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Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

code.google.com

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Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#41

Post by malka »

tomp wrote: post #40
vidarh wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As I just posted as a comment to the proposal: In the EU, e-mail addresses are personally identifiable information. It's not clear that an append-only log with no expiration or means for individuals to delete the content will even be legal in many EU countries.

What do you mean? When users sign up to a Key Registry, they are explicitly acknowledging that their emails and public keys can be used in the way described by the protocol. AFAIK, that's perfectly legal.

in EU, you can say at any point to a company 'delete every piece of personal information about me that you have', and email is considered an personal information. Even if you gave consent, you can withdraw consent at any point in time.

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#42

Post by motters »

tomp wrote: post #40
vidarh wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As I just posted as a comment to the proposal: In the EU, e-mail addresses are personally identifiable information. It's not clear that an append-only log with no expiration or means for individuals to delete the content will even be legal in many EU countries.

What do you mean? When users sign up to a Key Registry, they are explicitly acknowledging that their emails and public keys can be used in the way described by the protocol. AFAIK, that's perfectly legal.

Yes, but if users later can't remove their information because the list is append only then that may not be legal in the EU.

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#43

Post by sarciszewski »

blueskin_ wrote: post #14

So it seems they invented PGP keyservers with a monitoring protocol as a bag on the side? I've had keys on keyservers for years. The monitoring side is interesting though. It's also unclear how the whole directory will be compressed to 140 bytes - iirc, the best compression algorithms reduce text by ~80-90%, so it might work for a week or so, I guess.

Hash then compress. (Or hash then truncate.)

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#44

Post by tomp »

malka wrote: post #41
tomp wrote: post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What do you mean? When users sign up to a Key Registry, they are explicitly acknowledging that their emails and public keys can be used in the way described by the protocol. AFAIK, that's perfectly legal.

in EU, you can say at any point to a company 'delete every piece of personal information about me that you have', and email is considered an personal information. Even if you gave consent, you can withdraw consent at any point in time.

So, basically, I can tell my bank/credit agency/hospital "please forget that I got a mortgage/defaulted/tested positive for HIV"? Doesn't that sound rather risky?

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#45

Post by skj »

blueking wrote: post #26
blueskin_ wrote: post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As much as I generally distrust google with privacy when it comes to actually handing over data, in this case it's an open protocol that has just been drafted by google; anyone can run a server or make their own implementation. It also never touches private keys, only public. If you want a public key to have limited distribution, you don't put it on a keyserver, and instead only exchange it with the people you would…

You think google can write a proposal like this without the NSA getting involved ? The fact that they are preserving metadata is revealing and meaningful. Its another PR stunt. Google can never never be trusted again. They publicly lied about PRISM, and they got caught. These people have no business making security protocols for us.

What statement did Google make, regarding PRISM, that was a lie? And what evidence caused them to get caught?

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#46

Post by blueking »

skj wrote: post #45
blueking wrote: post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You think google can write a proposal like this without the NSA getting involved ? The fact that they are preserving metadata is revealing and meaningful. Its another PR stunt. Google can never never be trusted again. They publicly lied about PRISM, and they got caught. These people have no business making security protocols for us.

What statement did Google make, regarding PRISM, that was a lie? And what evidence caused them to get caught?

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/google-ceo-larry-page-issues-sta...

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-...

http://gizmodo.com/confirmed-nsa-paid-google-microsoft-other...

They are lying through their teeth. As you should know skj, being a google employee.

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#47

Post by Semaphor »

tomp wrote: post #44
malka wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

in EU, you can say at any point to a company 'delete every piece of personal information about me that you have', and email is considered an personal information. Even if you gave consent, you can withdraw consent at any point in time.

So, basically, I can tell my bank/credit agency/hospital "please forget that I got a mortgage/defaulted/tested positive for HIV"? Doesn't that sound rather risky?

There are of course exceptions ;)

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#48

Post by icebraining »

tomp wrote: post #44
malka wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

in EU, you can say at any point to a company 'delete every piece of personal information about me that you have', and email is considered an personal information. Even if you gave consent, you can withdraw consent at any point in time.

So, basically, I can tell my bank/credit agency/hospital "please forget that I got a mortgage/defaulted/tested positive for HIV"? Doesn't that sound rather risky?

It's not like that. You can demand to be informed about when the data is processed and for what purposes, get a copy of it, request corrections and object to processing in certain circumstances.

In practice, no, you can't demand to be wiped out from the internal database if you creditor. You probably can prevent them from publishing a debtors' list with your name, though.

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#49

Post by desas »

tomp wrote: post #44
malka wrote: post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

in EU, you can say at any point to a company 'delete every piece of personal information about me that you have', and email is considered an personal information. Even if you gave consent, you can withdraw consent at any point in time.

So, basically, I can tell my bank/credit agency/hospital "please forget that I got a mortgage/defaulted/tested positive for HIV"? Doesn't that sound rather risky?

It's not that simple (in the UK at least), you only have to stop processing information if "unwarranted and substantial damage or distress" is being caused.

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#50

Post by Soyuz »

jonttaylor wrote: post #36

I have been through this thought process before. The conclusion I came too was that the implementations should be transparent, but that the user information should not. Basically I was not going to put up a list of everyones email addresses and keys anywhere, and certainly not who they connect with. The more I looked into the problem, the more I realised that the vast majority of users would rather sacrifice security…

Do you use Key Escrow for private key storage? How can the other receiver decrypt the file using his browser only? Where do you store the private key?
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