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Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

code.google.com

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Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#11

Post by jpgvm »

bostik wrote: post #10

Reading through the spec, there is something eerily familiar with the key directory implementation. Quoting: Alice will obtain a proof from the Key Directory that demonstrates that the data is in the permanent append-only log, and then just encrypt to it. Within the message to send to Bob, Alice includes a super-compressed version of the Key Directories that fits in a 140 characters (called STHs which stands for Sign…

The blockchain (as most people understand it atleast) is an implementation of a Merkle tree. Which is why Git/Bitcoin are eerily similar - they both utilize Merkle trees for integrity.

The real innovation in the "blockchain" was using proof of work in combination with the Merkle tree in order to enforce a single history. Take that away and yes, it looks alot like Git. :)

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#12

Post by lifeisstillgood »

y0ghur7_xxx wrote: post #8
rbobby wrote: post #7

I hope this works out. If enough of the big email vendors (gmail, outlook, yahoo, etc.) get on board the network effect could be enough to push adoption to a very high percentage. Once that happens my "unencrypted" email folder would be viewed about as often as my junk mail folder. And then... maybe just maybe... spammers will be faced with a serious challenge.

> And then... maybe just maybe... spammers will be faced with a serious challenge. Why? Couldn't spammers encrypt the mail they send to you just like everybody else?

Because, I think, they would have to be part of the Key Directory too, listed under "Spammer".

This kind if implies a secondary directory market of ratings and rankings of the prime source (ie isASpammer, isWithinThreeHopsOnLinkedIn)

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#13

Post by bostik »

jpgvm wrote: post #11
bostik wrote: post #10

Reading through the spec, there is something eerily familiar with the key directory implementation. Quoting: Alice will obtain a proof from the Key Directory that demonstrates that the data is in the permanent append-only log, and then just encrypt to it. Within the message to send to Bob, Alice includes a super-compressed version of the Key Directories that fits in a 140 characters (called STHs which stands for Sign…

The blockchain (as most people understand it atleast) is an implementation of a Merkle tree. Which is why Git/Bitcoin are eerily similar - they both utilize Merkle trees for integrity. The real innovation in the "blockchain" was using proof of work in combination with the Merkle tree in order to enforce a single history. Take that away and yes, it looks alot like Git. :)

Ah, so that's why.

The term "Merkle tree" was familiar, but I didn't know what it was used for. (Read: never had reason to look it up.) Now I do.

Thank you. :)

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#14

Post by blueskin_ »

So it seems they invented PGP keyservers with a monitoring protocol as a bag on the side?

I've had keys on keyservers for years. The monitoring side is interesting though.

It's also unclear how the whole directory will be compressed to 140 bytes - iirc, the best compression algorithms reduce text by ~80-90%, so it might work for a week or so, I guess.

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#15

Post by michaelt » 

  The special thing about this Key Directory, is that 
  whatever is written in the directory can never be 
  modified, that is, it's impossible to modify anything from 
  there without having to bring the service down, or telling 
  to everyone that's looking about what is being modified.
The MIT PGP key server has eleven different keys in my name which I created in 1997, when I was about 12 years old. Of course, I have long since lost the private keys and e-mail addresses.

I guess with this proposal, the fact you used to go by benstillerfaggot69@verizon.net will be part of your permanent record.

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#16

Post by laggyluke »

phaer wrote: post #9
y0ghur7_xxx wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> And then... maybe just maybe... spammers will be faced with a serious challenge. Why? Couldn't spammers encrypt the mail they send to you just like everybody else?

Yes the could, but it would at least cost them more resources which could matter at the scale most spammers work.

AFAIK most spammers use botnets, so they don't really care about resources - it's not their resources to begin with.

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#17

Post by blueskin_ »

michaelt wrote: post #15

The special thing about this Key Directory, is that whatever is written in the directory can never be modified, that is, it's impossible to modify anything from there without having to bring the service down, or telling to everyone that's looking about what is being modified. The MIT PGP key server has eleven different keys in my name which I created in 1997, when I was about 12 years old. Of course, I have long sinc…

Unless I missed a part of it, the key is only permanently tied to the email address - i.e. you could always say that benstillerfaggot69@verizon.net is a different Joe Bloggs and not you (probably only plausible if you have a common to medium rarity name though).

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#18

Post by blueskin_ »

kleiba wrote: post #3
IgorPartola wrote: post #2

Interesting. It has bugged me for some time that if the Web of Trust was bigger, it could grow exponentially and become universal: once someone you personally know has entered you into the WoT, you can be trusted and can trust others based on a number of public signatures on their public key. However, currently the WoT is so sparse that you cannot do this. My idea was to use the existing web TLS platform to bootstrap…

Let's not forget that one of the most successful attack vectors is social engineering, that is, tricking people into trusting you and making you part of the WoT.

Solvable by only ever issuing marginal trust (technically, if enough people get social engineered in, that still causes a problem, but that's a lot harder than a single person.

Trusting above marginal level should be reserved for very few people if any at all. I don't have anyone with full trust.

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#19

Post by blueskin_ »

y0ghur7_xxx wrote: post #8
rbobby wrote: post #7

I hope this works out. If enough of the big email vendors (gmail, outlook, yahoo, etc.) get on board the network effect could be enough to push adoption to a very high percentage. Once that happens my "unencrypted" email folder would be viewed about as often as my junk mail folder. And then... maybe just maybe... spammers will be faced with a serious challenge.

> And then... maybe just maybe... spammers will be faced with a serious challenge. Why? Couldn't spammers encrypt the mail they send to you just like everybody else?

It'd probably become like SPF/DKIM - somewhat spammy companies who still have a genuine mailing list and will still opt you out if you ask (or even click 'Spam' in gmail etc via FBLs) will go to the effort to implement it, but random viagra spam being pumped out by botnets likely won't.

Re: Google's end-to-end key distribution proposal

#20

Post by Semaphor »

The first comment by Mailpile seems to highlight the biggest problem to me:

>Hello! Bjarni from the Mailpile team here.

>This is an interesting proposal and sounds like a significant improvement over the current centralized key-server model.

>The main quibble I have with it, is it seems there's no concern given to the privacy of user's communications - the proposed gossip mechanism seems designed to indiscriminately tell everyone who I am communicating with. That's a pretty severe privacy breach if you ask me, worse even then PGP's web-of-trust because it's real-time, current metadata about who is interacting with whom.

>Am I misunderstanding anything here?

>- Bjarni

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