Strengthening HTTP: A Personal View
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Re: Strengthening HTTP: A Personal View
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#4Also are those 1 or 2 (from what we know of) NSA employees still shaping crypto policy at IETF?
Re: Strengthening HTTP: A Personal View
#5Re: Strengthening HTTP: A Personal View
#6I hate this new HTTP. They seem to have taken a beautifully simple concept and added so much complexity it's ugly and horrible and awful.
HTTP 1.1 is relatively simple, but it's also a bottleneck.
Re: Strengthening HTTP: A Personal View
#7Myself, I like the idea of opportunistic encryption. Why not require TLS for HTTP/2 but don't require authentication for http:// URLs?
Re: Strengthening HTTP: A Personal View
#8I recognize that getting consensus is hard work, but I don't think creating another encryption-optional protocol and letting vendors duke it over security is going to end well for the users.
HTTP is a deployed protocol with lots of existing
stakeholders, like proxy vendors, network operators,
corporate firewalls and so on. Requiring encryption
with HTTP/2 means that these stakeholders get
disenfranchised.
I'd like to hear the arguments of the potentially-disenfranchised stakeholders first hand. Is it mainly because it makes it harder to sell or use products that allow traffic snooping?Re: Strengthening HTTP: A Personal View
#9It's disappointing to hear that the idea of requiring TLS with HTTP/2 has lost traction. For me, TLS-everywhere was the carrot on the stick. I recognize that getting consensus is hard work, but I don't think creating another encryption-optional protocol and letting vendors duke it over security is going to end well for the users. HTTP is a deployed protocol with lots of existing stakeholders, like proxy vendors, netw…
Re: Strengthening HTTP: A Personal View
#10Myself, I like the idea of opportunistic encryption. Why not require TLS for HTTP/2 but don't require authentication for http:// URLs?
It's hard to see what benefit that would offer. Non-authenticated TLS is trivially vulnerable to MITM attacks. This is especially the case because I can't foresee a situation in which a website would put the effort in to implement opportunistic TLS, but not implement straightforward authenticated HTTPS…