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But why can't I send people their passwords?

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Re: But why can't I send people their passwords?

#71
post #66

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You'd be giving the attacker the keys to the kingdom. No, the people who use a common password gave out the keys. There is simply no excusing it. The apologism for it has to stop. NEVER use the same password across multiple services. If one service gets compromised, the extent of their culpability is their own service. Anyone whose password exposes other things was the cause of their own demise. EDIT: I will not back…

I'm not going to presume to know anything about you, but as soon as your system interfaces with human beings, your system needs to adapt to human nature. You can't say "there's no excusing it" and "cause of their own demise". Humans act as humans tend to do - why should the security of your system rely on humans changing their natural behavior?

You can't say "there's no excusing it" and "cause of their own demise".

Yes, you absolutely can and should say that. This isn't human nature, but is simply accepted and defended behavior that gets caught out again, and again, and again. I have absolutely no doubt that many visitors to HN are guilty of this, and instead of confronting the reality of their insecurity, pretend it's someone else's fault.

Each time some random, irrelevant message board has a password exploit, everyone who should know better rushes forth to pillorize the operator because of the greater danger, yet the operator may have been sharing those passwords on the black market for time eternal. The operator may have been putting their plaintext backups on a compromised FTP site for years. They may have engaged endless contractors who made their own backups and are busy buying stuff on Amazon for it.

But instead we argue pretend security measures, when the horses have not only bolted, they're several states away.

It is complete idiocy to use passwords across services. Utter insanity. It is the worst possible practice imaginable, and is never, ever excusable.

If you used the same password across sites, you simply must assume that since day one it has been compromised, and it is your own doing.

But here we excuse it. And then, in excusing it and defending it and supporting it, claim that it's "human nature". It isn't human nature at all.

How To Hack 60% of Hacker News: Create a service requiring users to create logins, submitting it as a show HN. Harvest email/passwords from very foolish people and enjoy their access everywhere else.

Re: But why can't I send people their passwords?

#73
post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You shouldn't send the password because you shouldn't be storing the password. Worries about email security, etc. are secondary.

Yeah, I was surprised to see that this bit wasn't mentioned anywhere. If you are emailing someone their password in plaintext, that means you know their password in plaintext -- which you should not.

You do when they first create it.

Re: But why can't I send people their passwords?

#74
post #5

> 7. Fine, but I still get to send users their passwords once they created them so they don’t forget them, right? Email is not a secure medium. It was never designed to be one. It’s susceptible to Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks and a slew of other issues. Also, users might have their email accounts abused or hacked into (how many people do you know who have left their GMail logged in on a public computer?). Would y…

Gmail should make you type your password again in order to open password-reset emails sent by other services.

This would close the "I accidentally left my account logged in" hole.

Re: But why can't I send people their passwords?

#75
Your non-devs FAQ is still not quite informative. You still don't explain to laymen /why/ what the sites are doing is wrong, you just say "You should never see your password".

edit:

Maybe something along the lines of:

> Modern cryptography allows websites to save passwords in a form that is un-decryptable even to the site itself. This works because to check the validity of logins, the unencrypted (plain) version of the password is never needed. The fact that a site stores the password in a decryptable format and decrypts it to show it to you means that an attacker could potentially decrypt the password in the exact same way. Or even worse, maybe they never encrypt it in the first place! This potentially compromises the safety of the password you use because it lets an attacker steal your password.

Re: But why can't I send people their passwords?

#76
post #5

> 7. Fine, but I still get to send users their passwords once they created them so they don’t forget them, right? Email is not a secure medium. It was never designed to be one. It’s susceptible to Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks and a slew of other issues. Also, users might have their email accounts abused or hacked into (how many people do you know who have left their GMail logged in on a public computer?). Would y…

Gmail should make you type your password again in order to open password-reset emails sent by other services. This would close the "I accidentally left my account logged in" hole.

The "log in again to do something secure" is a rabbit hole, where suddenly you have to log in again to do anything it all. It could become a login nightmare.

Re: But why can't I send people their passwords?

#77
post #35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There was a discussion here a while back on this matter, where I held very much the same position as you. The other guy convincingly proved that adding the "must use at least one each of these character classes" barely reduces the password space, while promoting increased password complexity for those people who would pick the _really_ easy ones.

What if I want my password to be "one small step for man one giant leap for mankind" (or something less known)? Do I really have to put a dollar in that to make it secure? Teach good password hygiene. Use keepassx. Use decentralized third party authentication with providers that know what they are doing and use 2FA and such! But password restrictions achieve very little. Let people use their 12345 if they really want…

Well the other part of weak passwords is for many websites the users care less about account security then the website operator.

There are many sites which contain none of my personal info but I have to setup an account just to view website content. If my account gets hijacked, it might be used for spamming. But still If I could make a throwaway account with a blank password I would because I don't care about that accounts security. So surely some restrictions need to be in place if you're going to require signups.

Re: But why can't I send people their passwords?

#78
post #45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You shouldn't send the password because you shouldn't be storing the password. Worries about email security, etc. are secondary.

Yeah, I was surprised to see that this bit wasn't mentioned anywhere. If you are emailing someone their password in plaintext, that means you know their password in plaintext -- which you should not.

That's not quite true, most random web services send out the welcome email from the same page that just hashed your password so during email creation they still have the plaintext copy around even though it dies after the request ends.

Re: But why can't I send people their passwords?

#79
Creating an FAQ for these companies would be useful.

Something to arm the devs who work at these places with something when they go to management who's reaction is "yeah I know it's bad.. but... like, we have important shit to do."

Re: But why can't I send people their passwords?

#80
Our healthcare provider is storing passwords in plain text. When I went in for my health screening, they had everyone's forms printed out, with our passwords written on sticky notes attached to the front. Hundreds of people's health data, wide open for the taking. I was beyond pissed. Then I found out that they don't use ssl on their service, and the passsword can be retrieved at the click of a button. Ended up speaking with a C-level about it. Her response was that they are perfectly within HIPAA compliance, and that she would have to talk to their CTO about any other problems with their data security. Looking at the HIPAA, I have to say, it's not very clear on the need for hashing passwords. Still, I reminded her of the massive liability they are opening themselves to. She promised to get back in touch with me, but I haven't heard anything since (imagine that).
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