found by experimental observation). > Knowledge of the world is completely unjustified. I disagree. Again, it's justified by experiment. I…

Go further: reproducible experiment can tease out details to many decimal places of likelihood. Something can be known so thoroughly that we can make statements like "this is certain to behave as predicted millions or billions of times more often that not", which is pretty close to certain knowledge.

I'm not sure that I agree. I think that once you get into the realm of "absolute truth" (which is what I'm interpreting your post as saying -- apologies if I'm mistaken), you've left science behind. IMHO, science cannot (and does not aim to) deliver certain knowledge. Instead, it produces useful approximations.

Re: Correlation is usually not causation. But why not?

#62

All I know about causation and correlation I learnt hunting bugs in large legacy software systems. In that environment I got the impression that correlation almost never equalled causation, but that's only because the hardest bugs, the ones I remembered, were hard because the obvious correlations did not help identify the root cause. A similar argument might be made for scientific studies: most of the easy causes tha…

Yeah, debugging is great training in the scientific method.

Re: Correlation is usually not causation. But why not?

#64
post #48
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

@jerf Why did you assume I did not read the article? I read it, and I find the writing to be unclear. Maybe "you'd expect" means what you think; maybe not. Independent of my or your opinion, (or precisely because reasonable people may disagree over something so simple) the writing is unnecessarily unclear. It would be simple to add a quick note saying, more-or-less, that the author will revisit the point later. I als…

> I also disagree with another commenter who says that the later writing clears up this issue. The point about 33% not being a fair assumption isn't addressed head on in the way that I think matters most. How would you want it addressed? A large part of the article is exactly about how the - to some - "intuitive" idea of 3 evenly split categories is incorrect. E.g. later in the article he writes: "It turns out, we we…

Ok, to move this forward, let's move past the who has read what part, which doesn't seem to be helping. Anyhow, my point is relatively subtle, I think, and getting lost in communication somehow. I get what the article is saying, but I'm not sure that everyone here is getting what I'm saying.

Let me try to elaborate. My points are:

1. The article does indeed criticize the 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 split, but not for the same reasons that I am.

2. I would prefer that the 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 split not be used as a prior at all. (Yes, I get that Bayesian priors don't matter that much if you have enough data to update them. The article, on my reading, does not offer a way to get the needed observations, so I think the priors dominate.)

3. Yes, later, the article dismisses the even split as naive but does not go far enough when suggesting a better way. You see, the "better way" still boils down to the naive assumption of counting bins: this is to say that if we have more bins, then we should have a higher expected probability. In my opinion, the "better way" is still falling into a conceptual trap: this is not a combinatorics problem. For combinatorics problems to work they have to rely on real, countable things, not arbitrary notions of how you slice and dice a problem. Yes, I get that as you add more variables to the DAG, you can certainly say that there are more possible paths through the graph. But we cannot assume that just adding more nodes in the DAG will change reality. You see, the DAG is a mental construct. We should not assume that adding more mental bins (an arbitrary way of slicing reality) will affect the distribution.

Here is an example. Francis tells Greg there are three marbles in a jar (green, red, blue) but does not reveal the distribution, so Greg cannot rightly assume a 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 distribution. But let's say Greg does anyway. Next, Francis tells Greg, "Sorry, I was oversimplifying before; really there are 4 types of marbles in a jar (forest green, lime green, red, blue)." What should Greg do? Update the prior to 1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4? Well, that would be inconsistent, since 1/4 (forest green) + 1/4 (lime green) does not equal 1/3 (green). Should Greg suggest a 1/6 (forest), 1/6 (lime), 1/3 (red), 1/3 (blue) split? Nope. My point is this: down that road lies arbitrariness and contradictions.

Hopefully this helps explain what I'm talking about. I like the article, but I don't want people to get into the habit of assuming a distribution. I also don't like people counting up concepts that are arbitrary and turning that into a distribution.

Re: Correlation is usually not causation. But why not?

#65
post #53

The problem is that causation is an oxymoron. The measurement problem is the same as the problem of induction. Max Planck understood this, read his quotes on matter. No amount of correlation increases the probability of one event followed by another. Therefore, all scientific analysis is unverifiable. Knowledge of the world is completely unjustified. Not to mention our immense presumption of consistency in world phen…

I do agree with you that science doesn't show causation, but I think your interpretation of science is incorrect: > Therefore, all scientific analysis is unverifiable. I disagree. It's verified by experiment. (Here I'm using "verify" to mean that contradictions have not (yet) been found by experimental observation). > Knowledge of the world is completely unjustified. I disagree. Again, it's justified by experiment. I…

I agree that we do not disagree.

Your post is simply applying a different definition to the terms I used.

Your reply is a case for righteousness.

I don't think you have considered the implications of the use of such words as "good". I agree with you that experimentation is futile in the absence of ethics.

Why are you presuming common application of the use of the word good and useful? For example, the science behind the atomic bomb and it's usage, was it useful? To whom was it useful, those devastated by the blast or those who set it off?

I urge you to reevaluate your basis for righteousness.

Don't you understand that morality requires certainty?

Re: Correlation is usually not causation. But why not?

#66
post #53

The problem is that causation is an oxymoron. The measurement problem is the same as the problem of induction. Max Planck understood this, read his quotes on matter. No amount of correlation increases the probability of one event followed by another. Therefore, all scientific analysis is unverifiable. Knowledge of the world is completely unjustified. Not to mention our immense presumption of consistency in world phen…

> If I say that an airplane functions on fairy dust and you make an argument about propulsion and lift, and you claim that my assertion is wrong because ... The only reason "science" would claim that your assertion is wrong is if your explanation doesn't agree with reality. However, if you collect a bunch of data that you say supports your theory, but your experimental technique or data analysis is not good, then it'…

"The only reason "science" would claim that your assertion is wrong is if your explanation doesn't agree with reality."

