Earlier quoted context omitted.
How is it a good thing to fall back to non sufficient security? The only good fallback is falling back to crash and clean up. If libressl can't find enough entropy then it should give up on it.
I won't argue that point since I generally agree, but ask yourself this: 0. sshd will fork() and chroot() into /var/empty. After the fork(), you can't use the entropy you have because it's shared with the parent (i.e., it's not "entropic"). 1. Where should it get entropy from? 2. Where does OpenSSL get entropy from in this case? Anyway, I don't even work on portable libressl because I don't want to deal with shit lik…
I really think that LibreSSL's RAND_poll() should have similar behavior to ensure maximum compatibility with OpenSSL and to provide a means to use chroot() safely without the risk of falling back to the "bobo" code. (Also, a means of safely reseeding after a fork on systems without minherit(MAP_INHERIT_ZERO)).
(Incidentally, libsodium has a similar API: you can explicitly call randombytes_stir() to cause the library to open (and keep open) a file descriptor to /dev/urandom, so subsequent calls to the PRNG work in a chroot.)