Live data from Hacker News

Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

xs-sniper.com

61–70 of 170 posts

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#61
post #37
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What airlines are doing now amounts precisely to "a large amount of security theatre to meet appearances for the customers and appease the local regulations." I want to decentralize for two reasons: (1) it removes single points of failure. For instance, post-911, airlines needed to GET PERMISSION to make changes such as strengthening the cockpit door or changing the protocol for opening it. Being more flexible means…

I agreed with you more before this post. Let's consider the advantages of centralization: (1) A single agency can have within its mandate, expertise, and budget the security apparatus, which requires full-stack authority: airport design and administration, customs officials, airlines, planes, luggage, etc. The airlines can focus on the task they actually want to perform and are qualified to perform, whereas the one a…

> It is nonsense for a customer to walk openly onto an aircraft carrying a rifle.

I'm not sure that I agree. Prior to metal detectors and airport security here in the US plenty of guns were carried on planes and very few bad outcomes were the result. I've heard of planes getting hijacked and going to Cuba but nothing in the way of mass murders on airplanes.

I wish that instead of just stating this as a fact that you had argued it in some way. For point 1 you gave reasoning. For point 2 you just said "this is true" and stopped.

If you had said something like "air is necessary for life" yeah sure, I won't belabor that point. It's scientifically verifiable at least for humans.

But when the parent was posting "I wish people could just carry rifles and it not be a big deal" it's clear that your position is more of an opinion than a fact. You might consider it a fact, but you're replying to glenra who quite obviously doesn't agree.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#62
"TSA has not audited these devices for even the most basic security issues"

This to me is the most troublesome aspect of this an entire ordeal. Any security pen-testing firm with their wits about them could have discovered these backdoors in a few simple audits.

The fact that he was able to find all of these is very worrisome to me. I can only imagine what other bugs/backdoors are built in to these systems.

Does any of this security matter with the fact that you can build weapons using airport giftshop items?

http://www.wired.com/2013/12/terminal-cornucopia/

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#63
post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> So you also want airlines to modify cabins to handle oversized carry-on luggage? No more so than they already do. See, I routinely travel with an acoustic guitar in a gig bag as my "personal item"; it fits in the overhead compartment. And when I don't have the big guitar I often carry a smaller "travel" guitar in a triangular case that is almost exactly the size and shape of a rifle case; they often let me hang tha…

I like your example about skydiving, but your reasoning is flawed. Hijacking a skydiving plane and crashing it into a building isn't likely to cause a lot of damage. More importantly, it's not likely to cause a lot of terror. The planes are relatively small, passengers are well equipped to simply jump out (therefore, no hostages), or some would happily make a fight of it, knowing they'd probably be safe getting out o…

It's true that some people jump out of tiny planes like a cessna but I was thinking of the larger ones like this:

http://www.skydivephiladelphia.com/wp-content/themes/asc/ima...

Even less than fully fueled that thing could put a pretty big hole in a building and the cockpit doesn't even HAVE a door separating it from the main cabin. Yes, it might prove tricky to take over a flight full of instructors and students in the air, but given that legitimate customers have easy access to the airfield at ground level before and after a jump and there's no real security there it's not hard to imagine ways a sufficiently motivated and unscrupulous person could take over such a plane at relatively minimal risk to themselves and weaponize it.

But yeah, that's just one of a zillion possible threats anybody with half a brain can come up with. The current airport security model assumes the existence of terrorists who have a really weird set of characteristics such that they are simultaneously:

(1) sufficiently driven and resourceful to successfully bring down a plane via a bomb or weapons if there were no security (this is pretty hard)

(2) NOT sufficiently driven and resourceful to find a way AROUND the current security measures (even though this is easy)

(3) also NOT sufficiently driven and resourceful as to find some OTHER way of causing a similar amount of terror and damage, such as blowing up 5 busses or funding a half-dozen "DC snipers" around the country or blowing up the security line itself.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#64
post #44
post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

one where people could just walk on openly carrying a rifle if they so desired So you also want airlines to modify cabins to handle oversized carry-on luggage? Nevertheless, the amount of people who would pay more to do this would not be commercially viable - you yourself state that cost is a significant factor for users. Keep in mind also that your security-free airline would have to have its own terminals, as its c…

> So you also want airlines to modify cabins to handle oversized carry-on luggage? No more so than they already do. See, I routinely travel with an acoustic guitar in a gig bag as my "personal item"; it fits in the overhead compartment. And when I don't have the big guitar I often carry a smaller "travel" guitar in a triangular case that is almost exactly the size and shape of a rifle case; they often let me hang tha…

What disturbs me is that you're arguing from the opposite extreme. Airport security does stop security threats - it raises the bar considerably. There's definitely an argument that current security is way over the top in the US, but the opposite extreme is even more silly. The moderate path is the way forward - it does not follow that all security measures are security theater.

All the arguments about 'what about blowing up trains/buses/whatever' also miss vital points - namely, that the passengers on a plane cannot escape, and small damage to a plane can doom it. This is not true of trains or buses. Combine this with the point that the public, rightly or wrongly, are more significantly affected by a plane crash, and it becomes clearer why planes are better targets for terrorism. Similarly, the demographic that uses planes are largely middle-class. Those who use public transport have a much larger proportion of working-class people on them, who have less political power, and the media also cares less about them.

You also still have to face the issue of running your own terminals, because any international airport has its sterile zone, which is connected to every other international airport in the world. Until you get them all accepting your citizenry carrying weaponry, your local international airport is going to keep its sterile zones. And running your own terminals is going to cost you more than $5 extra/ticket...

Because I trust that on average, by and large, my fellow passengers are competent and well-meaning people.