Your statement is a circular reference to the problem of induction. You arbitrarily claim to be able to make accurate assertions of reality while at the same time agreeing that the essence of reality is unknowable.

This reply of yours is full of circular reasoning. Stop using the word good without making your case for righteousness. You can't substitute it with practical or useful either, both infer benefit at the personal degree.

Just because an expectation proved to be useful once, remember that the past does not predict the future.

"Belief in the Causal Nexus is superstition"

Re: Correlation is usually not causation. But why not?

#67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Go further: reproducible experiment can tease out details to many decimal places of likelihood. Something can be known so thoroughly that we can make statements like "this is certain to behave as predicted millions or billions of times more often that not", which is pretty close to certain knowledge.

I'm not sure that I agree. I think that once you get into the realm of "absolute truth" (which is what I'm interpreting your post as saying -- apologies if I'm mistaken), you've left science behind. IMHO, science cannot (and does not aim to) deliver certain knowledge. Instead, it produces useful approximations.

I agree with Matt,

There is no quantity of correlation that promotes one iota of certainty or probability.

The issue is Matt, many people like this gentlemen here actually believe that scientific experimentation offers explanations.

How many times have we heard, "there must be a rational explanation", when it fact never has a rational explanation ever been provided for any phenomenon.

We can't involve degrees, when the extreme principles infer that no such claims can be made. There is an unknown amount of probability given any proposition.

The only form of falsifiability we're capable of is in whether or not a person is conforming to the traditional use of language. If I say that 2 + 2 = 5, then I am wrong, since the rules for mathematical language are understood with certainty based on our tradition.

If I claimed that a plane IS powered by fairy dust and yet it is NOT powered by fairy dust, then I am technically wrong since I abused the use of language.

Re: Correlation is usually not causation. But why not?

#68
post #50

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think this low-hanging-fruit idea is generally true for all of science: after centuries of science as a profession, pretty much all the easy stuff has already been done. It's actually an argument for more cojones in science-- being willing to do bold stuff and explore "crazy" hypotheses. If all the easy stuff is done already, then picking methodically and timidly among the dregs is unlikely to ever yield anything.

An alternative viewpoint: everything's easy after it's been done, but it's hard up until then. > after centuries of science as a profession, pretty much all the easy stuff has already been done. But with the benefit of all that has already been done, shouldn't we be able to do things now that were previously impossible? In other words, "easy in 2014" != "easy in 1200". > It's actually an argument for more cojones in…

I'm not sure... seems like what you say may hold for a while, but eventually you start hitting a more objective sort of hard: things that are hard for human beings to comprehend due to the limitations of our intelligence itself. Beyond that there's probably an even harder hard-- when you start actually running out of new things to discover. Can there really be an infinite number of physical laws, principles, and useful relations? Or at some point have you actually found most of basic physics?

Once you start hitting those, you've either entered a permanent era of diminishing returns or one where you can only really make progress by radically redefining problems, making leaps, or trying wild and crazy ideas in the hopes of unlocking some isolated seam of high-value research that isn't connected to the others in the fitness/value state space graph.

Re: Correlation is usually not causation. But why not?

#69
post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I do agree with you that science doesn't show causation, but I think your interpretation of science is incorrect: > Therefore, all scientific analysis is unverifiable. I disagree. It's verified by experiment. (Here I'm using "verify" to mean that contradictions have not (yet) been found by experimental observation). > Knowledge of the world is completely unjustified. I disagree. Again, it's justified by experiment. I…

I agree that we do not disagree. Your post is simply applying a different definition to the terms I used. Your reply is a case for righteousness. I don't think you have considered the implications of the use of such words as "good". I agree with you that experimentation is futile in the absence of ethics. Why are you presuming common application of the use of the word good and useful? For example, the science behind…

At no point did I touch on morality or ethics. I do not know why you think that I did so.

> I agree with you that experimentation is futile in the absence of ethics.

I do not agree with that.

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Dictionary.reference.com:

> useful: being of use or service; serving some purpose; advantageous, helpful, or of good effect

> good: having admirable, pleasing, superior, or positive qualities; not negative, bad or mediocre

I urge you to reevaluate your understanding of the words "good" and "useful". Don't you understand that I'm not talking about morality?

Re: Correlation is usually not causation. But why not?

#70
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> If I say that an airplane functions on fairy dust and you make an argument about propulsion and lift, and you claim that my assertion is wrong because ... The only reason "science" would claim that your assertion is wrong is if your explanation doesn't agree with reality. However, if you collect a bunch of data that you say supports your theory, but your experimental technique or data analysis is not good, then it'…

"The only reason "science" would claim that your assertion is wrong is if your explanation doesn't agree with reality." Your statement is a circular reference to the problem of induction. You arbitrarily claim to be able to make accurate assertions of reality while at the same time agreeing that the essence of reality is unknowable. This reply of yours is full of circular reasoning. Stop using the word good without m…

Oops, instead of "reality" I meant "experimental observations". Good catch.

> You arbitrarily claim to be able to make accurate assertions of reality

Nope.

> while at the same time agreeing that the essence of reality is unknowable.

Yep. I guess? All I think is that it's okay if we don't know the true essence; science is still useful[0].

> Stop using the word good without making your case for righteousness.

Stop hijacking common words.

> You can't substitute it with practical or useful either, both infer benefit at the personal degree.

I don't know what that means.

> Just because an expectation proved to be useful once, remember that the past does not predict the future.

Depends what you mean by predict the future. Absolute truth? No. Useful[0] forecasts? Yes.

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[0] dictionary.reference.com:

> useful: being of use or service; serving some purpose; advantageous, helpful, or of good effect

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