31–40 of 170 posts
"Pulling the Curtain on Airport Security" - This article's title. Wow. Almost all airport security is a theater... The TSA are simply the actors...
"All the world's a ___"
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> if someone just drove a bomb into an airport. Which is exactly what the 2007 attack on Glasgow airport was.[1] All major airports in the UK now have limited access to the front of the terminal building (typically, buses and taxis only). Most now have a drop-off zone in the car park. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Glasgow_International_Air...
Does moving the "attack zone" make any sense? What if someone bombs the car park -- will the airport stop allowing personal cars into it? I know I'm not the first to say this sort of thing, and maybe it's cliche, but really, what is there to protect at the front of the terminal, that is not just as vulnerable now in the car park? (Edit: I recognize the poster I'm responding to hasn't necessarily endorsed the authorit…
If this isn't the answer, and I'm not asserting it is or isn't. What is, and how do implement it. Or do you suggest if we scrap it all and go back to 1950's like airport security that the few incidents that are inevitable are an acceptable risk? I don't know the answer, but I'd like to have the conversation.
I find it impossible to imagine any security threat to a flight where the passengers are packing and willing to defend themselves.
Doesn't this make flying exactly as dangerous as being in a crowd? For zero dollars?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why would the airlines have incentive to provide good-quality security? Terrorism events are rare and it seems unlikely that a reasonable amount of security infrastructure that the airline could provide would result in a substantial decrease in the probability that a sufficiently-motivated terrorist would be successful with an attack against that airline. I just can't imagine we would get anything more than the airli…
What airlines are doing now amounts precisely to "a large amount of security theatre to meet appearances for the customers and appease the local regulations." I want to decentralize for two reasons: (1) it removes single points of failure. For instance, post-911, airlines needed to GET PERMISSION to make changes such as strengthening the cockpit door or changing the protocol for opening it. Being more flexible means…
So you also want airlines to modify cabins to handle oversized carry-on luggage? Nevertheless, the amount of people who would pay more to do this would not be commercially viable - you yourself state that cost is a significant factor for users. Keep in mind also that your security-free airline would have to have its own terminals, as its customers wouldn't be able to mingle with existing airline customers.
Also, why would you pay more for an item that's better off in checked luggage anyway? It's not like you can use the rifle between luggage drop-off and pick-up, and it's irritatingly large to carry around a cabin. It sounds like sacrificing pragmatics for pointless idealism, to me.
Airport security will piss you off for a kid cissor.
But they will let you buy a glass bottle of alcohol in duty free.
That you can break properly and use as a weapon ...
Logic ...
I wish there was a transcript to go with these slides, or some context. It looks like an amazing talk. One thing that jumped out at me right away is that the explosives sniffer is also configured to detect narcotics, amphetamine and marijuana. Is this standard procedure at American domestic airports?
I wonder how the THC thing could possibly work. I opt out at every checkpoint, and each time, they maximize body contact and then generate an input to those machines. Wouldn't it go off for anyone who had smoked up earlier in the day, or the preceding day? It seems like they'd be spending all their time doing drug searches. (Don't get me wrong: drug searches at TSA checkpoints are extremely alarming, because TSA has…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why would the airlines have incentive to provide good-quality security? Terrorism events are rare and it seems unlikely that a reasonable amount of security infrastructure that the airline could provide would result in a substantial decrease in the probability that a sufficiently-motivated terrorist would be successful with an attack against that airline. I just can't imagine we would get anything more than the airli…
What airlines are doing now amounts precisely to "a large amount of security theatre to meet appearances for the customers and appease the local regulations." I want to decentralize for two reasons: (1) it removes single points of failure. For instance, post-911, airlines needed to GET PERMISSION to make changes such as strengthening the cockpit door or changing the protocol for opening it. Being more flexible means…
(1) A single agency can have within its mandate, expertise, and budget the security apparatus, which requires full-stack authority: airport design and administration, customs officials, airlines, planes, luggage, etc. The airlines can focus on the task they actually want to perform and are qualified to perform, whereas the one agency responsible for security can be audited and held accountable for that task as a unit.
(2) Customers cannot purchase less security. This is an advantage. It is nonsense for a customer to walk openly onto an aircraft carrying a rifle.
I think "airport security" has much less to do with passenger security than the risks inherent with allowing planes to fly through our skies. 9/11 is a clear example that many more people than the passengers of the flight can be affected via air-terrorism. This is why planes are controlled.
I'm not opposed to that control; I just marvel at how awful a job the U.S. government does at determing the cost/convenience/effectiveness tradeoffs. In my experience in the United States, this seems to be a systemic problem with governmentally-administered services that does not seem to exist so much in other governments.
There aren't many airlines, and I expect the overwhelming majority of consumers would consistently purchase the cheapest option. If airlines are the agency entrusted with safe flight, this makes everyone less safe. Rather, airport and flight security seems better serviced as an airport-surcharge or tax. What's missing is effective, accountable security provided by experts that we trust. I don't know why that isn't something we can solve.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Does moving the "attack zone" make any sense? What if someone bombs the car park -- will the airport stop allowing personal cars into it? I know I'm not the first to say this sort of thing, and maybe it's cliche, but really, what is there to protect at the front of the terminal, that is not just as vulnerable now in the car park? (Edit: I recognize the poster I'm responding to hasn't necessarily endorsed the authorit…
I assume the theory is that there will be less people in the car park then in the terminal.
Also, blowing up the front of the terminal has the potential to shut down airport operations much longer than a remote car park.
It makes laugh a lot, 9/11 happen because they used cutter. Airport security will piss you off for a kid cissor. But they will let you buy a glass bottle of alcohol in duty free. That you can break properly and use as a weapon ... Logic ...