'On average' is the problem here. The general public includes all sorts of idiots, terrorist or otherwise. Anyone who's had a job facing the general public will be aware that there are plenty of people who fuck with you just because they can. Particularly in an enclosed environment where people sometimes get heavily inebriated.

And regarding the skydiving, light aircraft have only rarely been used for terrorism. The same is very much not true of heavy aircraft, which have a long track record of terrorism.

The specific threat that modern "airport security" is designed to stop is essentially nonexistent.

Ultimately, this is a chicken-and-egg problem. Hijacking has been made extremely difficult by the current measures, but even before 9/11, hijacking was much more difficult in the 90s than in the 70s due to increasing the bar for security. The threat is there, but higher security means you have to be better-resourced in order to defeat it.

Perhaps put another way: if there is actually no threat, then why do you say you'd feel safer if your fellow passengers were armed? Shouldn't you be saying it'd make no difference?

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#65
post #50

If this isn't the answer, and I'm not asserting it is or isn't. What is, and how do implement it. Or do you suggest if we scrap it all and go back to 1950's like airport security that the few incidents that are inevitable are an acceptable risk? I don't know the answer, but I'd like to have the conversation.

Yeah, all of this scrap-the-TSA talk makes me wonder how much people have flown internationally: in places I've been, security has been very similar to the TSA with minor variations. It seems like for every policy that had something a little less strict about it there was also something else it was a little more strict about: some care about liquids, some treat iPads as laptops, some make you remove your shoes. I've…

> Yeah, all of this scrap-the-TSA talk makes me wonder how much people have flown internationally: in places I've been, security has been very similar to the TSA with minor variations. It seems like for every policy that had something a little less strict about it there was also something else it was a littles more strict about: some care about liquids, some treat iPads as laptops, some make you remove your shoes.

In my experience when traveling to south asia, once I was outside the US, they didn't care about liquids or shoe removal. The security scan just involved sending one's bags through the scanner and going through a metal detector. On the way back, though, it was much like the US with the shoe removal, taking the liquids out of carry-on bags, etc.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#66
Typical. Government organizations think IT security means having strongly worded statements and reams of bureaucratic rules and procedures. If you look closely though the strong words often aren't backed by any meaningful action. In a government official's mind if the 50 page IT security document was filled out and is on file that means the system is secure. It's all a big joke really.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#67

It makes laugh a lot, 9/11 happen because they used cutter. Airport security will piss you off for a kid cissor. But they will let you buy a glass bottle of alcohol in duty free. That you can break properly and use as a weapon ... Logic ...

Do they let you carry that own or do they hold that until you get off the plane? The latter was my experience some years ago.

There are many shops in the sterile area of most airports that sell goods that could be readily transformed into weapons.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#68

It makes laugh a lot, 9/11 happen because they used cutter. Airport security will piss you off for a kid cissor. But they will let you buy a glass bottle of alcohol in duty free. That you can break properly and use as a weapon ... Logic ...

Relevant - This guy built a bunch of weapons from things you can buy in airport shops.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2513362/Man-builds-h...

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#69
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's a risk that an aircraft will be bombed in-flight, which doesn't require access to the cockpit. Before 9/11, such bombings were the primary security concern as hijackings usually resulted in a hostage situation. It'd probably be wise to keep explosives screening.

If you want to kill 300 people, you can just blow up five buses. It's much easier than trying to blow up a plane.

It doesn't have the same publicity quality, though. The groups that carry out these attacks do it for attention, and they're going to do whatever they can to maximize their press time. That results in worldwide publication of their message, often requiring their opposition to acknowledge and respond, and gives them outlet to advertise to potential new recruits. Airplane attacks and crashes get a lot more coverage than incidents involving similar loss of life due to the emotional factor of being isolated 35,000 feet in the sky, and that makes the cost involved in launching a more intricate attack on aircraft worthwhile.

You can try to run away from a bomb at a parking garage after the initial explosion and an ambulance will be there to check things out and rescue people pretty quickly. If you're in the plane when it gets attacked, you have no recourse and virtually no chance for survival, which is not usually the case when a ground target is bombed with conventional explosives. Even if you survive the actual ground impact (zero chance if an event happens at cruising altitude, small chance if it happens at a more reasonable altitude during takeoff/landing), there's no guarantee you'll be anywhere near civilization that can give medical help or attention. This makes the risk of an airborne attack much more frightening, since death is virtually guaranteed.

Passengers want a reasonable assurance that there's something more than chance protecting the flights they're boarding (and for whatever reason, they don't usually make the same types of demands from ground entities like parking garages or bus stops). That's why the airlines added their own security checkpoints in the 70s as hijackings became prominent. That's also the reason the TSA can exist at all. The TSA takes it too far, and we all acknowledge that some threats can't be screened out, but just going back to nothing isn't a plausible solution, at least not at first. There needs to be a more gradual transition if we're ever going to get there.

Re: Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security [pdf]

#70
post #53

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Just get rid of it. What currently exists is like something from a police state. It's evil, tyrannical, and will fail stop a future attack against the traveling public inside the United States. If this gross violation of liberty and due process must continue for legitimate reasons of public safety, because the consequence of projecting power abroad is being targeted for reprisal, then at least grant immunity for offe…

> But that will not happen, because the people who enable and profit from these checkpoints aren't subjected to them at all. Don't worry - you can pay ~$100 to have the privilege of being "randomly" selected for "reduced" screening (ie, pre-9/11, with a metal detector). Of course, this is certainly not random at all. I don't have a random sample, but based on what I can see, it's very unlikely that they actually sele…

I applied to - and was granted - the TSA Precheck clearance. Let's face it; it's $100 for five years. And the interview took well under an hour including waiting time. Works out to be an almost negligible increase in cost compared to the cost of the travel it covers.

The fingerprinting is a different issue.

Post reply on HN